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ABSTRACT 
Since  the  recognition  (DSM-IV;  American  Psychiatric  Association,  1994)  of 
life-threatening illnesses as a stressor that can precipitate posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), research has focussed on the issue of PTSD following cancer. Although the 
utility of a trauma framework has been questioned, understanding symptoms associated 
with PTSD such as intrusive cognitions may be critical in understanding psychological 
distress in cancer patients. Research has found that cancer patients experience negative 
intrusive thoughts, which are associated with marked distress. However, studies have 
rarely  explored  the  content  or  nature  of  intrusions.  In  addition  to  verbal  intrusions, 
intrusive  memories  of  illness  have  been  reported  in  cancer  patients.  More  recently, 
intrusive imagery has been found in populations of anxious patients and reported to 
have a causal role in the maintenance of anxiety. Based on the recognition of cancer as a 
protracted experience involving multiple stressors, future-oriented visual intrusions, as 
well as intrusive memories and thoughts may play a role in psychological functioning. 
Chapter 1 is an overview of the literature assessing the presence of posttraumatic 
stress  and  posttraumatic  stress  symptoms  in  cancer  patients.  Chapter  2  is  a  cross-
sectional  study  which  showed  that  anxious  prostate  cancer  patients  (N=65)  were 
significantly  more  likely  to  report  intrusive  cognitions  compared  to  matched  non-
anxious  (N=65)  prostate  cancer  patients.  Intrusive  cognitions  were  frequent, 
uncontrollable  and  associated  with  significant  distress  and  maladaptive  adjustment. 
Chapter 3 is a cross-sectional study (N=139), which showed that factors such as how 
patients  appraise  intrusive  cognitions  affects  anxiety  severity  and  intrusion-related 
distress, after controlling for intrusion frequency. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the 
use of imagery in psychological therapy and how imagery has been used with cancer 
patients  in  therapy.  Chapter  5  presents  two  single-case  studies  of  cancer  patients 
completing a short therapy for anxiety, imagery rescripting, aimed at reducing negative 
properties of intrusive cognitions whilst also alleviating anxiety and depression. The 
final chapter provides a general discussion of the thesis and presents ideas for future 
research. 
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Recent research in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety 
has emphasised an important role of intrusive cognitions and avoidance in the elicitation 
and maintenance of psychological disorders and distress. The current review aims to 
investigate whether theoretical models and experimental findings within the existing 
literature can be effectively applied to the traumatic experience of being diagnosed and 
coping  with  cancer.  In  order  to  achieve  this,  PTSD  theories  and  definitions  are 
described and previous research applying these conceptual issues to patients with cancer 
are  discussed.  Limitations  of  the  research  conducted  so  far  are  covered  in  order  to 
highlight the next important steps in elucidating the value of applying PTSD models and 
intrusion research to the experience of cancer.  
1.1.  Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD): Theory 
and definitions  
Before describing work concerning PTSD and cancer (see Kangas, Henry, & 
Bryant,  2002  for  a  review)  and  intrusive  thoughts  and  cancer,  it  is  important  to 
summarise relevant stress response models and PTSD theories. In order to meet PTSD 
criteria, individuals must have been exposed to, or witnessed a traumatic event which 
invoked intense fear and helplessness, experience intrusive memories, nightmares and a 
sense  of  reliving  the  event,  experience  avoidant  symptoms  (e.g.  inability  to  recall 
trauma,  avoidance  of  thoughts),  and  experience  arousal  symptoms  (e.g.  insomnia, 
irritability). These symptoms must be present for at least one month following trauma 
and must cause significant impairment to daily functioning for the individual (DSM IV: 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
Although  there  are  several  cognitive  and  information  processing  theories  of 
PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 2001; Brewin & Holmes, 2003), 
the present discussion uses Brewin et al’s (1996,2001) dual representation theory as a 
framework and also discusses Horowitz’s stress response syndromes model (Horowitz, 
1986), which has previously been applied to the PTSD literature  (e.g. Gurevich et al., 
2004; Manne, Glassman, & Du Hamel, 2000) and precedes dual representation theory 
of PTSD. Ehlers & Clarks’ more recent synthesis of PTSD models is also considered 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
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Table 1 Conceptualisation of intrusive cognitions used in present research  
Type of intrusion  Definition 
Memory  Intrusive memories (in pictorial/ visual form) of a specific event 
that has occurred in the past  
Thought   Intrusive thoughts can relate to the past, present or future but are 
in verbal form (“like a silent conversation in your head”; (Nelson 
& Harvey, 2003) 
Image  Images  in  general  have  been  defined  as  mental  contents  that 
possess sensory qualities (Horowitz, 1970).  For the present study, 
intrusive images refer to pictures in the mind concerning the past 
present or future but past images are distinguished from memories 
because  they  lack  autobiographical  context  and  have  been 
described as an “abstracted essence of the memory” (Hackmann, 
Clark, & McManus, 2000, p605). 
 
Horowitz’s stress response theory (Horowitz, 1986) suggested that symptoms 
associated with PTSD, namely intrusive cognitions may exist due to the requirement for 
integration of experience into current schemata. Intrusive cognitions can be defined as 
mental phenomenon that repeatedly intrude into our minds and interrupt ongoing mental 
activity.  They  are  difficult  to  control  and  can  be  attributed  to  an  internal  origin 
(Rachman,  1981).  Other  key  properties  of  intrusive  cognitions  are  that  they  easily 
capture attentional resources and are associated with negative affect (Clark & Rhyno, 
2005).  Table  1  provides  a  more  detailed  conceptualisation  of  intrusive  cognitions 
adopted for the present research. After an initial trauma, Horowitz (1986) argued that 
there is information overload, in which thoughts, memories and images from the trauma 
cannot be integrated with current schemata. In defence, psychological mechanisms exist 
which try to numb the experience of the trauma. However, the tendency for completion 
(i.e. need to accommodate new information) means that cognitions automatically and 
uncontrollably break through the numbing system and intrude into consciousness in the 
form of intrusive cognitions, including memories of the event, thoughts and images. 
Such intrusions may be adaptive in aiding completion of processing, but if information 
processing  continues  to  fail,  (by  continued  inadequate  integration  of  the  trauma 
experience), individuals may experience chronic stress response reactions that require 
psychological treatments. Horowitz’s model (1986) is especially relevant to the present   12 
discussion, because the widely used scale, the Impact of Events Scale (IES: Horowitz, 
Wilner,  &  Alvarez,  1979)  was  developed  to  reflect  the  conceptualisation  of  stress 
response  following  trauma  and  has  been  consistently  used  in    cancer  research  (see 
section Intrusive thoughts and Cancer, p29).  
However, dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin & 
Holmes,  2003)  argued  that  although  Horowitz  provided  a  comprehensive  model  of 
stress response syndromes, there are several limitations of the approach. For example, 
Horowitz failed to explain the nature of existing schemata structures and the precise 
ways that integration of information fails. In particular, stress response theory does not 
address the differences between flashbacks and ordinary memories of trauma. Although 
the model emphasised the importance of processes such as social support, there is little 
explanation as to how these environmental processes operate. The model is also passive 
and therefore excludes the importance of individual subjective interpretation of stressful 
events.  
Brewin  et  al  (1996)  addressed  these  limitations  by  incorporating  increased 
explanatory  value  into  PTSD  theory.  In  particular,  dual  representation  theory 
distinguished between two different memory representations, one verbally accessible 
and one automatically accessible via significant situational cues. Verbally accessible 
memories  (VAMs)  about  trauma  refer  to  a  person’s  conscious  experiences,  such  as 
sensory features of the trauma, emotional and physiological reactions to the trauma and 
perceived  meaning,  which  are  controlled,  deliberately  retrievable  and  easily  edited. 
VAMs interact with autobiographical knowledge and are thus represented in a personal 
context reflecting past, present and future. Although these representations are available 
for  verbal  communication,  the  information  that  these  representations  contain  are 
restricted  due  to  the  involvement  of  limited  capacity  resources  such  as  attention 
(Brewin, 2001).  
On the other hand, situationally accessible memories (SAMs) refer to traumatic 
knowledge  that  is  not  consciously  accessible,  but  has  been  processed  at  a  lower 
perceptual  level  (e.g.  visuospatial  information  that  has  received  little  conscious 
processing).  These  affect-laden  representations  are  automatically  triggered  by 
contextual internal and external cues (e.g. consciously thinking about the trauma and 
hearing about the trauma from an external source) and are associated with emotions 
such as fear and helplessness, that were felt during the trauma, rather than later (as in 
the case of VAMs). SAMs are considered to be informationally encapsulated, so that   13 
they  do  not  necessarily  interact  with  general  autobiographical  knowledge  (Brewin, 
2001). 
 In addition to having different characteristics, and behaving in different ways, 
these two types of memory systems have different neural bases and respond to different 
types of treatment (Brewin, 2001). Based on neuroanatomical data of fear responses 
(e.g. LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti, & Reis, 1988), and the distinction/ dissociation between 
declarative    (e.g.  explicit,  conscious)  and    non-declarative  (e.g.  implicit,  automatic, 
outside  of  conscious  recall)  memory  (Gabrieli,  Fleischman,  Keane,  Reminger,  & 
Morrell,  1995),  Brewin  (2001)  argued  that  it  may  be  possible  to  infer  that  the  two 
memory representations described in dual representation theory may be processed in 
different  ways  within  the  brain.  For  example,  it  is  suggested  that  the  hippocampus 
(which  has  been  implicated  in  the  processing  of  declarative  memory),  may  be 
responsible for the development of integrated representations of conscious experience, 
whereas different routes to the  amygdala (e.g. the thalamo-amygdala route) may  be 
responsible for information that is processed at a lower level and without conscious 
awareness or possibility for deliberate recall. Memories formed by less sophisticated 
routes in the brain may be automatically triggered by cues, such as perceptual cues 
central to original processing.  
Functional neuroimaging studies have found several trends in neural correlates 
of PTSD, including decreased medial prefrontal cortex activation, increased amygdala 
activation  and  decreased  hippocampal  activity  in  PTSD  patients  during  symptom 
provocation  (Hull,  2002;  Francati,  Vermetten,  &  Bremner,  2007).  Symptom 
provocation or “script-driven imagery” is where PTSD patients are exposed to scripts or 
images of their trauma that they have previously provided and asked to vividly imagine 
the events as they are played (Brewin, 2007). Francati et al (2007) explained that the 
medial prefrontal cortex activates and modulates the initial threat response, but when 
activation  is  absent  or  depleted,  the  amygdala  does  not  receive  adequate  inhibitory 
feedback,  resulting  in  higher  autonomic  arousal  found  in  PTSD  patients.  Higher 
amygdala  activation  is  responsible  for  increased  fear  conditioning,  sensitisation  and 
trauma memories in PTSD patients (Elzinga & Bremner, 2002). Other consequences of 
decreased  prefrontal  cortex  activation  include  decreased  working  memory  capacity, 
decreased  inhibition  of  emotions  and  increased  intrusive  cognitions  (Elzinga  & 
Bremner, 2002). Altered functional activity in the hippocampus is linked to decreased   14 
declarative memory, increased fragmentation of memories and trauma-related amnesia 
(Elzinga & Bremner, 2002).  
Using Positron Emission Tomography (PET), Bremner et al (2004) found that 
women who had PTSD as a result of sexual abuse exhibited less anterior cingulate 
activation  during  an  emotional  stroop  task  requiring  trauma-related  processing 
compared to victims without PTSD. The anterior cingulate has been implicated in brain 
function associated with the medial prefrontal cortex which consists of several other 
related areas including the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior prefrontal cortex (Bremner 
et al., 2004). Their function is to mediate the extinction of fear response, which in PTSD 
is  disrupted  and  results  in  SAMs  (i.e.  intrusive  imagery).  It  has  been  argued  that 
emotional  stroop  studies  have  provided  evidence  consistent  with  reports  of  trauma-
related intrusive thoughts, as despite instructions to attend to word colour, the meaning 
of trauma-related words intrude, capture attention and slow colour naming (McNally, 
2006).  
In  terms  of  adequate  trauma  processing,  dual  representation  theory  (Brewin, 
2001)  argued  that  the  activation  of  highly  accessible  and  automatic  SAMs  initially 
functions  to  aid  the  process  of  cognitive  processing  of  the  trauma  experience,  by 
transferring  information  from  the  non-hippocampally  dependent  SAM  store  to  the 
hippocampally-based  VAM  store.  Adequate  trauma  processing  would  involve  the 
integration and assimilation of information in SAM form, to information in VAM form. 
If this processing is successful, the individual is relieved from a sense of immediate 
threat and the trauma experience is placed within a complete and elaborated personal 
context.  In  order  for  trauma  processing  to  occur  and  amygdala  inhibition  to  be 
successful,  Brewin (2001) argued that repeated flashbacks and “hotspots” of the trauma 
may be necessary, due to limited processing resources of the VAM system. . 
According  to  dual  representation  theory  (Brewin  et  al,  1996),  maladaptive 
coping strategies, such as sustained avoidance of both SAMs and VAMs can result in 
“chronic  emotional  processing”  and  “premature  inhibition  of  processing”  (p  679). 
Chronic emotional processing may occur when integration is not possible, due to the 
severity or length of trauma exposure. If VAMs and SAMs are chronically processed, 
memories  may  not  be  integrated  and  thus  individuals  will  continue  to  experience 
negative intrusive memories, with little change to existing representations (Brewin et al, 
1996). Further, chronic processing is linked to over-accommodation (Brewin, 2001), in 
which a person generalises their reaction to the specific trauma to a variety of other   15 
harmless situations which also have the potential to trigger cognitions related to trauma 
and thus a sense of current danger. Premature inhibition processing is another possible 
outcome following trauma, where active emotional processing is stopped, or restricted 
to a minimised and potentially distorted version of events (Brewin, 2001). Rather than 
over-accommodation, premature inhibition may result in over-assimilation, where these 
existing  knowledge  structures  are  maintained  and  not  integrated  with  VAMs  and 
autobiographical knowledge.  
Evidence for a distinction in memory systems, and the importance of the visual 
system  in  trauma  processing  has  come  from  research  investigating  the  effects  of 
distracter  tasks  on  desensitization  to  emotive  memories  (Andrade,  Kavanagh,  & 
Baddeley,  1997;  Kavanagh,  Freese,  Andrade,  &  May,  2001).  Andrade  et  al  (1997) 
found that participants reported less vivid negative images when concurrently engaging 
in visuospatial tasks involving eye movements,  such as identifying a particular letter on 
a computer screen, but not when engaging in a task involving another component of 
working  memory,  the  phonological  loop  (e.g.  counting).  It  was  suggested  that  the 
reduction in imagery vividness was due to the disruption of the visuospatial sketch pad 
(a component of working memory used to process visual information) and that such 
distraction could aid treatment of PTSD.  
Kavanagh et al (2001) provided further support for the finding that competing 
visuospatial  tasks  have  a  potential  role  in  therapy.  In  a  within  subjects  design,  18 
participants were initially asked to recall three situations in which they were happy (e.g. 
meeting romantic partners) and three situations in which they were fearful or distressed 
(e.g.  illness  or  death  or  family  of  friends).  Participants  were  required  to  rate  these 
images at baseline, for vividness (ranging from 0 = no image at all to 10 = perfectly 
clear, as vivid as normal vision) and emotional response (ranging from -10 extremely 
negative  to  +10  extremely  positive).  Participants  then  completed  three  distracter 
(visuospatial) task conditions, including eye movement, visual noise and exposure alone 
(control) in order to assess the effects of concurrent eye movements on the distress 
associated with repeated exposure to emotive memories. Kavanagh et al (2001) found 
that  when  participants  engaged  in  rapid  eye  movements  while  creating  images  of 
emotive experiences, the subjective vividness of the image was reduced and participants 
reported less extreme emotion than when recalling an image without a concurrent task. 
The  application  of  distracter  techniques  to  reduce  distress  in  patients  could  be 
appropriate both within and outside the therapy environment. For example, distressing   16 
images of the trauma could be made easier to confront and process if vividness and 
associated  negative  emotional  response  were  reduced  and  further,  patients  could  be 
helped  to  control  intrusive  images  outside  of  the  therapy  session  (Kavanagh  et  al., 
2001). A recent study has replicated the finding that concurrent rapid eye movements 
reduced  vividness  and  emotional  intensity  of  visual  images  (Kemps  &  Tiggemann, 
2007).   
Whilst  investigating  the  appropriateness  of  dual  representation  theory  for 
understanding PTSD, Brewin & colleagues (e.g. Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004) 
have   provided support  for the importance of the visuospatial sketchpad for trauma 
processing.  Holmes  et  al  (2004)  investigated  traumatic  processing  in  a  non-clinical 
population asked to view traumatic films of road traffic accidents, including images of 
trapped victims, dead bodies and body parts among car wreckages. They showed that 
competition from one specific kind of distraction task (visuospatial tapping task), while 
watching a traumatic film significantly reduced the extent to which distressing images 
from the film intruded in the following week but other kinds of distraction task actually 
increased  the  intrusions  (e.g.  counting  backwards  in  threes).  The  findings  were 
explained  using  dual  representation  theory’s  conceptualisation  of  memory  as  two 
distinct systems, verbal (VAMs) and visual (SAMs). Visuospatial tapping tasks may 
reduce SAM representations, as they compete for the same resources, culminating in a 
reduction  of  intrusive  images  over  the  following  week.  Conversely,  competition  for 
verbal  processing  resources  may  impoverish  VAM  representations  and  reduce  their 
ability to suppress SAMs in the following week. Subsequent research replicated the 
disruptive effects of a concurrent visuospatial task on intrusive images using a within-
subjects design and an alternative task, moulding plasticine (Stuart, Holmes, & Brewin, 
2006).  
Other  research  with  PTSD  patients  supported  these  findings.  Hellawell  & 
Brewin (2002) found that PTSD patients performed less well on specific tasks when 
they were interrupted during narratives of intrusive vivid images and asked to complete 
a visuospatial task (trail-making) compared to a verbal task (counting backwards in 
threes).  This  same  disruption  to  performance  was  not  found  when  patients  were 
interrupted  during  a  narrative  of  ordinary  autobiographical  memories  (Hellawell  & 
Brewin, 2002). A comparison of flashbacks and ordinary autobiographical memories 
found  a  greater  number  of  sensory  and  motion  words  associated  with  involuntary   17 
compared to voluntary memories (Hellawell & Brewin, 2004), providing further support 
for their independence (Brewin, 2007).  
Other  models  of  PTSD,  such  as  the  cognitive  model,  also  emphasised  the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory systems (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
According to Ehlers & Clark (2000), the nature of traumatic memories is influenced by 
encoding  processes  including  conceptual  encoding  and  data-driven  encoding. 
Conceptual encoding is focused on meaning and contextualising the traumatic event 
which facilitates integration of trauma information with the autobiographical memory 
system. Data-driven processing, on the other hand, is focussed on sensory stimuli and 
leads to memories that are hard to retrieve deliberately. Resulting intrusive memories 
are visual, uncontrollable, lack elaboration and contextualisation and are accompanied 
by physical and emotional sensations experienced during the actual event. Individuals 
thus experience a sense of reliving, as though the event were happening all over again, 
right now. A wide variety of cues may trigger the experience of intrusive memories, 
including cues that are temporally (e.g. spatial, olfactory cues), rather than semantically 
associated with the event.  
The experience of repetitive intrusive memories, and the negative appraisal of 
these memories, is thought to contribute to the persistence of PTSD. The formation of 
intrusive memories is explained within the dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin 
et  al,  1996),  where  inadequate  processing  of  the  initial  trauma  and  subsequent 
maladaptive  behaviour  (e.g.  suppression,  rumination,  avoidance)  in  response  to 
intrusive  memories,  leads  to  their  formation  and  persistence.  Other  problems  in 
persistent PTSD include the strength of associations between stimulus-stimulus (S-S) 
and  stimulus-response  (S-R)  and  the  lowered  perceptual  threshold  for  temporally 
associated  stimuli.  S-S  and  S-R  associations  may  develop  between  stimuli  present 
shortly  before  or  during  the  trauma  and  the  feeling  of  current  danger  and  these 
associations may not be consciously accessible and thus trigger intrusive recollections 
unexpectedly.  Lowered perceptual threshold refers to a form of implicit memory, where 
stimuli  that  are  temporally  associated  with  the  trauma  trigger  traumatic  memories 
because they are more likely to be noticed (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
 Ehlers & Clark (2000) suggested that a sense of current threat is crucial for 
PTSD  to  develop  and  there  are  two  possible  ways  that  current  threat  is  realised; 
individual differences in appraisal of trauma and individual differences in the nature of 
memory of the event. Strategies intended to avoid current threat paradoxically lead to   18 
feelings  of  current  danger  because  of  subsequent  negative  appraisal  of  trauma  and 
poorly processed memories of trauma. Negative appraisal of trauma include the inability 
to see the event as time-limited, over-generalisation of event to other neutral activities 
and the appraisal of self as someone that bad things happen to. In addition to negative 
appraisal of the traumatic event, idiosyncratic appraisals of subsequent stress responses 
may also contribute to the persistence of PTSD. For example, patients may interpret 
flashbacks and intrusive recollections as a sign they are going mad, and high arousal 
(e.g. irritability) as a sign that their personality has fundamentally changed or they can 
no longer relate to close family and friends. Individuals may also negatively appraise 
other people’s reactions, for example, positive reactions as a sign that they are unable to 
cope on their own, or negative reactions as a sign that nobody is there to support them. 
Steil & Ehlers (2000) described negative self-appraisals as a frame of  mind termed 
“mental defeat” and suggest that it is a risk factor for negative appraisal of trauma and 
trauma-related factors and thus ultimately a risk factor for the feeling of current threat 
and ensuing maintenance of PTSD (Steil & Ehlers, 2000).  
The  psychological  treatment  of  PTSD  aims  to  address  two  elements  of  the 
experienced trauma; repeated exposure to traumatic information to aid integration and 
modification  of  maladaptive  beliefs  developed  from  inadequate  processing  (Brewin, 
2001). Thus therapy may involve acting upon different types of memory representation, 
using  therapeutic  techniques  such  as  reliving  (Foa,  Rothbaum,  Riggs,  &  Murdock, 
1991)  and  eye  movement  desensitisation  and  reprocessing  (EMDR;  Shapiro,  2001). 
Reliving involves confronting flashbacks, rather than avoiding them, so that information 
in the SAM becomes recoded in the VAM and given a temporal context. After repeated 
sessions, information in SAM may be matched with information in the VAM, which 
indicates that immediate threat is not imminent, but rather, located in the past. In terms 
of neural activity, Brewin (2001) suggested that when the VAM system is activated, 
inhibitory  pathways  from  the  prefrontal  cortex  prevent  inappropriate  amygdala 
activation and the accompanying feelings of fear. EMDR is a method where individuals 
are asked to visualise the worst moments of trauma whilst holding a negative cognition 
concerning the trauma and attending to a concurrent stimulus such as the therapist’s 
finger movement in front of the face at the same time. Patient’s attempts to distance 
themselves from the trauma and associated cognitions allows for more thoughts and 
images to be integrated and processed (Brewin, 2001).    19 
In contrast to other contemporary theories of PTSD (Brewin & Holmes, 2003), 
dual  representation  theory  does  not  assume  that  trauma  memories  are  extinguished 
altogether but can be contextualised and incorporated into a more complex framework. 
In particular, Brewin (2006) suggested that recovery is seen as introducing retrieval 
competition  between  new  and  old  memories,  where  new  trauma  memories  are 
developed during therapy and are given a retrieval advantage because the new memories 
are well rehearsed  and  distinctive (Brewin  &  Holmes, 2003). Therapies for patients 
experiencing  traumatic  intrusive  memories  include  imagery  rescripting  (Hackmann, 
1998; Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007) which involves developing a competing image 
which has strong associations to the negative image, will effectively compete with the 
distressing image and involves positive affect and less toxic meaning (Wheatley et al., 
2007).  It is important to recognise that in this account, SAM memories remain intact 
and can still be retrieved with the right set of cues. However, therapy aims to reduce the 
possibility of negative intrusive memories winning the retrieval competition (Brewin, 
2006).  
In summary, PTSD is caused by the onset of  an extreme stressor  and  has a 
complex aetiology with core symptoms of intrusion (e.g. flashbacks), avoidance and 
arousal (e.g. hyperresponsivity). Theories of PTSD development and maintenance posit 
the presence of two distinct memory systems which are central to understanding the 
disorder.  Therapies  aimed  at  alleviating  PTSD  symptoms  focus  on  exposure  and 
integration of the trauma and modification of maladaptive beliefs and appraisals in order 
to aid inadequate processing.  
1.2.  PTSD and cancer  
1.2.1. Incidence of cancer-related PTSD  
Psychological trauma is caused by events that are sudden, unexpected and which 
the  individual  perceives  as  a  dramatic  loss  of  personal  control  and  personal  safety 
(Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Cancer can be encompassed within this definition (Brennan, 
2001) because such an extreme life event threatens core assumptions about the world 
including the belief that a) the world is benevolent; b) the world is meaningful and c) 
the  self  is  worthy  (Janoff-Bulman,  1992).  Since  the  introduction  of  life-threatening 
illness as a potential PTSD stressor in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders  (DSM-IV;  APA,  1994),  the  application  of  posttraumatic  stress  disorder   20 
models to the cancer experience has been the focus of considerable research interest 
(Kangas et al., 2002). In terms of dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin et al., 
1996), individuals diagnosed with cancer may be at risk of developing  pathological 
stress response symptoms due to a potentially severe and prolonged stressor. Individuals 
diagnosed  with  cancer  may  have  existing  assumptions  about  health  and  well-being 
violated  and  struggle  to  incorporate  new,  traumatic  information  into  pre-existing 
schemata.  Indeed, the types of events that Brewin et al (1996) included within their 
trauma framework involve signals that the world is unpredictable and uncontrollable 
and includes “major illness or disability” (p675). Kangas et al (2002) also noted that 
denial as part of the response process may represent the avoidance aspect of models of 
PTSD and further inhibit emotional processing via maladaptive information integration.  
Prevalence  rates  for  cancer-related  PTSD  vary  according  to  when  and  how 
PTSD  is  assessed.  For  studies  using  the  Structured  Clinical  Interview  for  DSM-IV 
(SCID; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 2002), estimates of current PTSD vary from 
0  (Mundy  et  al.,  2000)  to  6%  (Andrykowski,  Cordova,  Studts,  &  Miller,  1998). 
Participants had been diagnosed with breast cancer and were assessed 12 months post-
treatment, 6-72 months post-treatment respectively. A study investigating PTSD in a 
sample  of  breast  cancer  patients  3-15  months  post-surgery  reported  prevalence  of 
current cancer-related PTSD at 3.9%, also using the SCID (Matsuoka et al., 2005) and 
2.4% of post-surgery breast cancer patients (N=127)  met criteria for cancer-related 
PTSD (Mehnert & Koch, 2007).  
Other measures of PTSD include the PTSD Civilian Version Checklist (PCL-C: 
Weathers,  Huska,  &  Keane,  1991),  which  is  a  17  item  inventory  of  PTSD 
symptomatology,  including  measures  of  avoidance  (e.g.  “avoiding  activities  or 
situations  because  they  reminded  you  of  the  cancer  experience”),  re-
experiencing/intrusion (e.g. “suddenly acting or feeling as though the cancer experience 
was  happening  again”),  numbing  (e.g.  “trouble  remembering  important  parts  of  the 
cancer experience”) and  hyper-arousal (e.g. “having difficulty concentrating”). There 
are two methods to determine a PTSD diagnosis, the cut-off method (where cut-off 
score  must  be  greater  than  50)  and  the  symptom  method  (where  at  least  moderate 
ratings are given for one re-experiencing symptom, three avoidance-numbing symptoms 
and two arousal symptoms). 
Studies  using  the  PCL-C  and  cut-off  method  have  reported  current  cancer-
related prevalence rates of 5% (Andrykowski et al., 1998; Cordova et al., 1995; Smith,   21 
Redd, DuHamel, Vickberg, & Ricketts, 1999a), 12% (Jacobsen et al., 1998) and 17% 
(Levine, Eckhardt, & Targ, 2005). Studies using the symptom method have reported 
current PTSD prevalence rates of 6% (Andrykowski et al., 1998), 13% (Smith et al., 
1999a), 19% (Jacobsen et al., 1998) and 26% (Levine et al., 2005).  
Some  studies  have  used  the  Clinician  Administered  PTSD  Scale-Structured 
Interview (CAPS-I:  Blake et  al., 1995) to assess the prevalence of PTSD in cancer 
patients. Prevalence reports ranged from 14% (Pitman et al., 2001) to 22% (Kangas, 
Henry, & Bryant, 2005) and 32% (Naidich & Motta, 2000).  
In addition to the prevalence rates of current cancer related PTSD, studies have 
retrospectively estimated lifetime prevalence rates of PTSD, where patients are asked if 
they have experienced any PTSD symptoms since their cancer diagnosis. Mundy et al 
(2000) reported the highest rates of lifetime PTSD with 35% prevalence in their breast 
cancer  patient  sample.  However,  when  the  criteria  were  made  more  stringent,  by 
excluding, for example, the symptom “sense of foreshortened future”, the prevalence 
rate in this sample dropped to 24%. This is similar to another study of female cancer 
patients, which reported 22% of the sample meeting criteria for lifetime PTSD (Alter et 
al.,  1996).  One  other  study  considering  lifetime  rates  of  PTSD  found  much  lower 
prevalence of 3% (Green et al., 1998) and this was also with more stringent criteria (e.g. 
intrusive thoughts concerning fear of recurrence were excluded). 
 Green et al (1998) elaborated on the observed discrepancy between their finding 
and Alter et al’s (1996) finding, by reporting that although arousal and re-experiencing 
symptoms were at similar levels in both samples, the percentage of each sample that 
met full avoidance/numbing criteria was 8% and 30% respectively. Green et al (1998) 
argued  that  avoidance  may  therefore  have  been  assessed  quite  differently  in  both 
studies. Alternatively, the time of assessment may have had an impact, as Green et al 
(1998) assessed patients at 4-12 months post-treatment and Alter et al (1996) assessed 
patients at 3 years post-treatment.  
Based on the low prevalence rates reported, Green and colleagues suggested that 
having  cancer  may  not  truly  “fit”  a  trauma  model  (Green,  Epstein,  Krupnick,  & 
Rowland, 1997; Green et al., 1998). However, this does not preclude the possibility that 
cancer patients may experience PTSD symptomatology. Indeed, several studies have 
reported  a  significant  number  of  patients  endorsing  at  least  one,  and  often  more 
symptom clusters (e.g. Amir & Ramati, 2002: 56% of women endorsed 2/3 symptom 
clusters). Also, studies that have reported low prevalence rates of current PTSD (e.g.   22 
Matsuoka et al., 2005: 3.9%; Palmer, Kagee, Coyne, & DeMichele, 2004: 4% ), have 
also  reported  that  63%  and  67%  of  their  samples  reported  recurrent,  intrusive  and 
distressing recollections.  
1.2.2. Predictors of PTSD symptoms in cancer patients. 
 Kangas  et  al  (2002)  reviewed  predictors  of  PTSD  symptomatology,  which 
included  individual  risk  factors  and  trauma-related  factors  (Smith,  Redd,  Peyser,  & 
Vogl,  1999b).  Individual  risk  factors  include  previous  negative  life  stressors 
(Andrykowski, Cordova, McGrath, Sloan, & Kenady, 2000), increased psychological 
distress  prior  to  diagnosis  (Epping-Jordan  et  al.,  1999),  female  sex  (Hampton  & 
Frombach,  2000;  Deimling,  Kahana,  Bowman,  &  Schaefer,  2002),  younger  age  at 
diagnosis (e.g. Green et al., 1998; Tjemsland, Soreide, & Malt, 1998), fewer financial 
resources (Cordova et al., 1995) and poor social support (Andrykowski & Cordova, 
1998;  Butler,  Koopman,  Classen,  &  Spiegel,  1999).  However,  studies  have  also 
reported mixed findings (e.g. gender and younger age as risk factors) and the relative 
contribution of various risk factors has not been assessed (Gurevich, Devins, & Rodin, 
2002).  In  terms  of  previous  stress  levels  affecting  PTSD  symptoms,  Gurevich  et  al 
(2002)  suggested  this  may  be  due  to  a  diminished  stress  tolerance,  whereas  social 
support may lead to a reduction in PTSD symptoms due to facilitated affect regulation 
and information integration (Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000). 
In terms of trauma-related risk factors, Gurevich et al (2002) and Kangas et al 
(2002) suggested that greater proximity to treatment (e.g. Andrykowski et al., 1998), 
greater  treatment  intensity  (e.g.  aggressiveness,  duration:  Smith  et  al.,  1999b)  and 
recurrence  (e.g.  Cella,  Mahon,  &  Donovan,  1990)  have  been  associated  with  more 
severe symptoms of PTSD. Stage of disease has also been considered and found to be 
positively related to PTSD symptomatology (Andrykowski et al., 1998; Andrykowski & 
Cordova, 1998; Epping-Jordan, Compas, & Howell, 1994), although others have not 
found such an association (Alter et al., 1996).  
  An important consideration when discussing risk factors associated with PTSD 
development in cancer patients is a possible overlap of vulnerability factors for PTSD 
and cancer, such as excessive smoking and alcohol use (Kangas et al., 2002). Further 
limitations of cancer-related PTSD research will now also be addressed.    23 
1.2.3. Limitations of cancer-related PTSD research  
  Although the PTSD framework may apply to cancer patients in some respects 
(e.g. sudden and unexpected news about having cancer, traumatic treatment options, 
denial  about  having  cancer),  the  experience  of  having  cancer  may  be  qualitatively 
different from other PTSD stressors (Green et al., 1997; Gurevich et al., 2002). Reviews 
by Kangas et al (2002), Gurevich et al (2002), Green et al (1997) and limitations from 
studies investigating prevalence rates of PTSD in cancer patients will be considered in 
order to provide a summary of theoretical and methodological issues of using a PTSD 
framework for understanding the cancer experience. 
I. Application of PTSD models 
Although the incidence of cancer-related PTSD has been extensively investigated, 
there has been limited application of PTSD models to cancer patients. As previously 
mentioned, functional neuroimaging trends in neural correlates of PTSD seemingly map 
two  distinct  memory  systems  described  within  dual  representation  theory  of  PTSD 
(Brewin,  2001).  In  line  with  functional  neuroimaging  studies  conducted  with  other 
PTSD populations,  research investigating the volumes of hippocampus (Nakano et al., 
2002)  amygdala  (Matsuoka,  Yamawaki,  Inagaki,  Akechi,  &  Uchitomi,  2003)  and 
medial prefrontal cortex (orbitofrontal cortex; Hakamata et al., 2007) have found that 
these brain areas are significantly smaller in breast cancer survivors with a history of 
intrusive recollections compared to breast cancer survivors with no such history and 
healthy  controls  (Hakamata  et  al.,  2007).  These  brain  areas  are  implicated  in  the 
activation  and  modulation  of  the  initial  threat  response  (Francati  et  al,  2007).  For 
example,  decreased  prefrontal  cortex  activation  leads  to  decreased  working  memory 
capacity  and  decreased  inhibition  of  emotions,  which  are  associated  with  increased 
intrusive cognitions (e.g. Holmes et al, 2004). However, altered brain activity does not 
necessarily imply abnormal function and thus research linking symptom severity with 
brain function would demonstrate a clearer relationship between specific brain areas and 
intrusive cognitions (Matsuoka et al., 2003). 
The emotional stroop task has also previously been used to elucidate brain areas 
relevant to processing in PTSD (Bremner et al., 2004). The only study to use the stroop 
paradigm in relation to intrusive cognitions in cancer patients (Naidich & Motta, 2000) 
found that breast cancer patients responded significantly slower to trauma related words 
(e.g.  breast,  sick)  compared  to  other  emotional  stroop  words  (e.g.  dirty,  filthy).   24 
However,  the  same  pattern  of  results  was  observed  in  the  control  group  of  women 
without  breast  cancer  and  others  have  suggested  that  the  stroop  task  measures 
hyperresponsivity to threat rather than intrusive cognitions (Vythilingam et al., 2007). 
Although functional imaging studies using script-driven imagery have yet to be 
conducted  with  cancer  patients,  physiological  measures  such  as  heart  rate,  skin 
conductance and corrugator electromyogram responses were elevated for PTSD patients 
compared to non-PTSD patients presented with personal scripts of their breast cancer 
experience (Pitman et al., 2001). This paralleled previous findings previously reported 
in other PTSD populations, including combat veterans (Shalev, Orr, & Pitman, 1993), 
victims  of  terrorist  attacks  (Orr,  Pitman,  Lasko,  &  Herz,  1993)  and  motor  vehicle 
accidents (Blanchard & Hickling, 1997).  Pitman et al (2001) argued that this provides 
evidence of a characteristic physiological response found in PTSD and thus evidence 
that a PTSD framework is applicable to cancer patients (Pitman et al., 2001). However, 
caution could be taken in interpreting the results of this study, as sample sizes were 
small (N=37), and the PTSD group’s larger mean physiological responses during breast 
cancer imagery was heavily influenced by two patients. 
Kangas et al (2002) emphasised the importance of placing cancer within the 
PTSD framework as informed by PTSD models (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996). Previous 
research investigating PTSD in cancer patients has often failed to take this model, and 
other  theoretical  directions  into  account.  It  is  suggested  that  future  research  should 
conceptualise psychological distress in response to cancer using models such as dual 
representation theory to guide research and facilitate specific hypotheses-testing. For 
example, it may be necessary to identify and distinguish SAMs and VAMs and to show 
that, as with previous research in PTSD populations, the hotspots (the moments in the 
trauma  associated  with  the  highest  amount  of  emotional  distress)  of  trauma  are 
associated with more perceptual characteristics (e.g. perceptual words such as "red" and 
mention  of  fear;  Hellawell  &  Brewin,  2004).  Also,  research  identifying  whether 
concurrent  visuospatial  tasks  cause  more  interference  during  flashbacks  than  during 
ordinary memory description, as found in other samples of PTSD patients (Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2002),  would provide evidence for the existence of PTSD processes in cancer 
patients and allow for cross-study comparison.  
Another  application  issue  of  PTSD  and  cancer  research  is  how  appropriate 
existing treatment approaches are for cancer patients with PTSD (Kangas et al., 2002). 
For  example,  exposure  therapy  may  unnecessarily  provoke,  rather  than  alleviate   25 
anxiety, and  challenging negative thoughts about the future may be inappropriate if 
future cognitions are rational. 
II. Type of stressor 
One of the main issues regarding the use of a PTSD framework for the cancer 
experience  is  the  qualitatively  different  type  of  stressor  that  cancer  itself  presents 
(Kangas et al., 2002; Green et al., 1997). Cancer is a chronic, rather than acute stressor 
(Gurevich et al., 2002) and presents a series of different traumatic events over time, 
including  diagnosis,  disease  progression,  treatment,  adverse  physical  effects  (e.g. 
disfigurement) and recurrence (Kangas et al., 2002).  However, although the nature of 
cancer  as  a  stressor  may  be  distinctive,  Smith  et  al  (1999b)  argued  that  some 
characteristics  may  not  be  unique  to  the  cancer  experience.  For  example,  combat 
veterans may experience a number of stressful events over a long period of time, and 
fear  of  recurrence  may  also  be  true  of  other  victims,  such  as  victims  of  floods  or 
hurricanes (Smith et al., 1999b). 
 However, as well as being prolonged, Green et al (1997) argued that the cancer 
experience is different because it represents an internal, rather than external threat (e.g. 
in the case of a natural disaster such as a Tsunami), where the threat arises from within 
rather than from  an outside source and is thus  impossible to separate  from oneself. 
Green et al (1997) also suggested that the cancer experience can be conceptualised as an 
informational  as  well  as  an  immediate  threat,  so  that  initial  emphasis  may  be  on 
thinking about the future and information pertaining to prognosis, and later experiences 
(e.g. surgery to remove cancer) may represent more immediate threat to the self.  
III. Assessment considerations 
  There are several assessment issues concerning the measurement of PTSD in 
cancer populations including the lack of theoretical underpinning, the use of prospective 
studies,  self-report  and  retrospective  data,  inconsistent  methodology,  small  sample 
sizes,  lack  of  adequate  control  groups,  and  lack  of  detail  with  respect  to  clinical 
significance of PTSD prevalence rates.  
  For  example,  Kangas  et  al  (2002)  recognised  that  although  cross-sectional 
research may be useful, it limits the causal inferences that can be made concerning 
prevalence of PTSD in cancer patients and the demarcation of the importance of various 
stressors. Kangas et al  (2005) subsequently  conducted a prospective study of Acute 
Stress Disorder (ASD) and PTSD in 82 patients with head and neck or lung malignancy.   26 
ASD is a diagnosis used to identify traumatic symptoms in the month following trauma 
and its purpose was to find people at risk of developing PTSD.  However, Kangas et al 
(2005) found that although 53% of individuals diagnosed with ASD went on to develop 
PTSD at six months follow-up, 36% of patients with PTSD at six months follow-up, 
were not given an initial diagnosis of ASD.  
  Another key issue is the differential use of assessment tools, in particular the 
PCL-C, which can be used to diagnose PTSD in two different ways, one of which (cut-
off method) leads to lower prevalence rates than the other (symptom method). Also, 
specific assessment items, such as questions pertaining to a foreshortened future and 
intrusive symptoms such as fear of recurrence  or dreaming about dying (i.e. future, 
rather than past-oriented intrusions) have been omitted in some studies (e.g. Green et al, 
1998) but not in others (Alter et al., 1996) and this makes studies difficult to compare 
(Kangas et al, 2002). Further, scales such as the PCL-C do not measure criterion A2 of 
the DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis: “intense fear, helplessness and horror”, and when this 
criterion is assessed, it is not necessarily endorsed alongside symptoms of PTSD. For 
example, Palmer et al (2004) found that 41% of their breast cancer sample (N=160), 
endorsed this criterion, but 67% reported experiencing intrusive distressing thoughts. 
Further, the level of interference associated with reported symptoms (criterion F) is not 
measured using these scales. Others have specifically criticised the PCL-C as a method 
of  screening  for  PTSD,  arguing  that  it  demonstrates  low  sensitivity  and  positive 
predictive power based on a high number of false negative and positive PTSD diagnoses 
(Widows, Jacobsen, & Fields, 2000). 
So  far,  studies  investigating  PTSD  in  cancer  patients  have  not  used  another 
validated scale, the Posttraumatic Stress Symptom Scale (PSS: Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & 
Rothbaum,  1993).  The  PSS,  like  the  PCL-C,  is  a  17-item  scale  corresponding  to 
symptoms  of  PTSD  including  re-experiencing,  avoidance  and  arousal.  However,  in 
addition, the PSS also assesses questions relevant to criterion A (i.e.  describing the 
event), and includes questions pertaining to criterion F (how interfering symptoms are 
in daily life).  
Gurevich  et  al  (2002)  argued  that  another  reason  that  PTSD  studies  are  not 
comparable is because operationalisations vary dramatically. For example, time points 
labelled with the same name such as “post-treatment” reflected assessment at 6 weeks in 
some research (e.g. Tjemsland et al., 1998) and assessment at an average of 6.7 years 
post-treatment in other studies (e.g. Lewis et al., 2001)   27 
  Kangas et al (2002) also referred to sampling issues, suggesting that the majority 
of studies have focused on female cancer patients, often with early to  middle stage 
breast  cancer.  Perhaps  different  types  of  cancer  and  different  stage  of  disease  and 
prognosis would be associated with more severe PTSD reactions. Kangas et al (2002) 
also  argued  that  the  timing  of  assessment  of  PTSD  is  important,  as  individuals 
experience a range of stressful and varied events from diagnosis.  
Another important consideration is that individuals may perceive various stages 
of the cancer experience in different ways (Gurevich et al., 2002). For example, Mundy 
et al (2000) found that women who underwent bone marrow transplantation perceived 
the experience as life affirming rather than life threatening. Although in this case, PTSD 
theory was not used to explain this finding, it follows the proposition (Brewin et al, 
1996) that the appraisal of a stress provoking situation may be key to the development 
of stress response symptoms. Other issues include the suggestion that clinicians and 
researchers should be aware of comorbidity of PTSD with other disorders (e.g. anxiety, 
depression)  and  that  specific  symptoms  of  PTSD  may  overlap  with  symptoms 
associated with treatment (e.g. insomnia) and with typical grief reactions in response to 
a cancer diagnosis (Kangas et al., 2002). A study investigating symptom clusters in 
cancer patients according to the PCL-C (Shelby, Golden-Kreutz, & Andersen, 2005) 
concluded that 4 PCL-C items (“Feeling your future will be cut-short”; “Being super-
alert,  watchful,  on  guard”;  “Having  physical  reactions  to  reminders”;  “Having 
difficulty concentrating”) confounded with illness and treatment related symptoms and 
vigilance for symptoms of recurrence (Shelby et al, 2005).  
IV. Symptoms associated with PTSD  
  According to Kangas et al (2002), symptoms associated with PTSD, including 
avoidance, intrusion and arousal may not have the same meaning when described by 
cancer  patients,  compared  to  other  PTSD  populations.  For  example,  based  on  the 
suggestion that cancer represents an internal threat (Green et al., 1997), patients with 
cancer may be unable to avoid reminders of the trauma. Also, other external factors 
such as attending outpatient appointments and monitoring physical well-being present 
constant  reminders  of  the  trauma  that  may  not  occur  in  other  trauma-related 
circumstance.  A  second  avoidance  symptom,  dissociative  amnesia,  may  also  not  be 
appropriate to cancer patients as protracted experience may make forgetting unlikely 
(Kangas et al., 2002). Alternatively, patients may forget aspects of their trauma but for   28 
reasons such as concentration deficits and fatigue caused by treatment rather than due to 
a stress response reaction. Further, a “sense of foreshortened future” may not be an 
irrational fear for patients with cancer and may therefore be an inappropriate question to 
ask in order to assess PTSD and PTSD symptomatology. Kangas et al (2002) suggested 
that questions concerning avoidance symptoms need to be investigated for sensitivity 
and specificity as otherwise avoidance may be measured inaccurately, both in terms of 
underestimation and overestimation.  
Arousal  symptoms  present  similar  difficulties,  as  symptoms  associated  with 
PTSD such as concentration deficits, irritability and insomnia may also be side-effects 
of treatment and medication (Kangas et al., 2002; Gurevich et al., 2002). Green et al 
(1997) also emphasised that arousal symptoms may exist but take a different form in 
cancer  patients.  For  example,  rather  than  becoming  hypervigilant  to  external 
surroundings, individuals with cancer may become hypervigilant to physical health and 
bodily sensations. Green et al (1997) drew a parallel between this type of hypervigilance 
and the type of hypervigilance found in people with hypochondriasis.  For  example, 
individuals  may  be  checking  for  additional  lumps  far  more  often  than  would  be 
necessary for routine examination.  
  Finally, Green et al (1997) suggested that a potential problem in assessing PTSD 
in cancer patients may relate to potential differences in intrusive thinking. Specifically, 
intrusive cognitions and re-experiencing symptoms assessed as part of PTSD usually 
apply to a specific traumatic event that has occurred in the past (Kangas et al., 2002). 
However,  for  patients  with  cancer,  intrusive  thinking  (thoughts,  memories,  images), 
may  not  refer  to  actual  recollections  of  an  event,  but  to  future  oriented  anxiety 
concerning fear of recurrence, possible physical problems, treatment-side effects and 
death (Brennan, 2001).     
V. General controversy in PTSD research 
As well as attending to issues specific to cancer-related PTSD, is may also be 
useful  to  consider  more  general  criticisms  of  the  PTSD  framework.  For  example, 
McNally  (2003)  provided  an  extensive  discussion  of  pertinent  issues,  including 
“conceptual  bracket  creeping”  and  “the  dose-response  model  of  trauma.”  McNally 
(2003) suggested that the definition of trauma has broadened widely and increasingly 
more  life  events  are  considered  traumatic.  Broadening  the  definition  of  trauma  is 
problematic  in  several  ways  such  as  undermining  chances  of  understanding   29 
psychobiological mechanisms underlying PTSD and assigning causal significance to the 
stressor (McNally, 2003). In terms of cancer, this may be important because there are 
several different types of stressor associated with cancer (e.g. financial concerns, job 
loss)  which  are  not  necessarily  equated  with  the  perception  of  cancer  as  a  life-
threatening event. The difference between traumatic stressors and critical life events 
was defined in recent PTSD research (Birrer, Michael, & Munsch, 2007), where critical 
life events were considered normative experiences that naturally happen to individuals 
(e.g. divorce, job loss), whilst traumatic events were considered non-normative; rare or 
unexpected experiences (e.g. life-threatening illness).  
Further,  the  dose-response  model  assumes  that  PTSD  symptom  severity 
increases as the severity of the stressor increases. For cancer patients, the severity of the 
stressor is difficult to operationalise as it may relate to disease prognosis, severity of 
treatment, risk of recurrence and other social factors such as impact of diagnosis on 
family and work.  
1.2.4. Summary 
  Major  limitations  of  using  a  PTSD  framework  to  understand  the  cancer 
experience include the qualitatively different nature of stress response in patients with 
cancer compared to other trauma groups (in particular, the importance of future as well 
as  past  events),  assessment  considerations  such  as  inconsistent  approaches  and 
inadequate  measurement  tools  and  symptom  and  psychological  disorder  overlap. 
Although relatively low prevalence rates of PTSD have been documented in cancer 
patients (e.g. Palmer et al., 2004), these do not necessarily imply a lack of clinically 
significant distress (Green et al., 1998). As Green et al (1998) argued- having cancer 
may precipitate a specific stress reaction but that this does not necessarily fit with a 
PTSD trauma model. Thus, it may  be important to consider symptoms of PTSD in 
cancer patients, rather than full PTSD diagnoses. Previous research has also considered 
the incidence, course and importance of intrusive and avoidance symptomatology in 
cancer patients and this research will now be discussed in relation to cancer patients. 
1.3.  Intrusive thoughts and cancer  
1.3.1. Prevalence and impact on psychological functioning 
  Several studies have considered the prevalence of intrusive thoughts in cancer 
populations, mainly using the IES (Horowitz et al., 1979). The IES is a 15-item self-  30 
report scale, developed to measure subjective distress in relation to a specific event. 
There are two sub-scales representing avoidance (8 items, e.g. “I stayed away from 
reminders of it”) and intrusive thoughts (7 items, e.g. “I thought about it when I didn’t 
mean to.”) Estimates of the frequency of intrusive thoughts in cancer populations have 
varied from 10-43%, (see Kangas et al., 2002 ), according to time of measurement (e.g. 
immediately  post-diagnosis  vs.  3  month  follow-up)  and  gender  (females  generally 
report significantly higher numbers of intrusive thoughts than males; Kaasa et al., 1993; 
Hampton & Frombach, 2000). Additionally,  research using questions from the SCID 
(First et al., 2002) in a sample of breast cancer patients 3 years post-surgery, found that 
46% of women had reported experiencing intrusive thoughts at some time (Matsuoka et 
al., 2002). 
  Moreover, cross-sectional studies on people with cancer have found intrusive 
thoughts to be associated with psychological distress (Baider, Denour, & Kaplan, 1997), 
anxiety (Kelly et al., 1995; Nordin & Glimelius, 1998), depression (Primo et al., 2000), 
maladaptive  adjustment  (e.g.  anxious  preoccupation:  Matsuoka  et  al.,  2002),  spouse 
avoidance  (Manne,  1999),  social  constraint  (Cordova,  Cunningham,  Carlson,  & 
Andrykowski,  2001)  and  worse  physical  functioning  (Kaasa  et  al.,  1993).  Thus, 
intrusive  thoughts  may  negatively  impact  on  both  mental  and  physical  functioning 
(Devine, Parker, Fouladi, & Cohen, 2003).  
  Prospective  studies  have  found  that  intrusive  thoughts  contribute  to 
psychological distress longitudinally. For example, level of intrusive thoughts in women 
with breast  cancer two months post-surgery predicted psychological distress at 2 years 
post-diagnosis  (Bleiker,  Pouwer,  van  der  Ploeg,  Leer,  &  Ader,  2000)  and  intrusive 
thoughts were associated with anxiety and depression at baseline, 3 month and 6 month 
follow ups in mixed stage breast cancer patients (Epping-Jordan et al., 1999).  In a 
prospective  study  of  ovarian  cancer  patients,  perceived  social  support  and  intrusive 
thoughts were associated with anxiety at 3 month follow-up after chemotherapy, whilst 
disease stage and measures of physical functioning post-treatment were not associated 
with worse psychological outcome (Hipkins, Whitworth, Tarrier, & Jayson, 2004).  
  Explanations for the contribution of intrusive thoughts to psychological distress 
include a moderating role of support seeking (Lepore & Helgeson, 1998; Lepore et al., 
2000).  Based  on  the  assumption  that  intrusive  thoughts  are  a  marker  of  incomplete 
cognitive processing (Lepore, Silver, Wortman, & Wayment, 1996), and experiences of 
such  intrusions  signifies  maladaptive  coping  to  a  stressful  event  (in  this  case,  the   31 
experience  of  coping  with  cancer),  social  support  may  reduce  levels  of  reported 
intrusions by facilitating effective psychological processing of the event. For cancer 
patients, there is not an isolated incident that needs adequate processing but a number of 
ongoing and highly stressful experiences, including diagnosis, disclosure of diagnosis to 
family  and  friends,  uncertainty  about  the  future,  treatment  side-effects  and  fears  of 
recurrence.  
  The  recognition  of  social  support  as  a  mediating  factor  in  the  relationship 
between intrusive thoughts and psychological distress has led to intervention research 
(e.g.  Scott,  Halford,  &  Ward,  2004).  Scott  et  al  (2004)  found  that  a  couple  coping 
intervention  for  adjustment  to  breast  or  gynaecological  cancer  led  to  a  reduction  in 
avoidance  of  negative  intrusive  cognitions  in  the  intervention  group.  Understanding 
cognitive processes underlying psychological distress in patients with cancer may lead 
to improved interventions and thus effective positive change in quality of life. Other 
possible  treatment  strategies  aimed  at  reducing  distress  associated  with  negative 
intrusive thoughts may include thought stopping and distraction techniques or cognitive 
restructuring (Lewis et al., 2001).  
1.3.2. Intrusive thoughts and prostate cancer patients 
Although  most  research  concerning  intrusive  thoughts  has  been  with  breast 
cancer patients (e.g. Bleiker et al., 2000), research has looked at intrusive thoughts in 
other  patient  groups,  including  prostate  cancer  patients.  For  example,  Lepore  & 
Helgeson (1998) found that for men who felt socially constrained in terms of talking 
about  cancer  (e.g.  “some  of  my  friends  or  relatives  avoided  talking  with  me  about 
cancer”), intrusive thoughts were significantly associated with decreased mental health. 
Further, social support was found to be inversely related to level of intrusive thoughts in 
men with localised prostate cancer (Roberts, Lepore, & Helgeson, 2005). Specifically, 
baseline social support was related to mental functioning at 3 month follow-up and this 
relationship  appeared  to  be  mediated  by  cognitive  processes  including,  intrusive 
thoughts. Roberts et al (2005) suggested that social support may aid complete cognitive 
processing, and thus increase mental functioning. In a sample of 420 men with prostate 
cancer,  for  each  intrusion  item  on  the  IES  the  percentage  of  men  who  responded 
sometimes or often was between 24 and 27% (McBride, Clipp, Peterson, Lipkus, & 
Demark-Wahnefried, 2000).    32 
McBride et al (2000) were also interested in how the impact of cancer diagnosis 
affects  health  related  behaviours.  It  was  found  that  men  with  a  lower  impact  score 
(impact  referring  to  total  score  on  IES),  exercised  more  frequently.  Although  the 
directionality of this relationship could not be determined (McBride et al., 2000), the 
relationship may be important for several reasons. For example, exercise may provide a 
beneficial distraction technique from negative intrusive thoughts. On the other hand, 
having avoidant cognitions may lead to avoidance of behaviours aimed at improving 
physical quality of life and confronting the disease. Support for this explanation comes 
from the finding that high scores on the IES in male prostate, colon and lymphoma 
patients  was  associated  with  behavioural  avoidance  (Hampton  &  Frombach,  2000). 
Also, as McBride et al (2000) suggested, the cancer diagnosis may have led to greater 
distress in patients who were not engaging in positive health behaviours and who felt 
that their behaviours had contributed to their diagnosis.  
As yet, the importance of intrusive thoughts in prostate cancer patients has not 
been established and further, little is known about the subjective experience of prostate 
cancer patients generally (McBride et al., 2000). Also, previous research investigating 
intrusive thoughts in prostate cancer patients and in other cancer populations has several 
limitations, which will now be considered. 
1.3.3. Limitations of intrusive thoughts research with cancer 
patients. 
Universal criticisms of the IES  include the suggestion that the scale may be an 
inaccurate measure of subjective distress as some items can be perceived as neutral 
(e.g., item 6, "I had dreams about it": Joseph, 2000). Moreover, the IES may be an 
ineffective way of measuring negative intrusive thoughts specifically, not only because 
of  the  existence  of  more  neutral  items,  but  also  because  the  IES  was  originally 
developed as a measure of general subjective trauma-related distress. However, it has 
been suggested that the main usefulness of the IES is as a measure of intrusive and 
avoidant  symptoms,  that  mediate  between  trauma  experience  and  subsequent 
adjustment  (Joseph,  2000).  Yet  due  to  lack  of  content  measurement,  it  is  not  clear 
whether  intrusive  thoughts  are  positively,  negatively  or  neutrally  valenced  in  nature 
(Raphael, 1997) and further, the IES does not allow for the possibility that there may be 
more  than  one  type  of  intrusion  (e.g.  automatic  versus  controllable:  Joseph,  2000; 
Brewin et al., 1996). It has been suggested that in order to establish the frequency,   33 
nature  and  content  of  idiosyncratic  thoughts,  interview  methods  may  be  most 
appropriate (Clark & Purdon, 1995).  
Other  limitations  of  the  IES  to  measure  intrusive  thoughts  include,  lack  of 
content information concerning reported intrusions, and lack of separation between type 
of  intrusions  that  may  occur.  For  example,  within  the  posttraumatic  stress  disorder 
literature  it  has  been  argued  that  few  studies  distinguish  between  type  of  intrusive 
cognition  such  as  verbal  versus  imaginal  intrusions  or  thoughts  versus  memories 
(Reynolds & Brewin, 1998). Others (e.g. Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000) have argued that describing intrusive memories as thoughts is misleading, 
as  intrusive  memories  mainly  consist  of  brief  sensory  fragments  of  the  traumatic 
experience. 
Previous  research  that  has  delineated  different  intrusions  in  a  non-clinical 
population (Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996) found that both intrusive 
thoughts and memories were common (with thoughts being most frequent), but the most 
intrusive thought was more often associated with fear and the most intrusive memory 
was most often associated with sadness or happiness. The different emotions found to 
be associated with different types of cognition supports the notion that different types of 
cognitions should be defined and investigated separately.  
There  are  also  specific  problems  that  arise  due  to  the  use  of  the  IES  to 
investigate intrusive thoughts in cancer patients. For example, attempting to make cross-
study  comparisons  on  intrusive  thoughts  frequency  may  be  futile,  as  studies 
documenting the frequency of intrusive thoughts in a wide range of cancer patients (e.g. 
breast cancer, acute leukaemia, prostate cancer, ovarian cancer) have administered the 
IES at different time stages of the disease, for example, two months post-surgery and 2 
years  post-surgery  in  breast  cancer  patients;  (Bleiker  et  al.,  2000);    post-recurrence 
(Cella et al., 1990); and five year post-treatment (Green et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 
1997). Often studies have very different initial research questions (e.g. predictors of 
psychological distress in cancer patients, cancer recurrence as a traumatic event and 
assessing trauma related disorders in medical settings for the aforementioned studies).  
Further, across clinical populations, intrusions may not concern a specific event 
that has occurred, but rather, concern future-oriented cognitions. This is particularly 
pertinent  to  cancer  patients,  as  the  cancer  experience  spans  a  wide  time  scale  and 
involves  several  different  types  of  stressor.  For  example,  one  study,  looking  at 
intrusions in cancer patients within a posttraumatic stress disorder framework (Cordova   34 
et al., 1995) found that reported intrusive memories and dreams were related to fears of 
recurrence, as well of fears of surgery and treatment side-effects. Further, Greenberg et 
al (1997) found that scores on the IES significantly correlated with fears of recurrence, 
indicating  that  although  the  IES  was  developed  to  measure  subjective  distress  to  a 
specific event, the specific event (e.g. diagnosis of cancer) has implications for possible 
future negative events that may also trigger a stress response reaction featuring negative 
intrusive cognitions. 
More generally, it has been argued that although unwanted distressing memories 
of trauma are considered a core symptom of PTSD, relatively little is known about their 
phenomenology (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005). Phenomenology refers to 
the nature of intrusive cognitions, including for example, content (e.g. specific versus 
general  memories,  form  (e.g.  thoughts,  images,  flashbacks)  and  other  characteristics 
such  as  accompanying  emotions/physical  sensations  and  vividness  (Reynolds  & 
Brewin, 1998; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999).  
1.3.4. Intrusive memories and cancer patients  
One  exception  to  studies  that  have  failed  to  address  details  surrounding  the 
nature  of  intrusions  has  shown  that  depression  in  cancer  patients  is  associated  with 
negative intrusive memories (Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & Dayson, 1998a). 
Following  from  research  that  found  a  high  frequency  of  intrusive  memories  in 
depressed  patients  (e.g.  Kuyken  &  Brewin,  1994;  Brewin,  Hunter,  Carroll,  &  Tata, 
1996),  Brewin  et  al  (1998a)  suggested  that  a  more  stringent  confirmation  of  the 
conclusion that intrusive memories are specifically related to depression itself, rather 
than present life stresses in general, would require the inclusion of a control group to 
compare  matched  samples  of  depressed  and  non-depressed  patients  who  have 
experienced a common stressor.  
Brewin  et  al  (1998a)  interviewed  matched  samples  of  depressed  and  non-
depressed cancer patients about life events and identified intrusive memories concerning 
illness, injury and death which were more frequently reported in the depressed group 
compared to controls. Intrusive memories qualified if they consisted of visual images of 
a specific scene that had taken place. Participants were matched on age, sex, type of 
cancer and stage of disease. Not only were there more frequent reports of intrusive 
memories  in  the  depressed  group,  in  general,  when  depression  was  controlled  for, 
greater numbers of intrusive memories were associated with maladaptive adjustment   35 
(measured by the Mini-Mental Adjustment of Cancer Scale: Watson et al., 1994). For 
example,  higher  numbers  of  intrusive  memories  were  associated  with  more  anxious 
preoccupation,  more  cognitive  avoidance,  more  fatalism  and  more  hopelessness  and 
helplessness. Further, memories were usually reported to be vivid, lasted for minutes, 
occurred once a week or less and 76% of the memories reported were related to illness, 
injury and death and 44% of all memories concerned cancer specifically (Brewin et al., 
1998a).   
When examined longitudinally 68% of patients who had experienced intrusive 
memories at diagnosis (23%) continued to experience intrusive memories six months 
later (Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & Dayson, 1998b).  Experiencing intrusive 
memories at Time 1 was associated with greater anxiety at follow-up, especially if there 
was high avoidance of the initial memories. Brewin et al suggested that one possible 
explanation for this finding is that the existence of highly accessible specific memories, 
mainly  about  illness  and  death,  exacerbates  feelings  of  anxiety  and  makes  negative 
outcomes seem more likely. Brewin et al (1998b) also noted that intrusive cognitions 
predicted  anxiety  but  not  depression  at  follow-up,  suggesting  that  memories  may 
revolve to a greater extent around future threat than around past loss. 
1.3.5. Summary 
  Although  research  has  shown  that  the  prevalence  of  PTSD  is  low  in  cancer 
patients,  evidence  suggests  that  intrusive  thoughts  are  common  and  contribute 
significantly  to  psychological  distress.  Limitations  of  intrusion  research  with  cancer 
patients  include  over-reliance  on  the  Impact  of  Events  Scale  to  measure  intrusive 
symptomatology and the sampling of limited cancer populations, mainly women with 
breast  cancer.  Future  research  following  Brewin  et  al  (1998a)  is  required  to  further 
understand  the  phenomenology  of  intrusive  cognitions,  including  distinguishing 
between different forms of intrusion (e.g. verbal versus visual) and intrusion time scales 
(e.g. past oriented versus future oriented). In particular, the present research aimed to 
address the following questions: 
1.  Do anxious cancer patients experience repeated intrusive thoughts and images and is 
their content in some way related to the disease? 
2.   Is  the  presence  of  intrusive  cognitions  associated  with  anxiety  and  maladaptive 
adjustment?    36 
3.  What are the characteristics of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients and how do 
they compare to clinical and non-clinical populations?  
4.  How do cancer patients cope with intrusive cognitions; do they use beneficial or 
ineffective distraction techniques?  
5.  Can  therapeutic  interventions  targeted  at  intrusive  cognitions  help  alleviate  their 
frequency and impact?  
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In order to extend previous research investigating intrusive thoughts and memories 
in  cancer  patients,  this  chapter  introduces  intrusive  imagery  as  a  form  of  intrusive 
cognitions distinguishable from thoughts and memories and so far unexplored in cancer 
patients. The relationship between imagery (which includes both images and memories) 
and  emotion  is  discussed  and  the  identification  of  intrusive  imagery  in  anxiety  is 
described. Finally, the chapter presents a cross-sectional study conducted with prostate 
cancer patients at the Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust.  
2.1.  Intrusive images 
2.1.1. Intrusive images and anxiety 
Based on the premise that future oriented cognitions may be at least as important 
as past oriented cognitions in patients with cancer, further research is required to assess 
whether future oriented intrusive images are reported in cancer populations (Matsuoka, 
Nagamine,  &  Uchitomi,  2006).  Intrusive  images  are  distinguishable  from  intrusive 
memories  because  i)  they  can  be  future  oriented  and  ii)  they  may  represent  a 
“snapshot”, rather than a contextualised autobiographical memory (Patel et al, 2007). 
Although  the  importance  of  imagery  in  precipitating  and  perpetuating  emotional 
disorders  has  been  recognised  for  some  time  (e.g.  Beck,  1976;  Lang,  1977),  until 
recently, imagery in the context of anxiety disorders has received very little attention 
(Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). 
 Research  suggests  that  imagery  has  an  important  role  in  representing 
emotionally  charged  material  (Kosslyn,  1994).  For  example,  verbal  thoughts  about 
emotional  material  evoked  little  cardiovascular  response  compared  to  images  of  the 
same material (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). Further evidence was provided in a 
series of studies by Holmes and colleagues (e.g. Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Holmes & 
Mathews  (2005)  compared  reactions  to  threatening  information  in  a  group  asked  to 
focus on verbal text and a group asked to imagine the event. Participants in the imagery 
condition reported more anxiety and rated new descriptions as more emotional than 
those in the verbal condition (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). This finding was replicated 
when positive images where shown to have a greater impact on emotion that verbal 
representations  of  the  same  material  (Holmes,  Mathews,  Dalgleish,  &  Mackintosh, 
2006).    39 
One potential criticism of previous research was that both verbal and imagery 
conditions provided verbal descriptions and thus the effect of imagery on emotion may 
be due to the additional method of representation provided in the imagery condition. A 
recent study addressed this concern, by combining pictures and words at the initiating 
event  and  requiring  participants  to  combine  them  in  a  single  image  or  sentence 
(Holmes,  Mathews,  Mackintosh,  &  Dalgleish,  2008).  Two  studies  were  conducted 
where participants saw a series of pictures, each accompanied by a word designed to 
yield a negative or neutral meaning when combined. In Study 1, participants were free 
to  combine  pictures  and  words  as  they  desired  and  in  Study  2,  participants  were 
instructed  to  integrate  them  using  either  a  descriptive  sentence  or  mental  image.  In 
Study 1, greater self-reported use of imagery was associated with a greater emotional 
response than verbal processing of the same material. In Study 2, increases in anxiety 
due to negative picture-word combinations were greater following imagery than verbal 
encoding  instructions.  Conversely,  decreases  in  anxiety  due  to  neutral  picture-word 
combinations were greater following imagery than verbal encoding instructions. Study 2 
provided the first evidence that imagery causes changes in emotion, rather than the 
reverse and this extends beyond negatively valenced material (Holmes et al, 2008).  
 One possible explanation for the emotional effect of imagery is that imagery 
copies real-life perceptual events (Kosslyn, 1994) and thus has access to representations 
of related emotional states stored in autobiographical memory (Conway, 2001).  Images 
may therefore be particularly effective cues for re-activating related episodes in memory 
and associated emotions (Holmes et al, 2008). Indeed, Holmes et al (2008) found that 
integrating  word-picture  stimuli  using  imagery  was  associated  with  greater  self-
involvement and stronger associations with autobiographical memories.  
Research  in  anxious  populations  has  found  that  people  with  anxiety  report 
experiencing negative intrusive imagery  (e.g. social phobia: Hackmann et al., 2000; 
health anxiety: Wells & Hackmann, 1993; agoraphobia: Day, Holmes, & Hackmann, 
2004; obsessive compulsive disorder: Speckens, Hackmann, Ehlers, & Cuthbert, 2007). 
According to Hackmann & Holmes (2004), imagery in other anxiety disorders is similar 
to  imagery  found  in  PTSD,  as  images  are  often  vivid,  persistent,  distorted  and 
uncontrollable and occur in various modalities (e.g. visual, bodily sensations, sounds, 
touch, taste and smell). Also, across anxious populations, intrusive imagery may not 
only  be  future-oriented  but  often  representative  of  specific  abstracted  aspects  of   40 
memories which hold important meanings to the individual (e.g. a negative childhood 
experience such as being bullied or feeling rejected).  
Hackmann et al (2000) studied the frequency and nature of intrusive imagery in 
22 social phobic individuals and found that all participants reported intrusive negative 
imagery in various modalities, including visual, body sensations and sounds. Of these 
participants, all but one reported having a particular memory which they felt was closely 
linked to the recurrent image (e.g. being bullied) and the majority (82%) of recurrent 
images  were  rated  as  a  clear  visual  picture  by  the  interviewer.  One  limitation  of 
previous research was the lack of a control group. However, studies including a control 
group have shown almost identical patterns of results. For example, Day et al (2004) 
compared a group of agoraphobic patients (n= 20) with a group of non-anxious matched 
controls (n= 20) and found that all patients with agoraphobia and no control participants 
reported having negative intrusive images in agoraphobic situations. Moreover, images 
involved several sensory modalities (including, visual and body sensation perceptions) 
and, in most cases, were linked with unpleasant memories.  
The  link  between  memories  and  current  imagery  may  be  explained  by  the 
conceptualisation of images as goals, either goals referring to the past or goals referring 
to the future (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). Conway et al (2004) suggested that 
images  may  reflect  self-defining  moments  when  goals  have  been  challenged  and  a 
discrepancy exists in the self-memory system. Conway et al (2004) utilised Carver & 
Scheier’s (1998) behavioural self-regulation theory to explain how such a discrepancy 
occurs.  Self-regulation  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  behaviour  is  defined  by 
individual’s concrete and abstract goals. Goals determine action because goals serve as 
reference values for feedback processes (Scheier & Carver, 2003). A feedback loop 
consists of four elements; an input function (perception), a reference value (goal), a 
comparator (compares input and referent) and an output function (behaviour). There are 
two  types  of  feedback  loop,  discrepancy  reducing  (negative  feedback  loops)  and 
discrepancy enhancing (positive feedback loops). Carver & Scheier (1998) suggested 
that for negative feedback loops, the referent is what is intended to be reached and thus 
decreasing discrepancy, by doing well, leads to feelings of elation and doing poorly 
leads to feelings of depression. For positive feedback loops, the referent is what is to be 
avoided and thus doing well, by increasing the discrepancy between input and referent 
leads to feelings of relief, whilst doing poorly is associated with anxiety (Carver & 
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By conceptualising intrusive images as goals (referents), Conway et al (2004) 
suggested that such images form the basis of positive feedback loops. For example, a 
patient diagnosed with cancer may have goals about physical well-being challenged and 
thus have negative intrusive imagery of themselves in hospital, looking weak and frail 
after receiving chemotherapy. The image of the self as weak is an undesirable goal and 
thus one to be avoided. According to Conway et al (2004) intrusive imagery leads to 
distress  because  positive  feedback  loops  have  no  boundaries;  the  referent  is  to  be 
avoided as far as possible. However, in many circumstances, positive feedback loops 
are constrained by negative feedback loops which helps the loop become more stable. 
Conway et al (2004) suggested that problems may arise when discrepancy enhancing 
systems  are  not  constrained  by  discrepancy  reducing  systems.  They  proposed  that 
therapies aimed at augmenting the process of constraining positive feedback loops may 
lead  to  a  reduction  in  negative  intrusive  imagery.  For  example,  imagery  rescripting 
therapy which introduces positively-valenced imagery associated with positive affect 
provides an avenue for negative imagery to be associated with new desirable goals. 
Further, adopting new goal-referents through imagery rescripting can lead to positive 
emotions due to recalibration of the affect-generating systems described above.  
Some (Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison, 2003; Hirsch, Meynen, 
& Clark, 2004) asserted a causal role of negative imagery in the maintenance of anxiety. 
Hirsch et al (2003, 2004) manipulated the use of negative imagery in participants with 
low and high social anxiety in order to investigate whether imagery has a causal role in 
the maintenance of social phobia. Participants with low social anxiety (Hirsch et al, 
2003) were allocated to either a negative image or control condition and required to read 
six  long  descriptions  of  being  interviewed  about  a  job.  At  certain  time  points, 
participants were required to perform lexical decisions on ambiguous threatening or 
non-threatening  information.  Compared  to  the  control  group,  participants  holding  a 
negative image in mind lacked non-threatening inferential bias and also experienced a 
higher level of anxiety.  
Participants  with  high  social  anxiety  had  two  conversations  with  another 
volunteer, one where they held a negative image in mind and one where they held a less 
negative self-image in mind (Hirsch et al, 2004). For the negative image, participants 
recalled  a  situation  where  they  felt  socially  anxious  and  for  the  control  image, 
participants recalled a situation where they felt relaxed. The study showed that holding a 
negative image in mind was associated with higher levels of state anxiety and greater   42 
use of safety behaviours such as avoiding eye contact. Also, when holding a negative 
image in mind, participants with high social anxiety were more likely to report poor 
perceived  behavioural  (e.g.  “sweating”,  “hands  trembling”)  and  conversational  (e.g. 
uncomfortable pauses) performance which were partially confirmed by partner ratings 
of performance. However, socially anxious volunteers were likely to overestimate how 
poorly they performed compared their conversational partner. 
 These findings are consistent with research emphasising the causal influence of 
imagery on emotion (Holmes et al, 2008) and fit with previous prospective research, 
which  has  suggested  that  intrusive  negative  cognitions  may  help  maintain 
psychopathological disorders, including posttraumatic stress disorder (Jones, Harvey, & 
Brewin, 2007) and depression (Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999). For example, Brewin 
et al (1999) found that at 6 month follow-up in a sample of 62 depressed patients, the 
amount  of  intrusion  and  avoidance  associated  with  intrusive  memories  predicted 
subsequent depression, after controlling for initial depression severity.  
Hackmann & Holmes (2004) argued that intrusive images may maintain anxiety 
due  to  the  failure  to  update  goals  and  integrate  new  and  possibly  contradictory 
information. They suggested that following appraisal of an intrusive image, individuals 
may engage in behaviours intended to reduce the imminent threat, and in doing so, fail 
to update the original and negative content of the image. This approach is consistent 
with dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin et al, 1996) and the cognitive model 
of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), where intrusions are conceptualised as a failure of 
adequate processing of the trauma and avoidance is considered a maladaptive process to 
integration  and  thus  a  contributor  to  recurrent  negative  intrusions.  This  failure  of 
updating also corresponds to Conway et al (2004) conceptualisation of images as goals. 
Failure to update negative imagery leads to positive feedback loops aimed at enlarging 
perception-referent discrepancies. When this fails, individuals may experience anxiety. 
By changing the meaning of intrusive imagery and thus changing the referent to one 
that is desirable, the positive feedback loop is constrained by a negative feedback loop 
which, if successful leads to positive affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998).  
 As imagery has a causal relationship with emotion and is important in other 
anxious populations, perhaps the existence of intrusive images, in addition to intrusive 
thoughts is associated with psychological distress in cancer populations. The abundance 
and consensus of recent findings in the anxiety literature (see Hackmann & Holmes, 
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imagery in anxious cancer patients is an important next stage in formulating treatment 
strategies aimed at improving quality of life.  
2.2.  Study 1  
The general aim of the present research was to investigate to what extent the 
insights  gained  from  the  study  of  intrusive  cognitions  in  other  clinical  groups  (e.g. 
anxiety disorders) are relevant to anxious cancer patients and can be used to improve 
their quality of life. Additionally, the present study aimed to address some of the issues 
that  have  arisen  in  previous  research  concerning  intrusive  cognitions  and  cancer 
patients.  
In addition to interviewing anxious cancer patients, the present research aimed to 
interview  matched  non-anxious  patients  in  order  to  specifically  relate  intrusive 
cognitions  to  anxiety.  This  research  not  only  extends  the  cancer  literature  by 
investigating future-oriented intrusive imagery in this population for the first time, but 
also extends research that has found a higher frequency of intrusive images in anxious 
patients. Although some previous research has included a control group (e.g. Day et al., 
2004), the control group in the present study is more appropriate, as control patients 
have experienced the same stressor, without developing clinical levels of anxiety. 
 
Key research questions included: 
1.  Do anxious cancer patients experience intrusive thoughts and memories and how 
frequent/vivid/controllable/interfering  are  they,  how  long  do  they  last,  how 
distressing are they and what are the major themes?  
2.  Are there a higher number of intrusive images experienced by patients with high 
anxiety  scores?  What  is  the  nature  of  these  images?  Specifically,  how 
frequent/vivid/controllable/interfering  are  they,  how  long  do  they  last,  how 
distressing are they and what are the major themes?  
3.  Are intrusions associated with more maladaptive adjustment? 
2.2.1. Summary of background literature  
Previous  research  found  that  cancer  patients  experience  negative  intrusive 
thoughts, which were associated with marked distress (Kangas et al., 2002). However, 
studies have rarely explored the content or nature of intrusions. In addition to verbal 
intrusions,  intrusive  memories  of  illness  have  been  reported  in  cancer  patients    and   44 
found to be associated with maladaptive adjustment (Brewin et al., 1998a; Brewin et al., 
1998b).  More  recently,  intrusive  imagery  has  been  found  in  populations  of  anxious 
patients  (e.g.  Hackmann  et  al,  2000).  Intrusive  imagery  can  be  distinguished  from 
intrusive memories, as an intruding image is not of a specific event from the past, but a 
future-oriented  image,  or  de-contextualised  image  related  to  a  specific  memory. 
Investigating the presence of intrusive imagery more broadly is important as it has been 
suggested that imagery may have a causal role in the maintenance of anxiety (Hirsch et 
al.,  2004).  Based  on  the  recognition  of  cancer  as  a  protracted  experience  involving 
several different stressors (Kangas et al., 2002), future oriented visual intrusions, as well 
as  intrusive  memories  and  thoughts  may  play  a  crucial  role  in  psychological 
functioning.  The  present  investigation  was  designed  to  ascertain  more  detailed 
information pertaining to verbal intrusions reported by cancer patients and to investigate 
for the first time, whether intrusive imagery is also important.  
Brewin and colleagues (e.g. Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; Reynolds & Brewin, 
1999)  have  investigated  the  characteristics  of  intrusive  memories  in  non-clinical, 
depressed and PTSD samples. In both depressed and PTSD groups, reports of vivid, 
frequent and distressing memories have been found, which have unusual characteristics 
such a sense of reliving (Brewin, 1998). When depression was controlled for, greater 
numbers of intrusive memories were associated with maladaptive adjustment, including 
anxious preoccupation, cognitive avoidance, fatalism and hopelessness and helplessness 
in cancer patients (Brewin et al, 1998a). More recently, research has found that large 
numbers  of  patients  with  various  types  of  anxiety  disorder  report  the  presence  of 
negative intrusive imagery, which is not of a specific autobiographical event from the 
past, but a fragment of sensory information relating to the past, present or the future 
(Hackmann  et al., 2000; Day et al., 2004).  Identifying intrusive imagery  in anxious 
populations is important, because of its suggested role in the maintenance of anxiety 
(Hirsch et al., 2004) and the possibility that psychological treatments tailored to target 
intrusive imagery may  help to reduce anxiety (e.g. imagery rescripting; Arntz et al, 
2007).  
Although  relatively low prevalence rates of PTSD have been documented in 
cancer patients (Mundy et al, 2000; Andrykowski et al, 1998), these do not necessarily 
imply a lack of clinically significant distress (Green et al, 1998), as intrusive symptoms 
are often reported in the absence of full PTSD criteria (Palmer et al, 2004, Matsuoka et 
al, 2005). Previous research has  found that cancer patients also  experience negative   45 
intrusive thoughts (Kangas et al., 2002), which are related to psychological distress, 
anxiety  and maladaptive adjustment (Kangas et al., 2002; Baider et al., 1997; Matsuoka 
et al., 2002; Nordin & Glimelius, 1998). Further, the presence of  intrusive thoughts and 
memories predicts anxiety and depression at follow-up (Brewin et al, 1998b; Epping-
Jordan et al., 1999; Hipkins et al., 2004).The consensus is that intrusive cognitions have 
a significant role in the psychological distress reported by cancer patients; therefore, 
evaluation of and intervention of these symptoms may have significant implications for 
psycho-oncology services (Matsuoka et al., 2006).  
Although most research investigating intrusive thoughts in cancer patients has 
been with women, prostate cancer patients have been studied. For example, intrusions 
were  found  to  be  associated  with  poor  mental  health  in  men  with  prostate  cancer 
(Lepore & Helgeson, 1998). Social support in prostate cancer patients has been related 
to mental functioning (vitality and/or energy level/ role limitations due to emotional 
health,  problems  in  social  functioning  and  mental  health)  and  this  relationship  was 
mediated by cognitive processes, including intrusive thoughts (Roberts et al, 2005).  
Almost  all  studies  investigating  the  presence  of  intrusive  thoughts  in  cancer 
patients have used the IES (Horowitz et al., 1979), which was developed to measure 
subjective  distress  associated  with  a  traumatic  event  and  includes  intrusion  and 
avoidance items. One limitation of the IES is that it does not distinguish between types 
of intrusion or provide further information on the content or nature of intrusions. 
Another  issue  surrounding  intrusion  research  and  one  that  is  important  for 
ethically sound research practice is whether it is acceptable for patients to be questioned 
about  their  intrusions.  Previous  research  has  investigated  the  ethical  implications  of 
asking  about  trauma,  including  participant  attitude  towards  childhood  maltreatment 
trauma  questions  (Newman,  Walker,  &  Gefland,  1999;  Walker,  Newman,  Koss,  & 
Bernstein, 1997) and domestic abuse trauma questions (Johnson & Benight, 2003). A 
review summarising the findings of twelve trauma-related studies and their assessment 
of  reaction  to  research  (Newman  &  Kaloupek,  2004)  concluded  that  patients  from 
various  populations  reported  benefits  from  participating  in  trauma  related  studies, 
moderately  low  distress  levels  and  lack  of  regret  in  participating.    It  is  not  known 
whether cancer patients interviewed about intrusions find the experience distressing, or 
whether there are positive outcomes.    46 
I. Aims and hypotheses  
Although intrusive thoughts and memories have been assessed in patients with 
cancer, investigations have typically involved female cancer patients, and lacked detail 
surrounding intrusions. The present study aimed to investigate the presence of intrusive 
cognitions in prostate cancer patients, as men are understudied in this area of research. 
Looking at the presence of intrusions in people diagnosed with cancer also provides 
important insights into cognitive processes in those dealing with an ongoing sense of 
threat.  
This investigation sought to obtain more detailed information about intrusive 
thoughts  and  memories  and  for  the  first  time,  to  ask  patients  about  future-oriented 
intrusive imagery. In this study it was predicted that there would be a higher number of 
intrusive thoughts, memories and images in anxious patients compared to non-anxious 
matched controls, and all intrusions were expected to be associated with maladaptive 
adjustment. Based on previous research (Newman et al., 1999), it was also predicted 
that  asking  participants  about  intrusive  phenomena  would  not  be  associated  with 
elevated levels of distress.  
2.2.2. Method 
I. Patients 
Of  764  prostate  cancer  patients  approached  in  urology  clinics  at  the  Royal 
Marsden  NHS  Foundation  Trust,  574  (75%)  completed  and  returned  the  Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale. Patients who scored ≥ 8 or above on the anxiety sub-
scale (15.8%), were categorised as anxious (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and selected for 
the second interview stage of the study. For each anxious patient interviewed, a control 
patient was selected, based on a score of ≤ 4 or below on the anxiety sub-scale. Controls 
were  matched  on  age,  stage  of  disease,  current  treatment  and  time  since  diagnosis. 
Where more than one patient was suitable for control they were selected at random. 
At the screening phase of the study, 14 (1.8%) patients declined to participate: 
three felt too ill, two were recently widowed and were too upset to participate, one 
person felt too anxious to take part, three did not like filling in questionnaires and five 
did not give a reason. A further 176 (23%) patients failed to return the screening scale; 
thus  the  overall  response  rate  for  screening  was  75%.  There  were  no  significant 
difference between responders and non-responders on age [t(762)=0.22, P= .83] time 
since  diagnosis  [t(751)=1.00,  P=  .32]  and  disease  stage  [χ2(1)  =2.00,  P  =  .16].    47 
However, non-responders were significantly more likely to come from a different ethnic 
origin than be White British [χ2(2) = 42.59, P < .01]. 
Among  219  patients  invited  to  the  second  interview  15  (7%)  declined  to 
participate; 1 did not want to talk about their illness, 3 did not have enough time and 11 
did not specify a reason for their refusal. A further 53 patients (26%) did not respond to 
invitations to interview and the overall take-up rate for interviews was 67%. There were 
no significant differences between responders and non-responders on age [t(217) =0.44, 
P = .66], time since diagnosis [t(217)=0.92, P = .93] or ethnic origin [χ2(1) = 0.04, P = 
.84]. Responders were significantly more likely to have early-stage or advanced disease 
than locally advanced disease [χ2(2) = 14.87, P < .01], and responders were more likely 
to be anxious than non-responders [χ2(1) =12.02, P < .01].  
A priori power calculations indicated that to detect a medium effect size between 
two groups (d = 0.50) at  α = .05, a total of 130 patients yields statistical power of 0.88 
(Cohen, 1988).   One hundred and forty six patients were interviewed  , but 5 non-
anxious patients were excluded as they did not match patients in the anxious group, 10 
anxious  patients  were  excluded  from  the  sample  as  they  no  longer  met  criteria  for 
anxiety  on  the  HAD  scale  and  1  anxious  patient  was  excluded  due  to  incomplete 
interview data. The final sample consisted of 65 anxious patients and 65 controls.  
II. Measures 
 Screening  
The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-item self report scale which was 
developed specifically for the measurement of depression and anxiety in physically ill 
populations. The scale has two subscales consisting of 7 items, one for anxiety and one 
for depression, with a score range of 0-21. Items overlapping with possible physical 
symptoms (e.g. problems sleeping) are excluded in order to provide an unbiased scale. 
A large scale validation study of the HADS (Spinhoven et al., 1997) was conducted on 
various  age  groups  of  Dutch  participants  (N=  6165)  and  revealed  a  clear  2  factor 
solution corresponding to anxiety and depression sub-scales. Across age groups (e.g. 
18-65  years,  57-65  years,  >65  years),  the  reliability  of  the  scale  was  high  with 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient ranging from .82-.84 for the anxiety subscale, .71-.79 on 
the depression subscale and .84-.88 on the total HAD score. The scale also showed high 
test re-test reliability (after a mean interval of 22 days) with a Pearson product moment   48 
correlation coefficient of .89, .86 and .91 (P < .001) between test and retest subscale 
scores for anxiety, depression and total score respectively.  
The subscale scores of depression and anxiety have also been validated in cancer 
patients. For example, principal components analysis in a sample of 568 cancer patients 
revealed a 2 factor solution corresponding to anxiety and depression and high internal 
consistency (α  > .70) (Moorey, Greer,  & Watson, 1991). The HADS  has also been 
found to be an effective screening instrument and measure of psychological distress 
when compared to the SCID (Payne, Hoffman, Theodoulou, Dosik, & Massie, 1999).  
 Interview session 
 Mini-Mental Adjustment of Cancer Scale (Mini-MAC) 
The Mini-MAC (Watson et al., 1994) is a 29-item self report scale used to assess 
patients  coping  responses  to  a  cancer  diagnosis.  It  has  5  sub-scales:  helplessness-
hopelessness, cognitive avoidance, fighting sprit, anxious preoccupation and fatalism. 
The  scale  reveals  good  construct  validity  with  an  inverse  correlation  between 
helplessness and hopelessness (R = -.50) and fighting spirit and a positive association 
between helplessness-hopelessness and anxious preoccupation (R = .52). Thus although 
the subscales are associated to some extent, they do not measure identical dimensions 
(Watson et al, 1994). Internal consistency was also acceptable with Cronbach’s alpha 
for subscales as follows; helplessness-hopelessness, α= .87, anxious preoccupation, α= 
.88, cognitive avoidance, α=.74, fighting spirit, α= .76 and fatalism, α =.62. 
 A more recent study validating the use of the Mini-MAC in an Italian sample 
(N= 157, sub-sample of 430 patients; Grassi et al., 2005), has also found high test re-test 
reliability after a 3 month period (all correlations were significant at P < .001 and there 
were  no  significant  differences  between  any  of  the  scales  between  the  two  time 
intervals, P > .05). Factor analysis, using Varimax rotation confirmed the use of a 5 
factor solution and this has also been supported by validation of the scale in a Greek 
sample using structural equation modelling (Anagnostopoulos, Kolokotroni, Spanea, & 
Chryssochoou,  2006).  In  the  present  study  Cronbach’s  alpha  for  subscales  were; 
hopelessness/helplessness, α=.81; anxious preoccupation, α=.85, cognitive avoidance, 
α=.86; fighting spirit, α=.62 and fatalism, α=.48. 
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  Impact of Events Scale  
The IES (Horowitz et al., 1979) is a 15-item self report scale which examines 
subjective distress as a result of a specific event. The IES is made up of two sub-scales 
of intrusion and avoidance and each item is rated on a four-point scale from not at all, 
rarely, sometimes or often. The intrusion subscale measures a traumatic response type 
which involves forbidden thoughts and images, strong feelings and repetitive behaviour. 
The  avoidance  subscale  measures  a  traumatic  response  type  involving  ideational 
constriction,  denial  of  meanings,  blunted  sensation  and  awareness  of  emotional 
numbness (Horowitz et al, 1979).  
Sundin  &  Horowitz  (2002)  statistically  analysed  23  studies  which  have 
evaluated  the  psychometric  properties  of  the  IES.  In  terms  of  reliability,  internal 
consistency is high, with Cronbach’s alpha of α= .86 for IES intrusion and α=.82 for 
avoidance. Stability of the IES is also sound, with high test re-test reliability (.87 and 
.79 for intrusion and avoidance sub-scales respectively). Content and construct validity 
is acceptable, with the majority of published studies suggesting an underlying structure 
of two factors (Sundin  & Horowitz, 2002). Further, in the initial report on the  IES 
(Horowitz, 1976), the correlation between intrusion and avoidance was .41, indicating a 
substantial level of variable independence. In more recent studies, the mean correlation 
was .63, which still suggests that each subscale is measuring a different type of stress 
reaction (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002).   
 Following Brewin and colleagues, participants in the present study were asked 
to complete the IES in response to the most intrusive memories, thoughts and images 
(e.g. Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; Brewin et al, 1998a). According to Sundin & Horowitz 
(2002), the IES is a useful measure of stress reactions after a range of traumatic events 
and thus conceptualising intrusive cognitions as a traumatic stressor in their own right 
still lends itself to the use of the IES.  
 Intrusive Cognitions 
  A structured interview (Patel et al., 2007) was employed for the assessment of 
intrusive cognitions over the past week. Intrusive cognitions were defined as consisting 
of memories, images and thoughts that occurred repeatedly. “Memories” were defined 
as visual pictures of specific event that occurred to the individual in the past. Memories 
were elaborated and contextualised (e.g. a memory of being in hospital on a particular 
day with a family member who is dying) (Patel et al, 2007). “Images” were defined as   50 
specific visual pictures relating to the past, present or future. Unlike memories, images 
from the past consisted of brief snapshots with no surrounding context (e.g. of a family 
member’s ill face). Visual intrusions were coded as either memories or images, and 
there was complete agreement between two independent raters (κ = 1.00). “Thoughts” 
was defined as verbal content referring to the past, present or future. If more than two 
intrusions were reported, patients were asked to identify and concentrate on the two 
most distressing intrusive cognitions.  
Questions asked in relation to all intrusive cognitions  included a description of 
the  intrusion,  associated  emotions  (i.e.  sadness,  guilt,  shame,  anger,  anxiety  and 
helplessness; 0 = not at all, 100 = very much so), frequency (0 = none of the time, 100 =  
all of the time), duration (1= seconds, 2 = minutes, 3 = hours), interference with daily 
life (0 = not at all, 100 = severely), uncontrollability (0 = not at all, 100 = completely) 
and associated distress (0 = not at all, 100 = severely).  
A validity check was conducted for intrusive thoughts, to ensure that repetitive 
intrusive thoughts were being reported, rather than general rumination and worrying 
with regards to the cancer experience. Patients were asked to rate whether the intrusive 
thought they  were reporting was always the same or whether it varied; 0 = always 
different,  100  =  always  the  same.  Overall,  participants  reported  that  the  intrusive 
thoughts were nearly always the same (mean = 83.68, S.D. = 19.21), and no individual 
report, was lower than 60 (mostly the same).  
For memories and images, participants were asked how vivid the image was (0 = 
hazy memory, 100 = clearest and vividest memory). For images of past events, patients 
were asked whether it felt as though they were reliving the memory (0 = not at all, 100 
= very much so) and accompanying emotional and physical sensations (0 = not at all, 
100 = very much so). For images that were not past events, patients were asked if the 
image was related to an event that had actually happened.  
 The Research Participation Questionnaire (RPQ) 
The  RPQ  used  in  the  present  study  was  based  on  the  reactions  to  research 
participation questionnaires for Parents (RRPQ-P; Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002), 
comprising 12 items ranked on a 5 point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. Examples of questions include “Being in this study made me feel upset or sad”, 
“I am sorry I was in this study” and “I knew I could stop at anytime”. The possible 
range of scores was from 0 (very poor feedback) to 60 (completely positive feedback).   51 
The RRPQ-P had an internal consistency of between α= 0.78 and α =0.80 and factor 
analysis  revealed  factors  including  knowing  one’s  rights  and  making  a  contribution 
through research practice and other positive or negative appraisals of participating in 
research. Adults reported high acceptability  and comprehension of the  questionnaire 
(Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002) . 
III. Procedure 
  Ethical  approval  for  the  study  was  obtained  from  the  Local  Research  Ethics 
Committee.  A  consecutive  series  of  outpatients  attending  follow-up  urology  clinics 
were invited to participate. Patients were given the HADS to complete in clinic, or to 
complete at home and return by mail. Patients subsequently identified as anxious were 
contacted and invited to participate in an interview, either on the telephone or at the 
Royal Marsden Hospital. Control patients matched on age, stage of cancer, treatment 
and time since diagnosis, using information from the hospital computer systems, were 
selected for interview. If a time lapse of more than 21 days had passed since the initial 
screening,  participants  were  asked  to  repeat  the  HADS  questionnaire,  to  ensure 
eligibility.  Patients  interviewed  also  completed  the  IES  in  response  to  any  reported 
intrusions (see Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  Participants were asked to complete the 
Mini-MAC scale and RPQ.   
2.2.3. Results 
I. Characteristics of the groups 
The demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics of the total sample, 
non-anxious group, and anxious group are presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics [n (%)], of the 
total sample (N=130), non-anxious (n=65) and anxious groups (n=65).  
 
Characteristic  Total sample 
 
Non-anxious 
group  
Anxious 
group  
Difference between 
anxious and non-
anxious groups 
Age  67.07 (6.70)  67.34 (6.10)  66.80 (7.29)  t(128) = 0.45, P = .65 
Ethnic Origin 
White British 
Other 
 
123 (94.6) 
    7   (5.4) 
 
64 (98.5) 
1 (1.5) 
 
59 (90.8) 
6 (9.2) 
 
χ2(1) = 3.78, P = .06 
Marital status 
Married/Living with a 
partner 
Other 
 
105 (80.8) 
 
   25 (19.2) 
 
56 (86.2) 
 
9 (13.8) 
 
49 (75.4) 
 
16 (24.6) 
 
χ2(1) = 2.43, P = .12 
Education 
Left school before 15 
Secondary education 
College or specialised 
training 
University or equivalent 
Unknown 
 
19 (14.6) 
34 (26.2) 
30 (23.1) 
 
40 (30.7) 
7 (5.4) 
 
 
9 (13.8) 
13 (20.0) 
16 (24.6) 
 
25 (38.5) 
2 (3.1) 
 
10 (15.4) 
21 (32.3) 
14 (21.5) 
 
15 (23.1) 
5 (7.7) 
 
χ2(3) = 4.50, P = .21 
Employment 
Employed full-time 
Employed part-time 
Retired 
Unknown 
 
11 (8.5) 
27 (20.7) 
91 (70) 
1 (0.8) 
 
6 (9.2) 
14 (21.5) 
45 (69.2) 
0 (0) 
 
5 (7.7) 
13 (20.0) 
46 (70.8) 
1 (1.5) 
 
χ2(2) = 0.13, P = .94 
Occupation 
Manual 
Non-manual 
Unknown 
 
18 (13.8) 
65 (50) 
47 (36.2) 
 
10 (15.4) 
35 (53.8) 
20 (30.8) 
 
8 (12.3) 
30 (46.2) 
27 (41.5) 
 
χ2(2) = 1.66, P = .44 
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Table 2 continued (clinical and psychological variables) 
Characteristic  Total sample 
 
Non-anxious 
group  
Anxious 
group  
Difference between 
anxious and non-
anxious groups 
Time since diagnosis 
(months) 
39.98 (33.04)  40.35 (32.88)  39.60 (33.44)  t(128) = 0.13, P = .90 
Cancer Stage 
Early 
Locally advanced 
Advanced 
 
89 (68.5) 
14 (10.7) 
27 (20.8) 
 
45 (69.2) 
7 (10.8) 
13 (20) 
 
44 (67.7) 
7 (10.8) 
14 (21.5) 
 
χ2(2) = 0.05, P = .98 
Treatment 
Active surveillance 
On treatment 
Post-treatment 
Undecided 
 
35 (26.9) 
45 (34.6) 
44 (33.8) 
6 (4.6) 
 
19 (29.2) 
25 (38.5) 
19 (29.2) 
2 (3.1) 
 
16 (24.6) 
20 (30.8) 
25 (38.5) 
4 (6.2) 
 
χ2(2) = 1.60, P = .45 
Interview type 
In-person 
Telephone 
 
60 (46) 
70 (54) 
 
30 (46) 
35 (54) 
 
30 (46) 
35 (54) 
 
Time since HAD 
completion (days) 
 
7.63 (6.90) 
 
7.90 (6.86) 
 
7.66 (6.99) 
 
t(128) = 0.05, P = .96 
 
HADS- depression   3.71 (3.55)  1.43 (1.42)  5.98 (1.42)  t(128) = 9.53,  
P < .01, d=1.67 
 
HADS- anxiety  
 
6.06 (4.81) 
 
1.69 (1.39) 
 
10.43 (2.42) 
t(128) = 25.21, 
 P < .01, d= 4.44 
 
II. Number and type of intrusive cognitions 
Thirty patients (23%) reported an intrusive cognition, of whom four reported at 
least one additional intrusion. Of these, two patients reported an additional intrusion 
which was the same type as the first, one patient reported an intrusive memory and an 
intrusive image and one reported an intrusive memory and an intrusive thought. Of the 
34 intrusions reported in total, 8 were intrusive memories, 7 were intrusive images, and 
19  were  intrusive  thoughts.  There  was  no  significant  difference  in  whether  patients 
reported  intrusive  cognitions  according  to  whether  patients  were  interviewed  on  the 
telephone or in person [χ2 (1) = 0.23, P = .63].    54 
III. Content of intrusions 
Twenty-five  (74%)  of  the  intrusive  cognitions  related  to  the  person’s  own 
experience  of  having  cancer  and  five  (15%)  of  the  intrusions  were  in  relation  to  a 
relative’s  illness,  injury  and  death  (three  specifically  from  cancer).  In  total  82%  of 
reported intrusions were specifically  related to  cancer.  Four (11%) of the intrusions 
were unrelated to illness and death but were all related to feelings of past or future 
failures. The presence of intrusive cognitions was not related to disease stage [R=.00, P 
= .98]; thus, cancer-specific intrusions may represent more general subjective threats of 
the disease rather than threats specific to prognosis.  For intrusive imagery, four of 
seven reported images were related to a past event. Of the three reported images that 
were not related to past events, all were future oriented. For intrusive thoughts, the 
majority (12 of 19) of intrusions were future oriented, 3 were related to past events, 2 
were related to present concerns, and 2 were both past oriented and future oriented (see 
Table 3 for type, content, and timescale of each intrusion).  
Table 3 Description type, content and time-scale of intrusive cognitions. 
Intrusive  Memories  Timescale 
Father lying in bed, dying of cancer  Past oriented 
Being informed of mother’s death  Past oriented 
Being trapped in a magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) scanner 
Past oriented 
Watching two men dying of cancer while staying 
in a hospice for treatment 
Past oriented 
Stomach operation going wrong, and stomach 
bursting open 
Past oriented 
Girlfriend leaving him over 50 years ago  Past oriented 
Sitting in the doctor’s surgery and reading a 
newspaper article about misdiagnoses.  
Past oriented 
Being told that sister had suffered a stroke and 
was severely ill 
Past oriented 
Intrusive Images/ “Snapshots”  Timescale 
Self in hospital   Past oriented 
Self having a biopsy  Past oriented 
Self as an old man sitting at desk at school  Past oriented 
His own face as his fathers face, who died from  Past oriented   55 
prostate cancer  
House falling apart  Future oriented 
Self dying, deteriorating health  Future oriented 
Self being ill, and cancer spreading  Future oriented 
Intrusive Thoughts  Time-scale 
 Prostate specific antigen (PSA) level and 
worrying about health, concerns about what the 
doctor will say at next 3 monthly meeting 
Future oriented 
 Health concerns and fears about the future  Future oriented 
 Wife, who recently died of cancer  Past oriented 
 How things will be further down the line, if 
disease progresses.  
Future oriented 
 “I am going to die”  Future oriented 
 Uncertain future and worries concerning cancer 
and implications 
Future oriented 
 Money and the future  Future oriented 
 Recurrence of cancer, cancer getting worse and 
the possibility of dying.  
Future oriented 
 Telling his daughters about the illness, fear of 
things getting worse.  
Future oriented 
 Cancer and progressing, worries about wife, 
can't imagine her without him 
Future oriented 
 Death  Future oriented 
 “I am going to die”  Future oriented 
 Dying, the ultimate end. Described it as “a 
blockage called death”. 
Future oriented 
 The future, how treatment seems to have failed 
and fear of death. Thoughts about brother, who 
died of prostate cancer.  
Past & future oriented 
 Operation and problems with having a catheter   Past oriented 
 Being a failure and not achieving in life and 
feeling frustrated with health 
Past oriented 
 Recent treatment for radiotherapy and feeling 
weaker than before, fears of dying. Thoughts 
surrounding friend's death from  prostate cancer 
Past & future oriented   56 
 Leg pain and what cancer must be doing in order 
to cause the pain 
Present oriented 
Treatment options;  concerns about aches and 
pains and cancer spreading 
Present oriented 
 
IV. Characteristics of intrusive cognitions 
Of the 34 intrusive cognitions 6 lasted only seconds, 23 lasted minutes and 5 
lasted hours. Intrusions were reported to occur just over half the time in the past week 
(mean = 55.00, S.D. = 24.59) and interfere moderately with daily life (mean = 47.20, 
S.D. = 33.62). Intrusions were reported to be severely uncontrollable (mean = 70.00, 
S.D. = 35.40), and moderately-severely distressing (mean = 58.53, S.D. = 32.44). Mean 
subjective distress associated with intrusions, measured by the IES was 17.76 (S.D. = 
8.88) for avoidance, 18.06 (S.D. = 7.41) for intrusion and 35.82 (S.D = 12.70) for total 
IES score.  Analyses investigating the difference between visual and verbal intrusions 
on  impact  of  intrusions  found  no  significant  differences  (P  >  .05)  for  frequency, 
interference, uncontrollability, associated distress or IES scores.  
 For the 30 patients reporting intrusive cognitions, it was investigated to what 
extent  certain  emotions  were  associated  with  the  intrusions  (Table  4).  A  repeated-
measures  analysis of variance  (ANOVA)  was conducted. For patients reporting two 
intrusive cognitions, one intrusion was chosen at random to be included in the analysis. 
There  was  a  significant  difference  between  how  strongly  various  emotions  were 
associated with intrusive cognitions [F(2, 145) = 25.14, P < .01, ηp
2 = 0.46]. Sadness, 
anxiety and helplessness were most strongly associated with intrusive cognitions and 
least significant difference (LSD) pair wise comparisons revealed that there were no 
significant  differences  between  these  three  emotions.  Guilt  and  shame  were  least 
strongly associated with intrusive cognitions and LSD pair wise comparisons revealed 
that these were not significantly different from each other. All other LSD pair wise 
comparisons were significant at P < .01, although the difference between sadness and 
anger was significant at P < .05.  
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Table 4 Emotions associated with intrusive cognitions (n=30) 
Emotion  Mean (S.D.)  
Sadness  56.83 (31.03)
a 
Guilt  13.83 (25.31)
c 
Shame  8.00 (19.72)
c 
Anger  35.50 (32.55)
b 
Anxiety  64.17 (29.04)
a 
Helplessness  58.17 (34.05)
a 
Range, 0 (not at all associated) to 100 (very much so associated). Means followed by 
different letters differ significantly, according to how much they are associated with 
intrusive cognitions (P < .05) 
V. Specific characteristics of intrusive memories and images 
Intrusive memories were reported to be vivid (mean = 88.75, S.D. = 21.00; 0 = 
hazy memory, 100 = clearest and vividest memory). In addition, patients reported that 
when they experienced the memory, it felt as though it was not just a past event but 
happening all over again (mean = 70.00, S.D. = 36.65; 0 = not at all, 100 = very much 
so).  Patients  reported  “somewhat”  (mean  =  62.50,  S.D.  =  33.70)  re-experiencing 
emotions the same as or very similar to those reported during the actual event, whilst re-
experiencing of physical sensations was rare, (mean = 27.50, S.D. = 36.55; 0 = not at all 
and 100 = very much so). Intrusive images were also reported to be vivid (mean = 
70.71, S.D. = 23.00).  
VI. Intrusive cognitions and anxiety 
Fisher’s  Exact  Tests  were  conducted  in  order  to  assess  differences  in  the 
likelihood  of  anxious  and  non-anxious  patients  reporting  each  type  of  intrusive 
cognition. These confirmed that anxious patients reported significantly more intrusive 
imagery (7 of 65), than non-anxious patients (0 of 65) (P < .01), significantly more 
intrusive  thoughts  (18  of  65)  than  non-anxious  patients  (1  of  65),  (P  <  .01)  and 
significantly more intrusive memories (7 of 65) than non-anxious patients (1 of 65), (P 
< .05).  
In order to investigate any linear relationship between the number of intrusive 
cognitions and anxiety level, the total sample was divided into 3 groups; non-anxious (n 
=  65,  HADS  ≤  4),  mildly  anxious  (n  =  41,  HADS  ≤10)  and  moderate  to  severely 
anxious (n = 24, HADS > 10). This classification follows Snaith and Zigmond’s (1994)   58 
criteria  for  identifying  mild  (8-10),  moderate  (11-14)  and  severe  (15-21)  cases  of 
anxiety using the HADS (Snaith & Zigmond, 1994). A one-way ANOVA indicated a 
significant overall effect of anxiety category on number of intrusive cognitions reported 
[F(2,127)  =  22.63,  P  <  .01,  ηp
2  =  0.26].  A  polynomial  contrast  analysis  revealed  a 
significant linear trend (contrast estimate = 0.48, P < .01) of intrusive cognitions across 
ordered levels of the anxiety variable.  
VII. Intrusive cognitions and coping with cancer 
Biserial  correlations  between  the  presence  and  the  absence  of  intrusive 
cognitions and Mini-MAC score for adjustment to cancer showed that, when anxiety 
was statistically controlled for, the presence of intrusive cognitions was significantly 
correlated with helplessness-hopelessness and anxious preoccupation (Table 5).  
 
Table 5 Correlations between the presence and the absence of intrusive cognitions 
and coping with cancer (N=130) 
Mini-MAC subscales  Presence/absence of 
intrusive cognitions 
Presence/absence of 
intrusive cognitions 
(controlling for anxiety) 
Helplessness-hopelessness  0.47**  0.27** 
Anxious pre-occupation  0.55**  0.34** 
Fighting spirit  0.06  0.15 
Cognitive avoidance  0.35**  0.14 
Fatalism  0.03  0.04 
**P < .01, one-tailed 
VIII. The RPQ 
Of  130  participants,  129  completed  the  RPQ;  feedback  was  positive,  with  a 
range of scores from 44 to 60 (mean = 55.71, S.D. 3.71), out of a maximum score of 60. 
There was no significant difference on average RPQ score [t(127) = 0.11, P =  .91, 
between anxious (mean = 55.75, S.D. = 3.94) and non-anxious (mean = 55.68, S.D. = 
3.50) patients and no significant difference on average RPQ score [t(127) = 0.99, P =  
.32] between those reporting intrusive cognitions (mean = 56.30, S.D. = 2.77) and those 
not reporting intrusive cognitions (mean = 55.54, S.D. = 3.94).     59 
2.2.4. Discussion 
In this study, the presence of intrusive cognitions in prostate cancer patients was 
shown  to  be  related  to  higher  levels  of  anxiety,  and  not  to  stage  of  disease.  The 
frequency  of  intrusions  in  the  present  study  is  similar  to  the  frequency  of  intrusive 
memories found in a matched sample of depressed and non-depressed cancer patients 
(Brewin et al, 1998a). Moreover, the content of intrusive cognitions matches the pattern 
of results described by  Brewin et al  (1998a).   Intrusive cognitions were most often 
related to personal experience of illness or were related to a relative’s illness, injury or 
death. The most common type of intrusion reported was thoughts, supporting previous 
research in a non-clinical population, which also found that intrusive thoughts were 
more common than intrusive memories (Brewin et al., 1996). Although it is unclear 
why intrusive thoughts are most common, the finding that there are differences in the 
amount  that  different  types  of  intrusion  were  reported  supports  the  utility  of 
distinguishing between them. The finding also contrasts with research in PTSD samples, 
where  intrusive  imagery  is  more  common  than  intrusive  thoughts  (Ehlers  &  Steil, 
1995). This is important, because firstly intrusive thoughts were initially investigated in 
cancer patients following the inclusion of cancer as a stressor that could precipitate 
PTSD and thus it is unclear why other research has failed to assess the presence of 
intrusive  imagery  in  cancer  patients.  Secondly,  if  the  types  of  intrusive  cognitions 
reported  by  cancer  patients  are  different  from  individuals  with  PTSD,  this  may  be 
further  evidence  for  moving  away  from  a  strict  PTSD  framework  to  understand 
psychological  distress  in  cancer  patients.  Rather,  research  could  focus  on  the 
phenomenology of intrusive cognitions in order to understand how these intrusions are 
similar  as  well  as  different  from  intrusive  symptoms  reported  by  other  populations, 
including psychiatric and non-psychiatric samples.  
 The findings that patients reported future oriented intrusive imagery and that the 
majority of intrusive thoughts were future oriented also have significant implications for 
clinical practice and for research investigating cancer-related distress within a PTSD 
framework (Kangas et al, 2002). Asking about future-oriented intrusions is equally as 
important as asking about intrusive distressing recollections and flashbacks of events 
that have occurred in the past.  
In  line  with  previous  findings,  the  experience  of  intrusive  memories  was 
associated with feelings that the memory was not just a past event but was happening all 
over again, “right now” (e.g. Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004). Hackmann   60 
et al (2004) suggested that the subjective feeling of “nowness” is consistent with the 
notion that intrusive memories result from a lack of information updating, as described 
by theories of PTSD and intrusive phenomena (Brewin et al, 1996; Horowitz, 1986). 
The  characteristics  found  to  be  associated  with  intrusive  images  paralleled  previous 
work (e.g. Hackmann et al., 2000) which found across several anxious groups  that 
intrusive  imagery  is  extremely  vivid  and,  whilst  lacking  context,  can  be  related  to 
meaningful events such as a past episode of bullying (Hackmann et al, 2000). In the 
present study, the majority of reported images were related to a meaningful event in the 
past such as a parent’s death or previous negative experiences of hospitals. 
Importantly, the correlations between intrusive cognitions and aspects of coping 
were similar to results reported elsewhere (Brewin et al, 1998a), where anxious pre-
occupation and helplessness/hopelessness were associated with an increased number of 
intrusive memories. Previous research has also found in a sample of depressed women 
that reporting intrusive memories of negative events from childhood was significantly 
associated with avoidant coping (Kuyken & Brewin, 1999). This implies that targeting 
intrusions using distraction (e.g. Andrade et al., 1997) or imagery techniques (Arntz et 
al, 2007) may alleviate their impact  and reduce psychological distress.  
In  addition  to  the  similarities,  there  were  also  some  differences  between  the 
present findings and previous research. For example, while prostate cancer patients in 
the anxious group reported significantly more intrusions than prostate cancer patients in 
the non-anxious group, overall, anxious patients reported fewer intrusions than found in 
other populations and reported less overall impact of intrusions (Reynolds & Brewin, 
1998). This is consistent with research on intrusive memories in cancer patients (Brewin 
et al, 1998a), which emphasised that depressed cancer patients did not report intrusive 
memories as often as depressed psychiatric patients (Brewin, 1998).  
A  possible  explanation  may  be  that  patients  in  the  anxious  group  were  less 
anxious  compared  to  patients  in  the  psychiatric  populations  previously  studied.  The 
significant linear trend in this sample between the number of intrusive cognitions and 
level of anxiety suggests that highly anxious cancer patients would report equivalent 
levels of verbal and visual intrusions as other anxious groups.  
Another possible explanation for the reduced frequency and impact of intrusive 
cognitions is that the perceived meaning of intrusive cognitions may be qualitatively 
different for patients with cancer, compared to other anxious groups. For example, it has 
been  suggested  that  the  patient’s  interpretation  of  intrusive  cognitions  determines   61 
intrusion-related distress and negative intrusion appraisal can lead to increased intrusion 
frequency due to associated maladaptive coping and inadequate processing of trauma 
related  information  (Ehlers  &  Steil,  1995).  Future  research  investigating  intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients should take intrusion appraisal into account in order to 
clarify this further. Further research may also be required to illuminate whether there is 
a difference in the impact of intrusive cognitions between visual and verbal intrusions, 
as the reported non-significant difference may have been due to small numbers.  
Another notable difference was that individuals reporting intrusive memories in 
the present study did not appear to re-experience physical sensations experienced during 
the traumatic  event. A  possible explanation for this unexpected response is that the 
traumatic experience may be different from other stressors and thus patients may not 
have experienced accompanying physical sensations at the time of the reported memory 
and so do not re-experience them later. Some of the memories reported were of an event 
that was happening to someone else, for example, of watching someone else suffering 
from cancer.  In  addition, some of the memories related to experiences of hospitals, 
where  physical  sensations  may  have  been  inhibited  due  to  pain  killers  or  other 
medication.  This  account  requires  clarification  with  further  research,  as  a  relatively 
small  number  of  memories  were  reported  overall.  Another  possible  explanation  for 
relatively  low  levels  of  reexperiencing  in  cancer  patients  is  provided  by  Holmes  & 
Bourne (2008), who suggested that the fleeting nature of typical stressors (e.g. physical 
assault)  leads  to  intense  focus  on  sensory  components  experienced  at  the  time  of 
trauma. For cancer patients, the ongoing nature of the stressor may not allow for this 
intense focus, so subsequent reexperiencing of sensations is rare. 
The present study was not without its limitations. For example, the sample was 
demographically  homogenous;  including  mainly  White  British,  married,  retired  and 
well educated men and thus it is unclear whether the results are applicable to more 
diverse populations. Particularly, previous research has suggested that women are more 
likely to experience PTSD symptomatology (Hampton & Frombach, 2000; Deimling et 
al., 2002) and thus there is a possibility that female cancer patients would report higher 
numbers of intrusive cognitions than prostate cancer patients.  These limitations should 
be addressed by sampling more diverse groups of cancer patients. It may also be that 
intrusive symptoms are more common in different groups of patients such as advanced 
cancer patients compared to early stage cancer patients. Previous research has reported 
mixed  findings  in  terms  of  the  impact  of  disease  stage  on  PTSD  symptoms  (e.g.   62 
Cordova et al., 1995; Kelly et al., 1995) and this remains an issue for future research. 
Another  limitation  is  the  use  of  a  cross-sectional  design  as  prospective  research  is 
important for elucidating causal relationships between intrusive symptoms, anxiety and 
maladaptive adjustment. Furthermore, the present study did not assess the participants’ 
psychiatric  history  of  PTSD  and  depression,  both  of  which  have  been  shown  to  be 
associated with intrusive memories and thoughts. Finally, future research may benefit 
from making a distinction between cancer-related distress and anxiety unrelated to the 
cancer experience.  
In conclusion, the present study confirmed the link between intrusive cognitions 
and psychological morbidity in an under-researched group; men with cancer. The study 
extended previous findings by providing further information on the nature and content 
of  these  intrusions  and  by  illuminating  the  potential  role  of  intrusive  imagery  and 
future-oriented  intrusive  thoughts  in  psychological  distress  among  cancer  patients. 
Consistent with previous trauma-related research (Newman et al., 1999), there was no 
evidence  to  suggest  that  participants  found  being  questioned  about  their  intrusions 
distressing; indeed the interview was often perceived as beneficial.  The results show 
that  treatment  approaches  targeted  at  various  types  of  intrusive  cognitions,  such  as 
imagery rescripting, may have a useful part to play in the management of some anxious 
cancer patients.  
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Study  1  found  that  anxious  cancer  patients  experienced  negative  intrusive 
cognitions, including thoughts, memories and images which were often associated with 
feelings  of  sadness,  helplessness-hopelessness  and  were  interfering  and  difficult  to 
control. However, intrusions were less common than found in psychiatric populations 
(e.g.  Hackmann  et  al.,  2000)  and  were  associated  with  less  distress.  Possible 
explanations for the finding that intrusive cognitions were less impacting for anxious 
cancer  patients  include  the  relatively  mild  levels  of  anxiety  reported  in  the  sample 
population  and  the  possibility  that  patients  with  cancer  appraised  cognitions  in  a 
qualitatively  different  way  from  other  groups.    Negative  appraisal  of  intrusive 
cognitions  has  been  identified  as  a  key  cognitive  mechanism  that  mediates  the 
management of intrusive cognitions in PSTD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000) and depression (Starr & Moulds, 2006).  In Study 1, cancer patients reported 
experiencing  negative  intrusive  cognitions,  often  about  illness,  injury  or  death. 
However, because cancer patients have the concrete and ongoing stressor of a physical 
illness, intrusions may be appraised as a normal stress response reaction, rather than a 
sign of mental fragility. It is important to further apply cognitive models (e.g. Ehlers 
and Steil, 1995) of intrusive symptoms to cancer patients, in order to ascertain whether 
intrusive cognitions are qualitatively different for physically ill patients, compared to 
patients with depression or anxiety disorders. As the present research has shown that 
experiencing intrusive cognitions is related to anxiety in cancer patients, understanding 
the mechanisms involved in their maintenance is key to uncovering ways to alleviate 
intrusive cognitions and associated psychological distress.  
  The present study aimed to further investigate intrusive cognitions in a group of 
anxious cancer patients by investigating a larger, more diverse sample of intrusions and 
by investigating, for the first time, how cancer patients appraise and cope with intrusive 
cognitions.  
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3.1.  Study 2  
3.1.1. Negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions 
I. Negative appraisal of intrusions in PTSD 
Although  intrusive  thoughts  have  been  extensively  investigated  in  cancer 
patients (Kangas et al., 2002) and the presence of intrusive imagery has now also been 
considered in more detail in Study 1, the appraisal of such cognitions has yet to be 
investigated. Understanding appraisal of intrusions is important for therapeutic reasons, 
because  modifying  negative  appraisals  may  be  a  successful  treatment  approach  for 
reducing anxiety (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). The concept of intrusion appraisal was first 
discussed by Ehlers & Steil (1995) in their cognitive approach to posttraumatic stress 
disorder. Based on previous research, (e.g. Mayou, Bryant, & Duthie, 1993), it was 
suggested that in addition to the frequency of intrusive cognitions, the idiosyncratic 
meaning of intrusions may have an impact on the development of PTSD and PTSD 
severity (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). For example, Mayou et al (1993) found that if patients 
described their intrusive cognitions of road traffic accidents as “horrific”, they were 
likely to meet criteria for PTSD at 1 year follow-up. According to Ehlers & Steil (1995) 
the  meaning  attributed  to  the  experience  of  intrusive  recollections  determines  how 
distressing the intrusions are (e.g. “horrific” is taken as a sign of distress in the previous 
example) and the extent to which patients engage in coping strategies to control the 
intrusions. Coping strategies are implicated in symptom maintenance, as they prevent a 
change in the meaning of the trauma and subsequent recollections. 
Negative appraisal of intrusive recollections is described as the belief that the 
presence of uncontrollable intrusions indicates something negative about the self (e.g. “I 
am  going  mad”),  or  the  world.    In  particular,  Ehlers  &  Steil  (1995)  suggested  that 
although some patients view intrusive cognitions as a normal stress response reaction to 
trauma,  other  patients  interpret  intrusions  in  a  negative  way,  for  example  as  an 
indication that they cannot cope.  Further, they suggested that patients who appraise 
intrusive cognitions negatively are more likely to engage in maladaptive behaviour such 
as avoidance.  In turn, maladaptive coping strategies maintain intrusive symptoms in 
patients with PTSD by preventing adequate processing of trauma related information 
and thus increasing intrusion frequency (Ehlers & Steil, 1995).  
Research  supporting  the  notion  that  appraisal  is  an  important  factor  in  the 
maintenance  of  intrusive  symptoms  includes  several  cross-sectional  and  prospective   66 
studies.  Clohessy  &  Ehlers  (1999)  found  that  49%  of  ambulance  workers  reported 
experiencing intrusive memories and negative interpretation of intrusions (e.g. “some 
day I will go out of my mind”) was significantly associated with PTSD severity and 
general  psychiatric  symptoms.  Negative  appraisal  was  also  associated  with  distress 
reported in relation to intrusions, even when intrusion frequency was controlled for. 
Further, negative appraisal was significantly associated with rumination (e.g. “I dwell 
on it”, “I think about what I could have done differently”), suppression (e.g. “I try to 
push it out of my mind”) and dissociation (how detached or numb they felt when the 
memories  occurred),  after  controlling  for  intrusion  frequency  (Clohessy  &  Ehlers, 
1999). Research assessing the prevalence of PTSD in staff working in an accident and 
emergency  department  found  that  negative  appraisal  of  intrusive  cognitions  was 
associated with PTSD severity (Laposa & Alden, 2003).   
A cross-sectional study investigating the cognitive factors involved in the onset 
and  maintenance  of  PTSD  was  conducted  with  individuals  who  had  experienced  a 
physical  or  sexual  assault  in  the  past  3  months  (Dunmore,  Clark,  &  Ehlers,  1999). 
Individuals were interviewed and divided in to two groups, according to whether they 
currently  met  criteria  for  PTSD  or  not.  Questionnaires  were  devised  to  assess 
participant’s  appraisal  of  various  aspects  of  the  assault,  including  their  appraisal  of 
PTSD symptoms, such as intrusions (e.g. “Something terrible will happen if I do not try 
to control my thoughts about the assault”). In terms of intrusion appraisal, it was found 
that the PTSD group reported significantly more negative appraisals of their symptoms 
in the month after the assault compared to the no PTSD group. Negative appraisal of 
symptoms was shown to be associated with both the onset and maintenance of PTSD.  
Prospective  research  was  also  conducted  by  assessing  fifty  seven  victims  of 
physical or sexual assault for cognitive factors at 4 months, 6 months and 9 month 
follow-up (Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2001). As predicted, negative appraisal of PTSD 
symptoms  predicted  PTSD  severity  and  this  relationship  remained  significant  when 
gender  and  perceived  assault  severity  were  statistically  controlled.  Other  cognitive 
factors implicated longitudinally in the onset and maintenance of PTSD were cognitive 
processing  style  (e.g.  detachment)  during  assault,  appraisal  of  perceived  negative 
responses from others, negative beliefs about the self and the world and maladaptive 
coping  strategies  such  as  avoidance.  Dunmore  et  al  (2001)  argued  that  the  role  of 
negative appraisal of post-trauma symptoms in PTSD severity has been an especially 
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Further prospective research also supported the importance of intrusion appraisal 
as  an  indicator  of  subsequent  psychological  distress.  For  example,  a  prospective 
longitudinal study investigated psychological factors that could predict chronic PTSD 
after a motor vehicle accident (MVA) (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998). A large cohort 
of  patients  who  had  attended  an  emergency  clinic  after  a  MVA  were  assessed  for 
various factors including, PTSD, trauma severity, emotional response during trauma, 
negative interpretations of intrusive cognitions, rumination and thought suppression and 
anger. Negative appraisal was measured with the mean of two items; “I must be going 
out  of  my  mind”  and  “I  will  never  get  over  it”.  Participants  also  completed 
questionnaires  at  3  months  and  1  year  follow-up.  Ehlers  et  al  (1998)  found  that 
participants assigning negative meaning to their intrusive symptoms were more likely to 
suffer  from  PTSD  symptoms  at  3  month  and  1  year  follow-up  and  rumination  and 
suppression of intrusive cognitions at 3 months and 1 year follow-up were correlated 
with  PTSD  diagnosis  and  severity.  Overall  intrusion  appraisal,  maladaptive  coping, 
anger and persistent health and financial problems were the key predictors of PTSD at 1 
year. Also, negative appraisal of intrusions predicted a proportion of the variance at 1 
year  that  could  not  be  explained  by  PTSD  severity  at  3  months,  underlying  the 
importance of appraisal as a maintaining variable. A further 3 year follow-up conducted 
on this sample (Mayou, Ehlers, & Bryant, 2002) found that negative interpretations of 
intrusions,  rumination  and  thought  suppression  and  anger  cognitions  remained 
important predictors of PTSD persistence at 3 year follow-up.  
Steil & Ehlers (2000) found that negative idiosyncratic meaning (e.g. “I might 
go crazy”) of posttraumatic intrusion symptoms was significantly related to intrusion-
related  distress,  avoidance  strategies  and  PTSD  severity  in  large  samples  of  MVA 
survivors.  Correlations  between  negative  meaning,  distress,  avoidant  behaviours  and 
PTSD severity  remained significant  when intrusion frequency, accident  severity and 
general anxiety related cognitions were controlled for. Steil and Ehlers (2000) argued 
that if intrusions are seen as a normal reaction to trauma and part of recovery, distress is 
less likely than if a person interprets intrusive symptoms as a sign that they are mentally 
unstable  or  incompetent.  Avoidant  strategies  are  adapted  if  someone  perceives  their 
reaction  as  indicative  or  poor  adjustment,  but  the  strategies  paradoxically  lead  to 
persistent intrusive symptoms and more severe PTSD reactions. Steil and Ehlers (2000) 
suggested  that  interventions  aimed  at  identifying,  restructuring  and  changing   68 
idiosyncratic  meaning  of  intrusive  symptoms  may  prevent  the  use  of  maladaptive 
coping and help alleviate distress.  
II. Negative appraisal of intrusions in bereavement and depression 
Besides research investigating negative appraisal of intrusions in PTSD patients,  
the role of appraisal has also been considered in bereavement research (Boelen, van den 
Bout, & van den Hout, 2003). In a sample of bereaved participants, Boelen et al (2003) 
found  that  negative  interpretation  of  grief  reactions  (e.g.  “I  am  going  crazy”)  was 
strongly related with associated distress, avoidance strategies such as rumination and 
overall  traumatic  grief  and  depression.  Further,  recent  research  has  emphasised  the 
importance  of  negative  appraisal  in  the  maintenance  of  intrusive  symptoms  in 
depression and subsequent depressed mood (Starr & Moulds, 2006). Eighty-four non-
clinical participants were interviewed about intrusive memories and asked to complete 
the Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ, Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999). The RIQ 
measured intrusive memory frequency, associated distress, the meaning attributed to 
intrusive memories and the extent of avoidant coping strategies. Starr & Moulds (2006) 
found that 83% of the sample reported an intrusive memory of an unpleasant event 
within  the  past  seven  days.  Negative  appraisal  was  related  to  intrusion  associated 
distress, after controlling for intrusion frequency. Negative appraisal was also related to 
maladaptive  and  avoidant  coping  strategies,  including  rumination  and  suppression. 
Finally, negative appraisal was related to depression, even when intrusion frequency 
and  memory  severity  were  statistically  controlled  for.  Further  multiple  regression 
analyses  revealed  that  negative  appraisal  of  intrusions  was  the  best  predictor  of 
depression over and above intrusion frequency. 
Williams & Moulds (2007) presented  a replication and  extension of Starr  & 
Moulds’ (2006) findings by assessing the presence of intrusive memories in a sample of 
250  students  and  including  a  broader  array  of  cognitive  avoidance  and  appraisal 
measures. Of the sample, 60% of participants reported a negative intrusive memory. 
Negative  appraisal  of  intrusive  memories  was  positively  associated  with  intrusion-
related distress, level of depression and cognitive avoidance mechanisms (Williams & 
Moulds, 2007).  
   Research  investigating  the  role  of  negative  appraisal  of  intrusions  as  an 
important  factor  predicting  psychological  outcome  illuminates  the  possible  need  for 
appraisal-targeted treatments. For example, a recent study investigating the efficacy of   69 
an imaginal reliving intervention on changing the frequency and of intrusive memories 
associated with PTSD found that negative interpretation of PTSD symptoms was one of 
several factors predicting poorer outcome in patients (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, & 
Clark, 2006). Poorer outcome referred to a smaller reduction in intrusion frequency with 
reliving.  Speckens  et  al  (2006)  suggested  that  although  overall  reliving  showed  a 
positive  and  gradual  change  in  intrusive  memory  frequency,  vividness  sense  of 
“nowness”  and  associated  distress  in  patients  with  PTSD,  people  who  interpreted 
intrusions as indicative of mental weakness may be more unwilling to participate in 
reliving and thus show a poorer response (Speckens et al., 2006).  
3.1.2. Negative appraisal and cancer 
Although intrusion-appraisal has not yet been considered in cancer patients, the 
cognitive  model  of  adjustment  (Moorey  &  Greer,  2002)  predicted  that  negative 
appraisal (i.e. negative meanings that individuals assign to the cancer experience) may 
influence emotional responses, which include experiences such as intrusive cognitions. 
In  line  with  this,  the  meaning  of  events  to  an  individual  with  cancer  has  been 
highlighted  as  key  to  understanding  anxiety  (Stark  &  House,  2000)  and  previous 
research has found a link between the negative appraisal of disease-threat and severity 
of  stress  response  scores  (Hampton  &  Frombach,  2000;  Stuber,  Meeske,  Gonzalez, 
Houskamp, & Pynoos, 1994; Widows et al., 2000). Also, it was found that it was not the 
presence of cancer related concerns but threat- appraisal that was predictive of later 
affective disorders (Parle, Jones, & Maguire, 1996).  
In  the  previous  study  investigating  the  presence  of  intrusive  cognitions  in 
anxious prostate cancer patients (Study 1), it was found that although intrusions were 
reported, they were associated with less distress than in other clinical populations. One 
possible explanation for this finding was that patients were mildly anxious compared to 
other groups. However, another explanation is that patients with cancer may appraise 
intrusive cognitions in a less negative way, and thus report less associated distress. No 
research to date has examined cancer patient’s appraisals of intrusive cognitions and 
thus the present study aimed to investigate the presence of intrusive cognitions in an 
anxious group of cancer patients and for the first time, ask patients how they appraise 
intrusive cognitions.    70 
3.1.3. Coping strategies and intrusive cognitions. 
Coping  strategies  implicated  in  the  maintenance  of  anxiety  disorders  have 
included suppression and neutralising (e.g. Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher, & Blais, 
1995)  (Salkovskis,  1985;  Salkovskis,  1989).  Freeston  et  al  (1995)  interviewed  non-
clinical participants about the strategies used to control intrusive thoughts and found 
that  seven  types  of  strategy  were  used  frequently  included  physical  action,  thought 
replacement,  analyse,  talk  about,  replace,  thought  stopping  and  trying  to  convince 
oneself that the thoughts are unimportant.   
Research  investigating  the  types  of  coping  strategies  used  in  patients  with 
depression,  PTSD  or  non-clinical  groups  (Reynolds  &  Brewin,  1998)  found  that 
depressed  and  PTSD  patients  were  most  likely  to  use  suppression  and  distraction 
techniques, whilst non-clinical participants were most likely to use thinking through and  
talking. Overall, participants reported that they used coping strategies from 40-60% of 
the time. Differences were found in reported effectiveness of coping strategies, where 
patients with depression or PTSD rated all strategies as less effective than the non-
clinical group. For the clinical groups, talking through, distraction and writing were the 
most effective techniques and suppression was the least effective. Reynolds & Brewin 
(1998) argued that findings were consistent with previous research which has shown 
that  distraction  is  associated  with  a  decrease  in  reported  intrusions  (Salkovskis  & 
Campbell, 1994) and suppression is associated with an increase in intrusion frequency 
(the rebound effect: Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Although very few 
participants reported the use of writing as a coping strategy, the finding that writing was 
an effective method of dealing with intrusions is in line with research conducted by 
Pennebaker  and  colleagues  (e.g.  Pennebaker,  1992;  Pennebaker,  1997;  Pennebaker, 
Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1998), which has shown that disclosure through writing is an 
effective method of reducing distress (Smyth, 1998).  
Research  considering  negative  appraisal  of  intrusions  has  also  investigated 
cognitive strategies used in order to control intrusions (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Strategies 
such as rumination, suppression, distraction and avoidance of accident reminders were 
all significantly related to PTSD severity in a large sample of motor vehicle accident 
survivors  (Steil  &  Ehlers,  2000).  Starr  &  Moulds  (2006)  found  that  negative 
interpretation of intrusive memories was significantly related to depression severity and 
cognitive  avoidance  (e.g.    suppression  and  rumination)  in  a  non-clinical  group  of 
participants.  Williams  &  Moulds  (2007)  replicated  this  finding  and  reported  a   71 
significant  positive  relationship  between  dysphoria  and  cognitive  avoidance 
mechanisms employed in response to negative intrusive memories. Specifically, coping 
strategies  such  as  suppression  (“I  try  to  push  the  intrusions  out  of  my  mind”), 
rumination  (“I  dwell  on  it”)  and  dissociation  (“I  feel  numb”)  were  associated  with 
depression  level  after  taking  account  of  intrusion  frequency.  Research  with  high 
dysphoric individuals (Moulds, Kandris, Williams, & Lang, 2008) explored the use of 
safety behaviours in response to intrusive memories and concluded that cognitive and 
behavioural  safety  behaviours  were  common  (particularly  distraction)  and  these 
prevented negative interpretations of intrusive memories from being challenged and led 
to increased intrusion frequency.  
In  cancer  patients,  previous  research  has  found  that  the  number  of  reported 
intrusive  memories  is  significantly  associated  with  maladaptive  adjustment  such  as 
helplessness-hopelessness,  cognitive  avoidance,  anxious  pre-occupation  and  fatalism 
(Brewin et al, 1998a). Study 1 showed that the presence of intrusive cognitions was 
significantly associated with helplessness-hopelessness and anxious pre-occupation in 
anxious prostate cancer patients. However, the Mini-MAC (Watson et al., 1994) was 
designed to ascertain how cancer patients are coping in general and patients have yet to 
be asked to describe their ways of coping with intrusions specifically. Further research 
is required in order to identify whether other types of cognitive strategy that have been 
identified in other clinical groups such as depressed or PTSD patients are associated 
with intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. 
3.1.4. Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this study was to broaden our understanding of the presence and 
phenomenology of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. To do this, negative appraisal 
of intrusive cognitions in anxious cancer patients was assessed for the first time and 
patients were asked how they cope with intrusive cognitions. The secondary aim was to 
further  explore  the  relationship  between  intrusive  cognitions  and  maladaptive 
adjustment in cancer patients.  
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Key research questions included: 
1.  Is the linear relationship between anxiety and intrusions replicable in an anxious 
sample of cancer patients? 
2.  How do anxious cancer patients appraise intrusive cognitions? 
3.  Is negative appraisal associated with intrusion-related distress and anxiety severity?  
4.  Is negative appraisal related to the extent to which patients engage in maladaptive 
coping strategies? 
5.  Is  the  relationship  between  the  presence/absence  of  intrusions  and  maladaptive 
adjustment replicable? 
It was predicted that in an anxious group of cancer patients there would be a 
positive  linear  relationship  between  the  number  of  intrusions  reported  and  anxiety 
severity. Following previous research, it was predicted that there would be a significant 
positive  association  between  negative  appraisal  of  intrusive  cognitions  and  anxiety 
severity and negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions and intrusion associated distress 
after controlling for intrusion frequency. It was also predicted that negative appraisal of 
intrusive cognitions would be associated with the extent to which patients engaged in 
coping strategies and engaging in cognitive avoidance mechanisms would be associated 
with higher levels of psychological distress. Finally, it was predicted that there would be 
a positive relationship between the presence of intrusive cognitions and maladaptive 
adjustment. 
3.1.5. Method  
I. Patients 
 Outpatient screening 
Of 870 cancer patients approached in outpatient clinics at the Royal Marsden 
NHS Foundation Trust, 506 (58%) completed and returned the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale. Sixteen (2%) patients declined to participate at the screening stage; 1 
was recently widowed, 1 had poor English, 2 patients were too distressed and 12 did not 
specify a reason for their refusal. A further 348 (40%) of patients did not return the 
HADS.  At  the  screening  phase,  there  were  no  significant  differences  between 
responders and non-responders on time since diagnosis [t(856) =0.37, P=.71] or sex [χ2 
(1)  =  1.22,  P  =  .30].  However,  non-responders  were  significantly  younger  than 
responders [t(865) =3.19, P<.01] and were significantly more likely to come from a   73 
different ethnic origin than be White British [χ2 (1) = 16.36, P <.01]. Patients who 
scored  8  or  above  on  the  anxiety  sub-scale  (28%),  were  categorised  as  anxious 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and selected for the interview stage of the study. Of these 
141  patients,  66  (47%)  responded  and  were  interviewed.  For  the  interview  stage, 
responders and non-responders did not differ on time since diagnosis [t(139)=-1.21, 
P=.23], age [t(139)=0.62, P=.53], ethnic origin [χ2 (1) = 0.32, P=.57] or disease stage 
[χ2 (2) = 0.49, P=.78]. However, responders were significantly more likely to be female 
than non-responders [χ2 (1) = 4.53, P <.05].Responders and non-responders did not 
differ on anxiety [t(139)=-0.89, P=.32], or depression [t(139)=-1.83, P=.07].  
 Psychological Medicine Invitations 
  Of 278 cancer patients approached through Psychological Medicine Referrals, 
97 (35%) completed and returned the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Twenty 
four  (8%)  were  not  eligible  on  the  HADS  and  thus  a  total  of  73  patients  from 
Psychological Medicine were interviewed. Twenty-eight (10%) declined to participate; 
two felt too ill, two didn’t want to talk about their illness, two didn’t feel anxious, 1 
person did not have enough time and 21 did not give a reason for their refusal. A further 
153 patients (55%) did not respond to invitations to interview. There were no significant 
differences between responders and non-responders on age [t(273) = -0.55, P=.58], time 
since diagnosis [t(272) = 0.50, P=.62], ethnic origin [χ2 (1) = 3.39, P = .07] or sex [χ2 
(1) = 0.36, P = .22]. 
 Final interview sample 
 A priori power calculations indicated that to detect a medium effect size (r = 
0.30, α = .05) with 0.80 power requires a sample size of 64 participants (Cohen, 1988) 
and therefore at least 64 patients were required to report intrusive cognitions. From 
outpatient  screening  and  psychological  medicine  referrals,  139  patients  were 
interviewed and 67 participants reported intrusive cognitions.  
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II. Measures 
 Screening  
The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-item self report scale consisting of 
two subscales; anxiety and depression (see Chapter 2, p 47).  
 Interview session 
 Anxiety and depression 
Anxiety  and  depression  were  assessed  in  the  interview  using  the  Structured 
Clinical  Interview  for  DSM-IV  (SCID;  First  et  al.,  2002).  At  the  beginning  of  the 
interview,  all  patients  were  asked  whether  their  anxiety/concerns  were  related  or 
unrelated to the cancer diagnosis. Following this, generalised anxiety disorder, major 
depression, and adjustment disorder were assessed using sub-sections of the SCID. The 
diagnosis  of  adjustment  disorder  was  made  based  on  predominant  symptoms; 
adjustment with depressed mood, adjustment with anxiety or adjustment with mixed 
anxiety and depression. 
 Intrusive Cognitions 
The structured interview (Patel et al., 2007) used in Chapter 2 was employed for 
the  assessment  of  intrusive  cognitions  in  the  present  study.  The  validity  check 
conducted  for intrusive  thoughts showed that participants reported that the intrusive 
thoughts were nearly always the same (mean = 98.81, S.D. = 4.53). Visual intrusions 
were coded as either memories or images, and there was complete agreement between 
two independent raters (κ = 1.00).  
 Impact of Events Scale (IES; Horowitz et al., 1979)  
The IES (Horowitz et al, 1979) is a 15-item self report scale which examines 
subjective distress as a result of a specific event and consists of two subscales, intrusion 
and avoidance. Further information on the scale is reported in Chapter 2 (p 49). 
 Appraisal of intrusive cognitions  
 Six  items  measuring  negative  appraisal  of  intrusive  cognitions  from  the 
Response  to  Intrusions  Questionnaire  (RIQ;  Clohessy  &  Ehlers,  1999)  were  used 
including ‘Something is wrong with me’, ‘I am inadequate’, ‘I cannot cope’, ‘Some day 
I will go out of my mind’, ‘I have a psychological problem’ and ‘I will not achieve 
goals that are important to me.’ This latter statement replaced ‘I will not be able to do   75 
my job well’ following Starr & Moulds (2006). Patients were required to rate from 1 
(totally  disagree)  to  7  (totally  agree)  for  each  item.    In  the  present  study,  internal 
consistency for the scale was high (α =.86).  
 Coping with intrusive cognitions 
Patients were asked to rate on a 100-point scale (0 = not used at all, 100 = used 
very much) the extent to which they engaged in three coping strategies- distraction (‘I 
try to distract myself’), suppression (‘I try to push the intrusions out of my mind’) and 
rumination (‘I dwell on it’). The items were adopted from previous research (Reynolds 
& Brewin, 1998; Ehlers et al., 1998; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). In line with Reynolds & 
Brewin (1998), patients were also asked to rate how effective each coping strategy was 
(0 = not at all effective and 100 = very effective).  
 Mini-Mental Adjustment of Cancer Scale (Mini-MAC) 
The Mini-MAC (Watson et al, 1994) is a 29-item self report scale used to assess 
patients coping responses to a cancer diagnosis. Psychometric properties of the scale are 
reported in Chapter 2 (p 48). In the present study Cronbach’s alphas for subscales were; 
hopelessness/helplessness, α=.87; anxious preoccupation, α=.77, cognitive avoidance, 
α=.81; fighting spirit, α=.65 and fatalism, α=.20. The low internal consistency for the 
fatalism  subscale  can  be  explained  using  principal  component  analysis  (Varimax 
rotation with Kaiser normalization) revealing two principal factors underlying fatalism; 
the items “At the moment I take one day at a time” and “I’ve put myself in the hands of 
God” comprised one factor and “I am very optimistic”, “I’ve had a good life, what’s left 
is a bonus” comprised the other. Due to the low reliability of the fatalism subscale, this 
aspect  of  coping  is  not  reliably  measured  and  thus  will  be  excluded  from  further 
analyses.   
 The Research Participation Questionnaire (RPQ) 
The RPQ (Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002) is a 12-item scale used to assess 
reactions to research participation (see Chapter 2, p 50). 
III. Procedure 
  Ethical  approval  for  the  study  was  obtained  from  the  Local  Research  Ethics 
Committee. Two groups of patients were approached. A consecutive series of patients 
attending outpatient clinics were invited to participate. Patients were given the HADS to 
complete in clinic, or to complete at home and return by mail. Patients subsequently   76 
identified as anxious (=>8) were contacted and invited to participate in an interview, 
either  on  the  telephone  or  in  person  at  the  Royal  Marsden  NHS  Foundation  Trust, 
Sutton.  
At  the  same  time,  a  second  group  of  patients  who  had  been  referred  to  the 
Psychological Medicine Service at the hospital were sent an invitation pack inviting 
them to take part in a study aimed at understanding experiences of worry. The pack 
included the HADS to send back with the reply form expressing an interest in taking 
part. Patients identified as anxious (=>8) were contacted by telephone to arrange an 
interview, either on the telephone or in person. Patients who expressed an interest in 
taking part, but did not meet criteria for anxiety, were contacted by telephone to inform 
them that they weren’t eligible to take part. For all participants, if a time lapse of more 
than 21 days had passed, they were asked to repeat the HADS questionnaire, to ensure 
eligibility.  
Patients interviewed also completed the IES, RIQ items and coping scales in 
response to any reported intrusions (see Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  Participants were 
asked to complete the Mini-MAC scale and the RPQ.  
3.1.6. Results 
I. Participant characteristics 
The demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics of the total sample 
are presented in Table 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   77 
Table 6 Demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics of total sample 
(N=139) 
 
Characteristic  N (%) 
Age  52.22 (12.18) 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
43 (31) 
96 (69) 
Ethnic origin 
White British 
Other 
 
101 (72.7) 
 38  (27.3) 
Marital status 
Single 
Married/living with a partner 
Separated/divorced 
Widowed 
 
20 (14.4) 
95 (68.3) 
20 (14.4) 
4 (2.9) 
Education 
Left school before age of 15 years 
Secondary Education 
College or specialised training 
University or equivalent 
Unknown 
 
7 (5.0) 
38 (27.3) 
35 (25.2) 
37 (26.6) 
22 (15.8) 
Employment 
Employed full time 
Employed part time 
Retired 
Unknown 
 
21 (15.1) 
47 (33.8) 
37 (26.6) 
34 (24.5) 
Occupation 
Manual 
Non manual 
Unknown 
 
16 (11.5) 
79 (56.8) 
44 (31.7) 
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Table 6 continued (clinical and psychological variables) 
Characteristic  N (%) 
Time since diagnosis (months)  38.88 (50.45) 
Cancer type 
Testicular 
Prostate 
Lymphoma 
Lung  
Breast  
Ovarian 
Cervical 
Gastrointestinal 
Head & Neck 
 
12 (8.6) 
8 (5.8) 
30 (21.6) 
9 (6.5) 
55 (39.6) 
4 (2.9) 
2 (1.4) 
11 (7.9) 
8 (5.8) 
Cancer stage 
Early 
Locally advanced 
Advanced 
Unknown 
 
71 (51.1) 
20 (14.4) 
35 (25.2) 
13 (9.3) 
Treatment 
On treatment 
Post-treatment 
Undecided 
 
65 (46.8) 
69 (49.6) 
5 (3.6) 
Interview type 
In person 
Telephone 
 
68 (48.9) 
71 (51.1) 
Time since HADS completion (days)  7.14 (6.70) 
HADS anxiety  score  11.97 (3.05) 
HADS depression score  7.14 (4.03) 
Type of distress 
Cancer related 
Unrelated 
 
124 (89.2) 
15 (10.8) 
DSM-IV  
Doesn’t meet criteria  
Anxiety 
Depression 
Adjustment disorder-depression 
Adjustment disorder- anxiety 
Adjustment disorder- mixed 
 
89 (64) 
5 (3.6) 
5 (3.6) 
5 (3.6) 
24 (17.3) 
11 (7.9)   79 
 
II. Number and type of intrusive cognitions 
  Sixty seven patients (48%) reported an intrusive cognition, of whom fourteen 
patients reported at least one additional intrusion. Of these, three patients reported two 
intrusive  memories,  seven  patients  reported  an  intrusive  memory  and  an  intrusive 
thought,  one  patient  reported  an  intrusive  image  and  an  intrusive  thought  and  three 
patients  reported  an  intrusive  memory  and  an  intrusive  image.  Of  the  81  intrusions 
reported in total, 31 were intrusive memories, 8 were intrusive images and 42 were 
intrusive thoughts.  
III. Recruitment, demographic and clinical influence on reporting 
intrusive cognitions 
There  was  no  significant  difference  in  whether  patients  reported  intrusive 
cognitions according to whether patients were interviewed on the telephone or in person 
[χ2 (1) = 0.36, P= .55]. However, patients recruited from Psychological Medicine were 
significantly  more  likely  to  report  intrusive  cognitions  than  patients  recruited  from 
outpatient screening [χ2 (1) = 5.36, P<.05, Cramer’s V=.20].  
Age, sex, ethnic origin, marital status, education and employment had no affect 
on  whether  patients  reported  intrusive  cognitions  (P>.05).  However,  occupation  did 
influence  whether  patients  reported  an  intrusive  cognition  [χ2  (2)  =  8.06,  P<.05, 
Cramer’s  V=.24],  with  the  unknown  category  significantly  more  likely  to  report 
intrusive cognitions than manual and non-manual employees. The unknown category 
included  all  patients  who  were  currently  unemployed  or  retired.  Manual  employees 
were the least likely to report intrusive cognitions. Independent t-tests revealed that time 
since  diagnosis  significantly  affected  whether  patients  reported  intrusive  cognitions 
[t(137)=-2.46, P<.05, r=.21]. The group of patients reporting intrusive cognitions were 
significantly longer post diagnosis (mean = 49.60 months, S.D. =58.67) than patients 
not  reporting  intrusive  cognitions  (mean  =28.90  months,  S.D.  =39.22).  Finally,  the 
presence of intrusive cognitions was not related to treatment type [χ2 (1) = 0.00 P = .98] 
or disease stage [χ2 (2) = 3.21 P = .20]. 
IV. Content and timescale of intrusions 
  Fifty-eight  (72%)  of  the  intrusive  cognitions  related  to  the  person’s  own 
experience of having cancer, and thirteen (16%) of the intrusions related to a relative’s   80 
illness,  injury  or  death  (three  specifically  from  cancer).  In  total,  75%  of  reported 
intrusions were specifically related to cancer and ten (12%) were unrelated to illness or 
death. Fisher’s Exact Tests showed that intrusive cognitions unrelated to cancer were 
significantly more likely to be visual intrusions (21/23) than verbal intrusions (2/23) 
(P<.001)  and  cancer-related  intrusions  were  equally  likely  to  be  visual  (19/58)  and 
verbal  (21/58).  Exploratory  analyses  investigating  potential  differences  between 
whether  intrusive  cognitions  were  cancer-related  or  cancer-unrelated  and  intrusion 
qualities  (e.g.  frequency,  distress,  uncontrollability,  interference,  vividness,  negative 
appraisal and coping) found no significant relationships (P>.05). For intrusive images, 
four of eight of the reported images were related to a past event and the four remaining 
intrusive images were future oriented. For intrusive thoughts, thirty-four (81%) were 
future oriented, 1 was related to past event, 1 was both future and present oriented and 1 
was both future and past oriented. See Table 7 and Table 8 for examples of different 
types of intrusive cognitions reported in the present study.  
Table 7 Content of cancer-related intrusive cognitions 
Intrusion type  Timescale  Content 
Memory  Past  Having high dose chemotherapy, smell of sweet 
corn and messing the bed because I am 
incontinent 
Image  Future  Looking down on myself at my own funeral 
and seeing my friend and family who are crying 
and hearing music playing 
Thought  Future  I am going to die, the cancer is not going to go 
away 
 
 
Table 8 Content of unrelated intrusive cognitions 
Intrusion type  Timescale  Content 
Memory  Past  Boss at work, going to attack me and feeling 
humiliated 
Image  Future  Horrific monster type faces with sharp horrible 
teeth, snarling and mutating coming towards 
me 
Thought  Future  Fears about flat being destroyed   81 
 
V. Characteristics of intrusive cognitions 
Table  9  shows  the  mean  characteristics  of  intrusive  cognitions.  Of  the  total 
sample of cognitions (n=81), intrusive cognitions were reported to occur just over half 
the time in the past week, to interfere moderately with daily life and to be moderately to 
severely  distressing  and  severely  uncontrollable.  Intrusions  most  often  lasted  for 
minutes rather than being fleeting or lasting for hours. Analyses exploring the influence 
of clinical and demographic variables on the impact of intrusive cognitions, including 
distress, interference and uncontrollability found that there were almost no relationships 
(P>.05) except that age was significantly negatively correlated with intrusion-specific 
distress (R=-.28, P<.05); younger patients reported higher levels of intrusion-specific 
distress. This association remained even when anxiety severity and intrusion frequency 
were controlled for (R=-.31, P<.01).  
To  investigate  the  difference  between  specific  characteristics  of  visual  and 
verbal intrusions for 67 patients reporting intrusive cognitions, independent t-tests were 
conducted. For patients reporting more than one intrusion, one intrusion was randomly 
selected  be  included  in  the  analysis.  Analyses  investigating  the  difference  between 
visual (n=33) and verbal (n=34) intrusions found that visual intrusions were associated 
with significantly more subjective distress, including intrusion and avoidance, according 
to  the  IES.  Visual  intrusions  were  also  more  uncontrollable  than  verbal  intrusions, 
although this difference did not reach statistical significance. A Fisher exact test showed 
that  visual  intrusions  were  significantly  shorter  in  duration  than  verbal  intrusions, 
although both visual and verbal intrusions usually lasted for minutes. There was no 
association between whether intrusions were visual or verbal and each type of reported 
emotion (P>.05 for all).  
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Table 9 Characteristics of total sample of intrusive cognitions (n=81) and visual 
(n=33) and verbal intrusions (n=34) 
Characteristic  Total 
intrusions 
Mean (SD) 
Visual 
intrusions 
Mean (SD) 
Verbal 
intrusions 
Mean (SD) 
Difference between 
visual and verbal 
intrusions 
Frequency  56.30 (24.05)  56.82 (24.17)  59.85 (19.95)  t(65)=0.56,P=.58 
Interference  49.93 (32.43)  45.45 (34.45)  54.09 (31.40)  t(65)=0.47, P=.29 
Uncontrollability  81.43 (23.83)  85.00 (24.01)  75.15 (23.69)  t(65)=-1.70, P=.09 
Distress  69.94 (26.49)  70.00 (27.64)  69.85 (23.60)  t(65)=-0.2, P=.98 
IES total  39.59 (14.31)  42.33 (12.93)  34.32 (13.28)  t(65)=-2.50, P<.01,  
r=.30 
IES avoidance  18.69 (9.15)  19.64 (8.47)  15.68 (8.09)  t(65)=-1.96, P<.05,  
r=.24 
IES intrusion  20.90 (7.81)  22.70 (7.37)  18.65 (7.39)  t(65)=-2.25, P<.05, 
 r=.27 
Duration N (%) 
Seconds  
Minutes 
Hours 
 
17 (21) 
52 (64.2) 
12 (14.8) 
 
9 (27.3) 
20 (60.6) 
4 (12.1) 
 
1(3) 
26(78.8) 
6 (18.2) 
 
Fisher exact test <.05, 
Cramer’s V =0.34 
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For the 67 patients reporting intrusive cognitions, it was investigated to what 
extent  emotions  were  associated  with  intrusions  (Table  10).  A  repeated  measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. For patients reporting more than one 
intrusion, one intrusion was chosen at random to be included in the analysis. One person 
did not report emotions associated with intrusions and thus the analyses are for n=66. 
There  was  a  significant  difference  between  how  strongly  various  emotions  were 
associated  with  intrusive  cognitions  [F(5,325)=68.87,  P=.001,  ηp
2  =.51].  Sadness, 
anxiety and helplessness were most strongly associated with intrusive cognitions, and 
least  significant  difference  (LSD)  pairwise  comparisons  revealed  there  were  no 
significant  differences  between  these  three  emotions.  Shame  was  the  least  endorsed 
emotion and this was reported significantly less than all other emotions (P<.01). All 
other emotion comparisons were significant at  P<.01. A cautionary note is required 
when  interpreting  the  ANOVA  described,  as  guilt  and  shame  both  had  positively 
skewed distributions and anxiety and helplessness had negatively skewed distributions.  
 
Table 10 Emotions associated with intrusive cognitions (n=66) 
Emotion  Mean (SD)  
Sadness  69.50 (34.81)
a 
Guilt  20.61 (36.71)
d 
Shame  8.64 (26.31)
c 
Anger  40.53 (38.71)
b 
Anxiety  78.56 (25.81)
a 
Helplessness  75.59 (30.50)
a 
Range, 0 = (not at all associated) to 100=( very much so associated).  
Means followed by different letters differ significantly according to how much they are 
associated with intrusive cognitions (P < .01).  
 
Post-hoc exploration of the emotion data for n=66 intrusions found that guilt 
was  most  strongly  associated  with  other-focused  (n=  17)  events  compared  to  self-
focused (n=49) events (R=.27, P=.03) and anxiety was most strongly associated with 
self-focused events compared to other-focused  events (R=-.21, P=.08), although this 
just failed to reach statistical significance.  
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VI. Specific characteristics of intrusive memories and images 
Intrusive memories and intrusive images were reported to be extremely vivid 
(mean = 89.26, S.D. = 15.74 and mean = 85.63, S.D. = 21.45 respectively; 0 = hazy 
memory, 100= clearest and vividest memory). For intrusive memories, patients reported 
experiencing emotions the same as, or similar to those experienced during the actual 
event  (mean  =  82.10,  S.D.  =  27.57;  0=not  at  all,  100=very  much  so)  and  reported 
moderately reliving the memory (mean = 54.52, S.D. = 41.52; 0=not at all, 100=very 
much  so),  as  though  it  were  happening  all  over  again,  right  now.  Re-experiencing 
physical sensations was reported “a little” (mean = 37.74, S.D. =43.64; 0=not at all, 
100=very much so).  
VII. Intrusive cognitions and anxiety 
In order to investigate the relationship between number of intrusive cognitions 
and anxiety level, the total sample was divided into three groups according to Snaith & 
Zigmond’s (1994) criteria; mildly anxious (n=53, HADS =8-10), moderately anxious 
(n=55,  HADS  =11-14)  and  severely  anxious  (n=31,  HADS  =  15-21).  A  one-way 
ANOVA indicated a significant overall effect of anxiety category on the number of 
intrusive  cognitions  reported  [F(2,136)=3.40,  P<.05]  and  least  significant  difference 
(LSD)  pairwise  comparisons  revealed  that  severely  anxious  patients  reported 
significantly more intrusive cognitions, than mildly anxious patients (P<.01, r=.26), and 
there  were  no  significant  differences  between  moderately  anxious  and  mildly  and 
severely  anxious  patients  (P>.05).    A  polynomial  contrast  analysis  showed  that  the 
mean number of intrusions increases (contrast estimate = 0.27, P<.05) as anxiety level 
increases. The linear relationship between anxiety and intrusive cognitions may explain 
why  a  higher  number  of  patients  from  Psychological  Medicine  reported  intrusive 
cognitions  than  patients  screened  in  outpatient  clinics.  Patients  recruited  from 
Psychological Medicine referrals were significantly more anxious [t(137)=-3.67, P<.01, 
r=.30]  and  depressed  [t(137)=-3.65,  P<.01,  r=.30]  than  patients  meeting  cut-off  for 
anxiety via outpatient screening. Indeed, the association between recruitment type and 
presence/absence of intrusions [R=.20, P<.05] disappears when anxiety is statistically 
controlled [R=.14, P=.14].  
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VIII. Intrusion appraisal and coping 
Means  and  standard  deviations  for  all  measures  for  participants  reporting 
intrusive  cognitions  are  reported  in  Table  11.  As  would  be  expected,  anxiety  and 
depression  were  higher  for  those  patients  reporting  intrusive  cognitions  than  in  the 
overall sample. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted which showed that there 
were significant differences according to how much three coping strategies were used in 
response to intrusive cognitions [F(2,132)=12.44, P=.01, ηp
2 =.16]. Least significant 
difference (LSD) pairwise comparisons revealed that rumination was used significantly 
less frequently than both suppression and distraction (P<.01) and these did not differ 
from  each  other  (P>.05).  The  reported  effectiveness  of  coping  strategies  was  also 
subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA and showed significant differences according 
to how effective strategies were [F(2,62)
1 =16.16, P=.01, ηp
2 =.34]. Least significant 
difference (LSD) pairwise comparisons revealed that distraction was considered more 
effective  than  suppression  and  rumination  (P<.01  for  both)  and  suppression  was 
considered more effective than rumination (P <.05). 
 
Table 11 Means and standard deviations for self-report measures (n=67) 
Measure  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Anxiety (HADS)  12.67  3.11 
Depression (HADS)  8.07  3.97 
IES total  38.27  13.62 
IES intrusion  20.64  7.60 
IES avoidance  17.63  8.45 
RIQ negative appraisal  19.31  10.82 
Distraction  72.54  35.42 
Suppression  62.31  38.27 
Rumination  43.51  37.97 
Distraction effectiveness  64.34   31.50 
Suppression effectiveness  37.20  33.06 
Rumination effectiveness  20.12  24.23 
 
                                                 
1 Note-due to success only reported for patients endorsing the coping strategy in the first place the total 
sample for this is n=32
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IX. Negative intrusion appraisal and anxiety, depression and intrusion 
related distress. 
Table  12  contains  the  correlations  between  negative  appraisal  of  intrusions, 
anxiety,  depression  and  intrusion-related  distress.  Negative  appraisal  was  positively 
correlated  with  anxiety,  depression  and  intrusion-related  distress  (0=not  at  all,  100- 
severely distressing), even after controlling for intrusion frequency. Negative appraisal 
was mildly associated with subjective distress associated with intrusions (IES) and was 
not correlated with the intrusion sub-scale of the IES. However, negative appraisal was 
positively  correlated  with  the  avoidance  sub-scale  of  the  IES.  After  controlling  for 
intrusion frequency, only the relationship between negative appraisal and IES avoidance 
remained. 
Table 12 Pearson correlations of negative meaning of intrusive cognitions and 
anxiety, depression, intrusion controllability and distress (n=67) 
  Negative 
appraisal (RIQ) 
Controlling for 
frequency 
Anxiety  .37**  .29** 
Depression  .42**  .31** 
Intrusion 
uncontrollability 
.31**  .27** 
Intrusion 
distress 
.42**  .34** 
Total IES score  .22*  .15 
Avoidance 
(IES) 
.28**  .23* 
Intrusion (IES)  .08  .01 
*P<.05, ** P<.01 (one-tailed) 
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X. Negative intrusion appraisal and intrusion-specific coping 
Table 13 shows the correlations between negative appraisal of intrusions and 
coping  strategies  used  in  response  to  the  intrusions.  Rumination  was  significantly 
associated  with  negative  appraisal  of  intrusions  and  this  remained  significant  after 
controlling for intrusion frequency. Table 14 shows the correlations between coping 
strategies used in response to intrusive cognitions and anxiety and depression severity. 
Although rumination is positively associated with depression severity, this relationship 
does  not  hold  when  intrusion  frequency  is  controlled  for.  However,  avoidance  of 
intrusions as assessed by IES was significantly correlated with depression severity and 
this remained significant after controlling for intrusion frequency. Overall, subjective 
distress associated with intrusive cognitions was associated with anxiety and depression, 
after controlling for intrusion frequency. 
 
Table 13 Pearson correlations of negative meaning of intrusive cognitions and 
coping (n=67) 
  Negative 
appraisal (RIQ) 
Controlling for 
frequency 
Distraction  .17  .08 
Suppression  .19  .10 
Rumination  .41**  .33** 
*P<.05, ** P<.01 (one-tailed) 
Table 14 Pearson correlations of intrusion specific coping and anxiety and 
depression (n=67) 
  Anxiety  Depression 
Distraction  .08 (.03)  .06 (-.02) 
Suppression  -.02 (-.10)  .02 (-.09) 
Rumination  .04 (-.05)  .21* (.10) 
Total IES score  .25**(.21*)  .40**(.35**) 
Avoidance 
(IES) 
.13 (.09)  .32**(.28**) 
Intrusion (IES)  .30**(.27*)  .35**(.32**) 
*P<.05 (one-tailed). Partial correlations (controlling for intrusion frequency) in brackets  
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XI. Intrusive cognitions and adjustment to cancer 
Biserial correlations between the presence or absence of intrusive cognitions and 
the  Mini-MAC  score  for  adjustment  to  cancer  showed  that  when  anxiety  was 
statistically  controlled  for,  the  presence  of  intrusive  cognitions  was  significantly 
correlated  with  helplessness-hopelessness  and  anxious  preoccupation  (Table  15).  An 
unexpected finding was that interview type (telephone vs. in person) was significantly 
associated with scores on the cognitive avoidance subscale of the Mini-MAC. Patients 
interviewed  in  person  scored  significantly  higher  on  cognitive  avoidance  than  those 
interviewed on the telephone [t(137)=-3.16,P<.01, r =.26]. It may be that patients who 
find it harder to talk about their illness prefer to be interviewed face to face rather than 
on the telephone. There were no other significant relationships between interview type 
and Mini-MAC scores (P>.05 for 4 other subscales). 
 
Table 15 Correlations between the presence or absence of intrusive cognitions and 
adjustment to cancer (N=139) 
Mini-MAC subscales  Presence or absence 
of intrusive 
cognitions 
Presence or absence of 
intrusive cognitions 
(controlling for 
anxiety) 
Helplessness-hopelessness  .27**  .20** 
Anxious preoccupation  .23**  .16* 
Fighting spirit  .12  .09 
Cognitive avoidance  .02  .03 
*P<.05, ** P<.01 (one-tailed) 
 
In order to start unravelling the intrusion-coping relationship found in cancer 
patients,  exploratory  analyses  were  conducted  to  investigate  whether  specific 
characteristics of intrusive cognitions were related to specific aspects of adjustment to 
cancer. Table 16 shows that helplessness-hopelessness subscale of the Mini-MAC is 
significantly  associated  with  several  intrusion-specific  characteristics,  including 
uncontrollability,  frequency,  distress,  interference  and  subjective  distress  associated 
with intrusions, specifically level of intrusion. Anxious preoccupation was associated 
with uncontrollability of intrusions. Fighting spirit was negatively associated with level 
of intrusion, so that the higher levels of intrusion were associated with lower levels of   89 
fighting  spirit.  Cognitive  avoidance  was  strongly  associated  with  intrusion  specific 
avoidance.  
 
Table 16 Correlations between intrusion characteristics and adjustment to cancer 
(n=67) 
Mini-MAC 
subscales 
Uncontrol- 
lability 
Frequency  Distress  Interfer-
ence 
IES 
total 
IES 
intrusion 
IES 
avoidance 
Helpless-
hopeless 
.35**  .35**  .35**  .41**  .28*  .28*  .19 
Anxious 
preoccupation 
.28**  .18  .17  .06  .23  .18  .21 
Fighting spirit  -.08  .04  -.07  .05  -.17  -.27*  -.07 
Cognitive 
avoidance 
.12  -.00  -.00  -.12  .26*  -.07  .48** 
** P <.01, * P<.05 (two-tailed) 
XII. The RPQ 
Of 139 participants, 135 completed the RPQ; feedback was positive with a range 
of scores from 42 to 60 (mean=56.01, S.D.=3.26), out of a maximum score of 60. There 
was  no  significant  difference  on  average  RPQ  score  [t(133,  =1.16,  P=.25]  between 
those reporting intrusive cognitions (mean=55.68, S.D.=3.24) and those not reporting 
intrusive cognitions (mean=56.33, S.D.=3.27). 
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3.1.7. Discussion 
  The  present  study  replicates  and  expands  findings  of  Study  1,  that  anxious 
cancer patients experience frequent negative intrusive cognitions which are distressing, 
interfering, uncontrollable and commonly related to future concerns. It was also found 
that cancer patients appraised intrusive cognitions in a negative way, for example, as a 
sign that they could not cope or have a psychological problem. Mean negative appraisal 
of intrusive cognitions was in fact higher in cancer patients compared to ambulance 
workers and non-clinical populations (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Starr & Moulds, 2006) 
and  equivalent  to  a  depressed  sample  (Moulds  et  al,  2008).  This  contradicts  the 
suggestion that one explanation for lower frequency and impact of intrusions in cancer 
patients is that they do not perceive intrusions as a sign of mental fragility. Rather, the 
linear relationship between anxiety and intrusive cognitions remains a robust finding 
and supports the notion that phenomenological experiences such as intrusive cognitions 
exist on a continuum from non-clinical (Brewin et al., 1996; Starr & Moulds, 2006) to 
clinical populations (Hackmann et al., 2004; Patel et al., 2007).  
 As predicted, negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions was related to general 
psychological distress including anxiety and depression severity and negative appraisal 
was  also  related  to  intrusion  specific  characteristics,  including  distress  and 
uncontrollability. These relationships remained after controlling for intrusion frequency. 
This  follows  a  pattern  of  results  reported  in  PTSD  samples  (ambulance  workers, 
Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; victims of sexual and physical assault, Dunmore et al, 2001; 
motor vehicle accident survivors, Ehlers et al, 1998) bereaved (Boelen et al 2003) and 
student samples (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2007). Rumination and 
intrusion  avoidance  were  also  associated  with  negative  appraisal,  irrespective  of 
intrusion frequency. This is in line with the suggestion that cognitive avoidance and 
rumination  used  in  response  to  intrusive  cognitions  paradoxically  prevent  the 
elaboration and integration of intrusive cognitions and help maintain negative appraisals 
(Michael  et  al,  2005).  Thus,  such  strategies  may  serve  to  exacerbate  rather  than 
ameliorate intrusive cognitions which in turn lead to the maintenance of distress (Ehlers 
&  Steil,  1995).  In  the  present  study,  avoidance  of  intrusions  was  associated  with 
depression severity after controlling for intrusion frequency. Overall the results support 
the notion that negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions plays a role in the development 
of emotional distress after cancer diagnosis.    91 
In terms of coping with intrusive cognitions, distraction was the most common 
strategy  and  was  considered  the  most  successful,  followed  by  suppression  and 
rumination. The success of distraction as a technique for coping with intrusions parallels 
previous  research  which  has  found  that  distraction  is  associated  with  a  decrease  in 
intrusive cognitions (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994). Contrary to previous research (e.g. 
Steil & Ehlers, 2000) suppression and distraction were not associated  with negative 
appraisal of intrusive cognitions. This may be because suppression and distraction were 
considered more successful than rumination, with distraction rated a successful coping 
strategy. In previous research which found distraction to be the most common coping 
strategy in response to intrusive memories (Moulds et al, 2008), it was suggested that 
distraction  encompasses  an  array  of  different  responses  (e.g.  use  of  positive  image, 
listening to music) and thus closer screening of idiosyncratic responses may be required.  
A number of further unexpected findings also require explanation. For example, 
rumination, suppression and distraction were not associated with general distress in the 
present  study.  Previous  research  (Starr  &  Moulds,  2006)  also  found  no  relationship 
between the item “I dwell on it” and depression severity and suggested that it may 
reflect a combination of positive and negative types of rumination including experiential 
self-focus  and  conceptual-evaluative  rumination  (Watkins,  2004).  Experiential  self-
focus  involves  a  non-evaluative  focusing  of  attention  on  direct  experience  which 
facilitates emotional processing (e.g. “How did you feel moment-by-moment?), whereas 
conceptual-evaluative rumination (e.g. “Why did you feel this way?”) is more often 
linked to maladaptive outcomes (Watkins, 2004)). Starr & Moulds (2006) also found 
suppression to be unrelated to depression severity, whilst Clohessy & Ehlers (1999) did 
report a relationship. Thus, future experimental research may be required to resolve 
inconsistencies  and  elucidate  the  role  of  thought  suppression  on  the  frequency  and 
impact of intrusive cognitions (Starr & Moulds, 2006). Finally, distraction may have 
been  unrelated  to  psychological  distress  because  it  was  often  deemed  an  effective 
coping strategy for reducing the frequency and impact of intrusive cognitions.  
The  present  study  replicated  the  finding  (Study  1)  that  there  is  a  positive 
relationship between the presence of intrusive cognitions and maladaptive adjustment to 
cancer,  including  anxious  preoccupation  and  helplessness-hopelessness.  Closer 
inspection of this relationship revealed that helplessness-hopelessness was significantly 
correlated  with  several  key  negative  characteristics  of  intrusive  cognitions; 
uncontrollability,  frequency,  distress,  interference  and  level  of  intrusion.  The  link   92 
between individual characteristics of intrusive cognitions and helplessness-hopelessness 
is  important,  as  this  subscale  of  the  Mini-MAC  has  been  associated  with  5  year 
(Watson, Haviland, Greer, Davidson, & Bliss, 1999) and 10 year (Watson, Homewood, 
Haviland,  &  Bliss,  2005)  disease-free  survival  as  well  as  psychological  outcomes 
including anxiety, depression and emotional control (Watson et al., 1991).  Due to the 
correlational  nature  of  this  finding,  it  is  not  clear  whether  experiencing  particularly 
frequent,  uncontrollable,  distressing  intrusive  cognitions  leads  to  individuals  feeling 
more  helpless  and  hopeless  about  their  disease  or  whether  an  overall  sense  of 
hopelessness makes it more difficult to cope with intrusive cognitions when they arise. 
Either way, it is important to address the relationship between the presence of intrusive 
cognitions and feelings of helplessness-hopelessness in psychological therapy.  
General cognitive avoidance of cancer was significantly related to avoidance of 
intrusive cognitions, which suggests that someone who is likely to avoid thinking about 
the overall implications of a cancer diagnosis, may also be likely to try avoiding specific 
intrusive cognitions about cancer, illness and death and vice versa. For these patients, 
cognitive  avoidance  strategies  may  prove  unsuccessful  and  paradoxically  lead  to  an 
increase in intrusions and maladaptive adjustment. As might be expected, fighting spirit 
was inversely related to level of intrusion so that higher levels fighting spirit (e.g. “I see 
my illness as a challenge”) were related to lower levels of intrusion. An unexpected 
relationship  was  the  negative  correlation  between  fatalism  and  level  of  intrusion, 
although  low  internal  consistency  on  this  subscale  prevents  clear  interpretation. 
Although these are preliminary findings, the relationship between intrusive cognitions 
and maladaptive adjustment is clearly a complex one and merits further research. 
The content of intrusive cognitions was similar to content reported in Study 1, 
where intrusions were most often related to personal or family-related illness injury or 
death. Previous research with clinical populations (depression and PTSD) has found that 
the  content  of  intrusions  influences  accompanying  emotions  (Reynolds  &  Brewin, 
1999). For example, sadness and guilt were mainly associated with other-focused events 
such as family deaths or illnesses and fear was mainly associated with self-focussed 
events such as personal injury. In the present study, guilt was associated with other-
focused  intrusions  and  anxiety  was  associated  with  self-focused  intrusions.  Thus, 
another similarity between intrusive cognitions in cancer patients and those in clinical 
samples was found and future research could explore this further.    93 
Comparison  between  cancer-related  and  cancer-unrelated  intrusions  revealed 
that unrelated intrusions were more likely to be visual than verbal. The majority of 
unrelated intrusions were intrusive memories of a friend or  family member’s death. 
Experiencing  physical  illness  including  confiding  in  family  and  friends,  frequent 
hospital visits and ongoing treatment may provide powerful triggers of these memories 
which become frequent, intruding and difficult to control. Very few intrusions were 
completely unrelated to illness, injury or death and these often included negative events 
where individuals felt humiliated or their life had failed in some way. This echoes the 
findings  of  Study  1,  where  four  intrusions  unrelated  to  illness,  injury  or  death 
represented  past  or  future  failures.    There  were  no  significant  differences  between 
cancer-related  intrusions  and  unrelated  intrusions  in  terms  of  qualities  such  as 
frequency, associated distress, uncontrollability, interference, vividness, accompanying 
emotions, negative appraisal and coping. The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer 
(Moorey & Greer, 2002) provides a potential explanation for the finding that intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients are not necessarily related to the cancer experience, or 
illness, injury or death. The model emphasised the extensive nature of concerns which 
may be disease specific (e.g. prognosis) or related more generally to appraisals of the 
self, others and the world. Following a cancer diagnosis, changes in personal and social 
roles may lead to negative beliefs about the self, for example that individuals can no 
longer work and provide financial support for the family or that they have failed in life 
and not fulfilled their potential.  
The  relatively  large  sample  of  intrusions  in  the  present  study  allowed  novel 
comparisons to be made between visual and verbal intrusions in cancer patients. As 
with previous research (Study 1), intrusive images were relatively uncommon, unlike in 
some studies of patients with anxiety disorders (e.g. Hackmann et al, 2000). Instead, 
memories were more prominent, with the majority of patients describing contextualised 
imagery anchored in the past. Comparisons of visual and verbal intrusions revealed that 
visual intrusions were associated with significantly more subjective distress (intrusion 
and avoidance) than verbal intrusions and were more difficult to control. Also, intrusive 
imagery  was  more  likely  to  last  for  seconds  compared  to  intrusive  thoughts.  These 
findings support previous work which has emphasised the fleeting nature of intrusive 
imagery (Holmes, 2004; Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007) and the 
special  relationship  between  imagery  and  emotion  (Holmes  &  Mathews,  2005). 
Previous  research  found  that  imagery  has  a  greater  impact  on  emotion  than  verbal   94 
representations of the same material because i) images are more like actual percepts 
(Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001) ii) images trigger episodes in autobiographical 
memory  (Conway  &  Pleydell-Pearce,  2000)  and  iii)  images  often  include  personal 
involvement in events (Holmes et al., 2008).  
Holmes  et  al  (2008)  suggested  that  processing  emotional  properties  and 
consequences of events happening in the immediate sensory environment is prioritised 
in the brain and thus mental operations (e.g. intrusive imagery) relying on the same 
brain regions may be given higher priority. The finding that intrusive imagery is often 
defined by a sense of “nowness,” the feeling that the intrusive memory is happening all 
over again, right now, is also in concordance with the finding that intrusive imagery is 
more intruding, less controllable and leads to greater avoidance. The sense of nowness 
reported in the present study matched levels reported in PTSD samples (Hackmann et 
al, 2004) and supports the argument that a sense of “nowness” may not be restricted to 
flashback  experiences  accompanied  by  a  loss  of  awareness,  but  to  other  types  of 
intrusive memories (Hackmann et al, 2004).  
Although  these  findings  are  post-hoc  and  require  further  investigation,  the 
discovery  that  images  and  thoughts  are  distinguishable  in  this  population  supports 
previous research emphasising their independence (Brewin et al, 1996). For example, 
thoughts were more likely to be characterised by fear and memories were more likely to 
be characterised by sadness and happiness (Brewin et al, 1996). Brewin et al (1996) 
suggested  that  participants  found  it  easy  to  distinguish  between  these  two  types  of 
cognitions,  which  is  an  important  point  for  future  research  investigating  intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients. So far, research has focussed almost exclusively on the 
presence of intrusive thoughts in cancer patients (Kangas et al, 2002), leaving an entire 
category of intrusions unexplored. Future research investigating intrusive cognitions in 
cancer patients should consider the distinction between types of intrusions, including 
visual or verbal intrusions and past or future-oriented intrusions.  
Although the present study did not set out to assess risk factors for intrusive 
cognitions  in  cancer  patients,  some  exploratory  analyses  revealed  some  interesting 
findings.  The  finding  that  disease  stage  did  not  influence  whether  patients  reported 
intrusive cognitions supports the suggestion in Chapter 2, that cancer-specific intrusions 
may represent general concerns regarding disease-threat rather than prognosis-specific 
threats.  Contrary  to  previous  research  (e.g.  Hampton  &  Frombach,  2000)  female 
patients  were  not  more  likely  to  report  intrusive  cognitions  than  male  patients.   95 
However, occupation had a significant influence on whether patients reported intrusions 
or not, with patients within the “unknown” category more likely to report intrusions and 
patients with manual jobs the least likely to report intrusions. A possible explanation for 
this is that the unknown category included patients who were currently unemployed or 
retired and thus those less likely to have distraction as a potential tool for coping with 
intrusive cognitions when they arise. Another explanation could be that these patients 
have fewer financial resources, which has also been identified as a risk factor for PTSD 
symptomatology  (Cordova  et  al,  1995).  To  date,  although  sociodemographic 
characteristics have been recognised as significant determinants in the severity of stress 
response symptoms (Gurevich et al., 2002) occupation has not been highlighted as a 
potential factor. Future research assessing risk factors for intrusive symptoms in cancer 
patients should take this into account.   
Surprisingly, time since diagnosis was higher in the group of patients reporting 
intrusive  cognitions,  than  those  not  reporting  intrusive  cognitions.  This  contradicts 
previous research, where a greater proximity to diagnosis is associated with a higher 
frequency and severity of stress response symptoms (Gurevich et al, 2002). The finding 
that  patients  report  intrusive  cognitions  after  a  substantial  time  since  diagnosis 
highlights the prolonged nature of  cancer as  a  stressor that can precipitate intrusive 
symptomatology throughout the course of the disease. Theories of trauma (Horowitz, 
1986; Brewin et al., 1996) recognised that experiencing intrusive symptoms can be an 
adaptive  response  aimed  at  integrating  traumatic  information  into  existing  memory 
systems.  However  when  integration  fails,  individuals  can  experience  ongoing  and 
severe stress response reactions that require psychological therapy (Horowitz, 1986). 
The  adoption  of  maladaptive  coping  strategies  (e.g.  cognitive  avoidance)  and  the 
severity  and  length  of  trauma  all  increase  the  likelihood  of  integration  failure  and 
ongoing intrusive symptoms (Brewin et al, 1996).  
For those patients reporting intrusive cognitions, younger age was associated 
with  higher  levels  of  intrusion  specific  distress,  irrespective  of  anxiety  severity  and 
intrusions  frequency.  This  is  in  line  with  previous  research  where  younger  patients 
reported higher rates of intrusive symptoms (Cordova et al., 1995; Green et al., 1998; 
Tjemsland et al., 1998).  
Limitations of the present study include the inability to draw conclusions about 
directionality. Prospective research is required to confirm the relationships as the cross-
sectional  design  precludes  causal  interpretation.  Also,  the  number  of  correlations   96 
conducted may increase the probability that relationships were encountered, although 
the consistent pattern found across correlations and concordance with previous research, 
means it is unlikely the findings were found by chance. Intrusion-specific coping was 
assessed with single-item measures which may have compromised the reliability of the 
assessment and underestimated the effect of intrusion-coping on negative appraisal and 
distress severity. Thus, further research investigating these concepts may benefit from 
longer scales. Also, dissociation was not included as a coping strategy in the present 
study  and  this  should  be  rectified  in  subsequent  research.  Another  area  of  potential 
interest not systematically explored in the present study was whether cancer patients 
report  intrusive  cognitions  which  include  other  sensory  modalities  such  as  hearing, 
taste, smell and pain (e.g. Hackmann et al, 2004; Whalley, Farmer, & Brewin, 2007). 
Descriptions given by patients often included a sensory component (e.g. smell of sweet 
corn, funeral music) which concords with the sensory component of intrusions reported 
in other samples (e.g. PTSD; Hackmann et al, 2004). Further, Hackmann et al (2004) 
raised the possibility that people who experience prolonged or repeated traumatic events 
may have additional or different types of intrusive cognitions, and to investigate these 
differences remains a question for future research.  
Although  negative  internal  appraisals  were  considered,  other  appraisals  may 
play a role in the presence and maintenance of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients 
(Fairbrother & Rachman, 2006; O'Donnell, Elliott, Wolfgang, & Creamer, 2007). For 
example,  internal  threat  appraisal  encompasses  individual  perceptions  of  the  self  as 
capable, acceptable and in control in general, in addition to how individuals perceive 
their reaction to intrusive cognitions (O’Donnell et al, 2007). External threat appraisals 
(e.g. disease-specific threat) are also important and have consistently played a role in 
psychological models of cancer such as the cognitive model of adjustment (Moorey & 
Greer, 2002) and found to be related to stress response symptoms (e.g. Hampton & 
Frombach, 2000). Others have suggested that future research should assess the content 
of intrusive cognitions to understand why some are more distressing than others and 
whether individual meaning may influence the content and type of intrusions (Vickberg, 
Bovbjerg,  Duhamel,  Currie,  &  Redd,  2000).  Although  the  meaning  of  intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients has been assessed for the first time, this work could be 
extended to take other definitions of meaning into account (White, 2004), such as global 
meaning (e.g. global beliefs and expectations of the world) and situational meaning (e.g. 
interaction  of  global  beliefs  with  personal-environment  interaction).  Also,  positive   97 
appraisal of events may play a role in the alleviation of emotional distress in cancer 
patients and it has been asserted that assigning positive meaning has been related to 
positive outcomes, including fewer intrusive thoughts (White, 2004).  
Overall, the present study adds to our understanding of the phenomenology of 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. The similarity between the types of intrusive 
cognitions found in cancer patients and patients with psychological disorders supports a 
transdiagnostic  approach  (Harvey,  Watkins,  Mansell,  &  Shafran,  2004)  aimed  at 
identifying experiences which are common across emotional disorders and across non-
clinical and clinical populations (Brewin et al, 1996).  The finding that the negative 
appraisal  of  intrusive  cognitions  plays  a  significant  role  in  anxiety  and  depression 
severity  and  intrusion-specific  distress  strengthens  the  argument  that  intrusive 
cognitions are an important area of research in psychooncology. In particular, if the 
phenomenology of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients shows similarities to intrusive 
cognitions  found  in  other  clinical  populations,  psychological  therapies  developed  to 
reduce the impact of intrusions in these samples may provide a reduction in distress for 
cancer patients reporting these experiences.  
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Besides work with PTSD populations (Hackmann, 1998), imagery has recently 
been neglected in psychological therapy (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). In Chapter 1, the 
utility  of  applying  PTSD  models  to  cancer  patients  was  critically  appraised.  Two 
important implications for psychological therapy were noted. Firstly, it was recognised 
that  although  research  has  assessed  the  prevalence  of  PTSD  in  cancer  populations, 
therapies  developed  to  treat  PTSD  (e.g.  reliving  therapy)  have  rarely  been  applied. 
Secondly,  cancer  may  not  truly  fit  a  PTSD  model  and  thus  these  therapies  may  be 
inappropriate.  Study  1  and  Study  2  found  that  cancer  patients  reported  negative 
intrusive imagery and it was associated with anxiety severity.  Importantly, in Study 2, 
intrusive  images  were  as  common  as  intrusive  thoughts  and  were  associated  with 
increased intrusiveness and uncontrollability. Images were similar to those reported in 
other  samples,  including  PTSD,  depressed  and  other  anxious  groups.  For  example, 
imagery was frequent, interfering, associated with significant distress and a sense of 
nowness.  Chapter  3  proposed  adopting  a  transdiagnostic  approach,  where  intrusive 
symptoms are identified as common experiences across emotional disorders and clinical 
and non-clinical groups. With this in mind, this chapter discusses the history of imagery 
in therapy, the application of imagery therapy to PTSD and a renewed interest in the use 
of imagery in therapy across clinical groups. Research using imagery in therapy for 
cancer patients is appraised and in line with a transdiagnostic approach, a modular view 
of  therapy  is  presented.  Finally,  research  supporting  the  effectiveness  of  a  specific 
therapy,  imagery  rescripting,  is  reviewed  in  anticipation  of  its  application  to  cancer 
patients in Study 3 (Chapter 5).  
4.1.  An overview and history of the use of imagery in 
therapy 
The potential use of imagery in psychological therapy has been recognised since 
1889, where Pierre Janet described examples of imagery substitution, (i.e. replacing one 
image with another) in hysterical patients (Van Der Kolk & Van Der Hart, 1989). For 
example, Edwards (2007) described one of Janet’s cases of a woman, Marie with severe 
psychological problems including psychogenic blindness in the left eye (see Edwards, 
2007). Marie’s problems started following an incident when she was 6 years old and 
shared  a  bed  with  a  child  disfigured  by  impetigo  on  her  face.  Janet’s  imagery 
substitution involved encouraging Marie to re-experience the memory and to imagine 
the girl as a friendly person and visualise stroking the girls face without fear. Following   100 
therapy,  Marie’s  sight  returned  and  associated  psychological  symptoms  disappeared 
(Edwards, 2007).  
Other early use of imagery in therapy included work by Freud and Jung (see 
Hackmann, 1998 for a review). They both recognised that bringing memory images and 
imaginative images into awareness and reflecting on them could be therapeutic. For 
example, Jung developed a technique called active imagination  (Jung,  1960), where 
under meditation, patients allowed any spontaneous images to emerge and watch them 
without intervening. These visualisations were discussed with the therapist and their 
symbolism analysed (Hackmann, 1998). Other more direct imagery techniques included 
Guided Affective Imagery (Leuner, 1969) where patients were given a scene such as a 
meadow  and  prompted  to  make  a  journey  and  deal  with  symbolic  material  as  it 
appeared. The theory was that the material would demonstrate areas of conflict in the 
person’s life (Hackmann, 1998). Gestalt therapy developed by Fritz Perls also utilised 
mental imagery (Hackmann, 1998). An important strategy of Gestalt therapy was to 
increase the immediacy and completeness of information by bringing it into the here 
and now by describing the imagery in the present-tense. For example, patients were 
encouraged  to  work  with  imagery  including  memories  and  dreams  by  imagining 
themselves  as  each  of  the  other  characters  in  the  image  to  provide  alternative 
perspectives in various situations (Perls, 1971).   
Hackmann (1998) discussed the use of imagery in behaviour therapy, including 
systematic  desensitisation  (Wolpe,  1958),    covert  conditioning  (Cautela,  1977)  and 
imaginal flooding (Stampfl & Levis, 1967). Systematic desensitisation (Wolpe, 1958) is 
a technique which involves pairing a feared stimulus (e.g. snake phobia) with a positive 
stimulus (e.g. relaxation). The feared response is approached in a graded way, via a 
series of imagined hierarchical scenarios (e.g. imagine being in the same room as a 
snake, imagine touching the snake). Over a number of trials (i.e. pairings), the fear 
evoked by the negative stimulus is reduced and there is an increase in the amount of 
approach behaviour (Hackmann, 1998). Covert conditioning, conceptualised within an 
operant conditioning model (Cautela, 1977) involved changing behaviour patterns by 
imagining them to be followed by positive or negative reinforcement or by punishment. 
The technique has been used to treat maladaptive behaviours and has been applied to 
smoking,  drinking  and  obesity.  For  example,  a  smoker  may  be  asked  to  imagine 
smoking without the taste or smell of the cigarette (Cautela, 1971). Imaginal flooding 
involves imagining a feared stimulus (e.g. snake) without associated punishment (e.g.   101 
snake  biting).  Imaginal  flooding  is  similar  to  reliving  as  imagining  the  feared  item 
repetitively leads to the extinction of anxiety (Hackmann, 1998).  
 Beck also recognised the value of imagery when he first developed cognitive 
therapy (Beck, 1976). Based on the premise that the appraisal of events affects how 
people feel and can be the cause of psychological disorders, Beck (1976) suggested that 
underlying meaning could be accessed through imagery, including images, memories 
and dreams. Cognitive therapy may use imagery by unpacking the meaning of imagery, 
examining  the  beliefs  associated  with  imagery  and  attempting  to  transform  it 
(Hackmann, 1998). However, despite Beck’s early acknowledgement that imagery may 
be an important component of psychological therapy, there has been an emphasis on 
verbal thoughts in clinical psychology (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004).  
An exception is the therapeutic work conducted with PTSD patients, as intrusive 
memories  are  considered  a  hallmark  of  the  disorder  (DSM-IV;  APA,  1994). 
Psychological  therapy  which  has  used  imagery  successfully  with  PTSD  patients 
includes  reliving,  eye  movement  desensitisation  (EMDR),  and  imagery  rescripting 
(Hackmann, 1998; Arntz et al., 2007). Reliving involves asking participants to describe 
their traumatic experience aloud, in the first person whilst attempting to re-experience 
what happened (Foa et al., 1991). The method results in the account becoming more 
organised, complete and contextualised. EMDR is a technique where patients hold in 
mind negative imagery, associated cognitions and bodily sensations whilst tracking the 
clinician’s finger in front of their visual field (Shapiro, 2001). Theoretically, the success 
of EMDR is attributed to the role of saccadic  eye movements in using visuospatial 
resources required for intrusive imagery (e.g. Andrade et al., 1997) although the method 
has remained controversial (Davidson & Parker, 2001). Imagery rescripting involves 
imagining the traumatic memory and subsequently trying to modify it (e.g. what would 
you  have  done  differently  in  the  image?  Arntz  et  al,  2007).  Imagery  rescripting  is 
described in more detail at the end of this chapter. 
4.2.  Rationale for working with imagery in therapy 
 Previous research has shown that emotion-laden intrusive imagery can predict 
and possibly maintain depression (Brewin et al., 1999), anxiety (Hirsch et al., 2003; 
Hirsch et al., 2004) and posttraumatic stress disorder (Jones et al., 2007). Based on the 
assumption  that  negative  intrusive  imagery  may  maintain  psychological  distress  by 
reinforcing avoidant and maladaptive coping strategies (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004)   102 
treatments specifically targeted at these processes could provide an effective and rapid 
relief from anxiety. It has been argued that, in comparison to intrusive thoughts, images 
provide an alternative and quick route to accessing generic belief systems and meanings 
underlying  emotional  responses  (Wells  &  Hackmann,  1993;  Hackmann,  1998). 
Hackmann (1998) suggested that images condense a large amount of information and 
reveal  layers  of  idiosyncratic  meaning.  Hackmann  also  emphasised  that  images  are 
flexible because they represent perspectives of any time-scale (past, present, future) and 
can be literal or symbolic (Hackmann, 1998).  
Wells & Hackmann (1993) argued that investigating the existence and content of 
images  experienced  by  patients  with  health  anxiety  provided  an  effective  means  of 
revealing  complex  individual  beliefs  and  identifying  their  origins.  The  themes  that 
emerged were those of misinterpretation of bodily symptoms and overestimation of the 
likelihood of death. Patients also had superstitious beliefs that just imagining illness or 
death could make it happen. Holmes et al (2007) made two key proposals regarding the 
use of imagery in therapy; 1) “Imagery has a more powerful impact on negative emotion 
than verbal processing of the same material, and therefore imagery should be examined 
during  clinical  assessment  across  disorders”  and  2)  “Imagery  has  a  more  powerful 
impact on emotion than verbal processing and cognitive behavioural techniques used to 
promote  positive  change  should  also  employ  positive  imagery”  (Holmes,  Arntz,  & 
Smucker, 2007, p3-4).   
Evidence  for  the  suggestion  that  imagery  has  a  more  powerful  impact  on 
emotion  than  verbal  processing  has  been  reported  using  an  interpretation  training 
paradigm  (Holmes  &  Mathews,  2005).  Participants  were  required  to  either  imagine 
unpleasant events while listening to a description of these events, or think about the 
verbal meaning. Those in the imagery condition reported more anxiety and rated new 
ambiguous descriptions as more emotional than those in the verbal condition. It was 
concluded that negative imagery has greater effects on emotion than verbal processing 
of the same material. Research adopting a between-subjects design and manipulating the 
use  of  imagery  or  verbal  thoughts  provided  causal  evidence  that  negative  imagery 
influences emotion rather than the reverse (Holmes et al, 2008). Working with imagery 
in therapeutic environments may thus be an effective method of accessing meaning and 
alleviating emotional distress.  
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Holmes et al (2007) categorised the use of imagery in therapy as imagery which 
is direct (‘imagery interactive’) or indirect (imagery-property’) and techniques which 
focus on alleviating negative imagery or promoting positive imagery (See Figure 1 for 
examples).  
 
Direct technique 
‘imagery-interactive’ 
•  Imaginal exposure/systematic 
desensitisation 
•  Imagery rescripting 
Indirect technique 
‘imagery-property’ 
•  Mindfulness based stress reduction 
•  Attentional training 
•  Imagery competing tasks (e.g. 
EMDR) 
 
•  Building compassionate mind 
imagery 
•  Positive future self-imagery 
(e.g. guided imagery) 
 
•  Positive interpretation bias training  
via imagery 
Figure 1 Examples of types of imagery technique on two dimensions 1) Addressing 
intrusive negative imagery to promoting positive imagery 2) working with image 
directly or indirectly (Holmes et al, 2007, p 6) 
 
In addition to the negative direct techniques that have briefly been described in 
relation to behaviour therapy (SD) and treatment of PTSD (imaginal exposure/reliving, 
imagery  rescripting),  other  direct  techniques  utilise  positive  imagery.  For  example, 
building  compassionate  mind  imagery  is  a  technique  based  on  Buddhist  healing 
practices (Ringu & Mullen, 2005), where individuals are encouraged to practice warm, 
compassionate images. For example, self-reassuring imagery could involve imagining a 
self-supporting or compassionate part of yourself and to imagine this as a person with 
facial  expressions  and  a  voice  (Gilbert,  Baldwin,  Irons,  Baccus,  &  Palmer,  2006). 
Gilbert et al (2006) found that trait self-criticism (e.g. “ “I am easily disappointed with 
myself”) was associated with the ease in generating hostile self-critical images, while 
trait self-assurance (e.g. “I encourage myself about the future”) was associated with the 
ease in generating warm and supportive images of the self. A pilot study assessing the 
use of compassionate imagery with a depression support group (Gilbert & Irons, 2004) 
Address 
negative 
imagery 
Promote 
positive 
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reported some success with encouraging patients to generate images in order to self-
soothe.  
Lee (2005) suggested that compassionate imagery can be directed to that of a 
“perfect nurturer” which has qualities to nurture the individuals personal needs (Lee, 
2005). For example, Lee (2005) described a case of a young woman, ‘Sylvie’ who had 
developed PTSD and depression following an emergency Caesarean and was informed 
that she had been 10 minutes from death. Sylvie had intrusive images concerning the 
birth of her son and also experienced self-critical thoughts and deep feelings of shame 
and self-loathing. After a series of cognitive therapy sessions the therapist and Sylvie 
identified that she felt unloved and the traumatic birth of her son was linked to her 
belief  that  she  was  unlovable  and  nobody  cared  about  her.  In  subsequent  sessions, 
Sylvie developed an image of a perfect nurturer who was calm, tranquil and warm. The 
image she developed was of a woman with soft linen clothing, a relaxed face and warm 
texture. The nurturer reassures Sylvie by providing her comfort and whispering in a 
soothing voice, “it’s OK, everything is going to be fine.” After repeated practice of the 
image, Sylvie developed a short cut where she just imagined a pair of arms outstretched 
and the smell of her skin. At the end of therapy, Sylvie felt strong and positive and at 
three month follow-up she no longer met criteria for depression (Lee, 2005).  
Indirect  techniques  that  address  negative  imagery  include  mindfulness  based 
stress  reduction,  attentional  training  and  imagery  competing  tasks.  Mindfulness  is 
defined as “the awareness that emerges though paying attention on purpose, in the 
present  moment,  and  non-judgementally  to  the  unfolding  of  experience  moment  by 
moment.”  (p  145,  Kabat-Zinn,  2003).  A  core  element  of  mindfulness  is  meditation, 
where individuals may be encouraged to focus on various experiences including internal 
experiences such as thoughts, images and bodily sensations and external experiences 
such as sights and sounds (Baer, 2003). Meditation within mindfulness based therapy 
emphasises  a  non-judgemental  and  detached  approach  in  response  to  mental 
experiences. Baer (2003) described the most frequently cited method of mindfulness 
training, mindfulness based stress reduction which is conducted over 8-10 sessions and 
involves  group  courses  of  mindfulness  training.  The  training  is  complex,  and 
participants are encouraged to practice skills outside group meetings for at least 45 
minutes a day. When participants notice negative images or thoughts, they are taught to 
note the nature and content of the cognitions and then return attention to the present 
moment so as to not become absorbed in the content of the cognitions. The premise of   105 
mindfulness based stress reduction is that it is not the presence of phenomena such as 
intrusive thoughts and images that are stress provoking but the tendency to become 
emotionally involved with them. Mindfulness based therapy is different from traditional 
cognitive behavioural techniques because rather than challenging negative cognitions 
with a specific goal in mind, individuals are taught to observe underlying processes in a 
dispassionate way (Kabat-Zinn, 2003).  Other interventions incorporating mindfulness 
training  include  acceptance  and  commitment  therapy  (ACT;  Hayes,  Luoma,  Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Hayes et al (2006) suggested that rather than focussing on 
changing psychological events (e.g. intrusive images) approaches such as acceptance 
and  cognitive  defusion  are  used  to  change  the  function  of  those  events  and  the 
individual’s  relationships  to  them.    Acceptance  involves  actively  embracing  mental 
events and cognitive defusion involves creating contexts in which unhelpful functions 
of negative mental events are diminished.  
Attentional training is an approach developed by Wells (ATT, Wells, 1990) that 
is used to learn new ways of responding to negative imagery. The basic premise is that 
attentional selectivity and intensity govern the nature of individual experience and the 
control  and  availability  of  resources  can  influence  the  efficiency  of  processing  and 
belief change (Wells, 2007). The aim of ATT is to increase flexible cognitive control 
(e.g. planning for intended actions), disrupt negative styles of thinking (e.g. intrusive 
images) and enhance metacognitive awareness (Wells, 2007). Metacognitive awareness 
refers to knowledge about thinking (Wells, 2007) and is involved in controlling thinking 
and subsequent choice of coping strategies. Wells (2007) suggested that metacognitions 
include the belief that worry is necessary for coping (“If I worry I’ll be prepared”) and 
the belief that controlling negative thoughts is desirable (“I must control my thoughts or 
I’ll go crazy”).  ATT consists of three categories; selective attention, attention switching 
and divided attention. Participants are asked to focus on a fixation point and remain 
visually  focussed  throughout.  A  number  of  competing  sounds  are  introduced  and 
identified in the environment. These stimuli must load heavily on attentional resources 
and participants are trained to focus their attention to these stimuli in a flexible way. 
This  flexible  approach  is  also  applied  to  other  internal  stimuli,  such  as  intrusive 
imagery. Participants are trained not to avoid negative internal events, but to respond to 
them in a constructive manner.  
   Imagery competing tasks refers to research which has started to investigate the 
effects  of  visuospatial  distracter  tasks  (e.g.  eye  movements,  tapping  tasks)  on   106 
desensitization  to  emotive  memories  (Andrade  et  al.,  1997;  Kavanagh  et  al.,  2001; 
Holmes et al., 2004). Participants are required to participate in a task (e.g. tapping out a 
pattern, moulding plasticine) that loads on the same resources required for intrusive 
imagery, thus reducing vividness, emotional intensity and intrusiveness of imagery.  
Finally,  indirect  imagery  techniques  focussed  on  positive  imagery  include 
positive  interpretation  training,  which  is  a  method  aimed  at  the  experimental 
modification  of  negative  interpretation  biases  associated  with  anxiety  and  mood 
disorders  (Holmes  et  al.,  2006).  Modification  can  be  achieved  by  encouraging 
participants to more routinely use positive imagery when confronted with ambiguous 
situations  (Holmes  et  al,  2007).  An  example  of  the  potential  success  of  positive 
interpretation bias training via imagery was presented in two recent studies (Holmes et 
al., 2006; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, in press). Participants were required to listen to and 
either  a)  imagine  themselves  in  numerous  ambiguous  situations  or  b)  focus  on  the 
verbal meaning of ambiguous situations. For positive interpretation training, the task 
constrained participants to resolve the outcome of a situation in a positive way. For 
example, “You are at home alone watching TV. You must have been dozing because 
you suddenly wake up. You have the impression that you heard a frightening noise and 
then realise with relief that it is your partner returning home.” The initial part of the 
sentence is ambiguous because it implies a negative outcome (e.g. intruder) and the 
positive resolution is in italics. Over 100 positive training scenarios were presented to 
participants in the imagery and verbal conditions. Participants in the imagery condition 
showed greater increases in positive affect and greater reductions in anxiety compared 
to  those  in  the  verbal  condition.  As  well  as  providing  evidence  for  the  success  of 
positive  interpretation  training  via  imagery,  this  work  extended  that  of  Holmes  & 
Mathews  (2005)  to  show  that  positive  imagery,  as  well  as  negative  imagery  is 
associated with more emotion than verbal processing of the same material.  
Holmes  et  al  (2007)  demonstrated  how  in  recent  years  there  has  been  a 
rejuvenation of interest in the use of imagery in psychological therapy. Based on the 
finding  that  mental  imagery  has  a  special  relationship  with  emotion  (Holmes  & 
Mathews,  2005),  imagery  may  be  a  powerful  tool  for  alleviating  emotional  distress 
(Holmes et al, 2007). The discussion will now turn to the use of imagery techniques 
with cancer patients.    107 
4.3.  Imagery in therapy and cancer  
4.3.1. Direct techniques  
Both  direct  techniques  working  on  positive  imagery  (guided  imagery)  and 
negative  imagery  (systematic  desensitisation)  have  been  applied  to  cancer  patients 
experiencing psychological distress. The most prevalent therapeutic technique that uses 
imagery  in  cancer  patients  is  guided  imagery.  Guided  imagery  refers  to  the  use  of 
imagination  to  invoke  one  or  more  of  the  senses  in  order  to  ‘guide’  the  individual 
through experiences in the mind. Individuals are encouraged to form positive mental 
representations  of  objects,  places  or  situations  (Roffe,  Schmidt,  &  Ernst,  2005). 
Techniques  vary  but  can  include  non-specific  calming  themes,  such  as  imagining  a 
bright  healing  light,  and  more  specific  disease-related  themes  such  as  the  use  of 
metaphor to visualise the body’s natural defences (Simonton et al., 2000). For example, 
patients may imagine a soldier with a bayonet attacking a cluster of cancer cells or 
visualising  fish-like  creatures  swimming  in  blood  and  lymph  looking  for  a  primary 
tumour or hidden metastases (Walker, Sharp, Walker, & Walker, 2007). Patients have 
also used images such as PAC-men, an animated computer game where a small yellow 
shape follows and eats “bad monster” characters to represent the cancer being attacked 
by the immune system (Moore & Spiegel, 1999). Guided imagery techniques are used 
to enhance an individual’s ability to cope with stress and sense of control (Walker et al, 
1999) and encourage the general process of recovery (Simonton, Matthews-Simonton, 
&  Creighton,  1978).  Guided  imagery  may  also  encourage  patients  to  distance 
themselves from inflexible or negative thought patterns (Post-White, 2002).   
One study investigated the psychological, clinical and pathological effects of 
relaxation training and guided imagery during primary chemotherapy (Walker et al., 
1999). Ninety-six women with newly diagnosed locally advanced breast cancer were 
randomly allocated to standard care (control group) or standard care plus relaxation 
training  and  guided  imagery  (experimental  group).  The  intervention  was  aimed  to 
reduce levels of stress and increase feeling of control (Walker, 2004).  Relaxation was 
taught via  audiotape and imagery was  encouraged using a portfolio of ten coloured 
cartoons to help visualise host defences killing cancer cells. Participants were asked to 
practice  at  least  daily  and  document  difficulties  and  vividness  of  imagery.  Clinical, 
pathological and psychological responses to chemotherapy were assessed using standard 
measures (e.g. size of tumour, histology of breast tissue, mood, coping and quality of   108 
life). Beneficial psychological effects of the intervention were reported; women in the 
experimental group were more  relaxed, had  fewer psychological symptoms and had 
higher  self-rated  quality  of  life.  There  were  no  significant  differences  between  the 
experimental  and  control  group  on  measures  of  clinical  and  pathological  response, 
although, there was a significant correlation between ratings of imagery vividness and 
clinical response, in terms of host defences. Specifically, the more vivid the imagery 
reported, the higher the natural killer (NK) cell and lymphokine activated killer (LAK) 
cell  activity  after  chemotherapy  and  12  weeks  after  radiotherapy  (Walker,  2004). 
Although Walker et al (1999) found no significant effect of intervention on pathological 
and clinical response, follow-up over 68 months did show a trend for prolonged survival 
in the intervention compared to control group and this was statistically significant for 
tumour size (Walker et al., 2000). The question remains how psychological intervention 
may lead to survival in cancer patients, although it has been suggested that intervention 
may  offset  stress-induced  immunosuppression  (Walker,  2004).  Walker  et  al  (2000) 
suggested that it may be premature to evaluate the effect of intervention at 68 months 
and longer-term follow-up is necessary. 
Others have supported the potential positive effects of guided imagery on the 
immune system. For example, a clinical study of visualisation on depressed white blood 
cell count in medical patients, including cancer patients found a significant effect of 
mental imagery  on immune response. Specifically, white blood cell count increased 
over a 90 day period, indicating a “strengthening of the immune system” (Donaldson, 
2000, p124). Others also reported a significant increase in NK cell activity in early stage 
breast cancer patients following guided imagery  (Bakke, Purtzer, & Newton, 2002).  
  Another recent study with 28 early stage breast cancer patients (Lengacher et al., 
2008) found that visualisation of immune cells destroying cancer cells over a 4 week 
period had beneficial immunological effects on NK cell activity. However, these studies 
were not randomised controlled trials, as they utilised repeated-measures designs and 
thus other important variables were not controlled. For example, Bakke et al (2002) 
admitted that their design did not allow the conclusion that imagery enhances immune 
function because psychological benefit of personal support was not controlled. Further, 
they reported that although guided imagery remained successful for reducing depression 
at 3 month, the increased NK activity was not maintained (Bakke et al., 2002). Another 
recent study testing the efficacy of guided imagery in breast cancer patients found that   109 
although there were significant effects on depression and anxiety there were no effects 
on immunosuppression (Nunes et al., 2007).  
The effect of guided imagery and relaxation on pain in cancer patients has also 
been  studied  (Wallace,  1997).  A  systematic  review  of  the  literature  analysed  the 
efficacy of guided imagery and relaxation on pain relief in nine studies from 1982 to 
1995 (Wallace, 1997). Although there were mixed findings for the usefulness of guided 
imagery for cancer pain (e.g. Arathuzik, 1994; Ferrell, Ferrell, Ahn, & Tran, 1994), it 
was  concluded  that  there  was  significant  evidence  that  imagery  reduces  the 
physiological  experience  of  pain  in  cancer  patients,  as  measured  by  self-report. 
However,  it  was  argued  that  there  is  little  evidence  that  relaxation  and  imagery 
interventions are able to change affective states, feelings of control and quality of life. 
Wallace (1997) suggested that research focussing on the effect of guided imagery on 
pain in cancer patients should make explicit the description of pain experience being 
studied, to study single interventions rather than mixed interventions, take measures of 
patient compliance with the treatment and conduct longitudinal studies where possible.  
One study that wasn’t included in the systematic review (Syrjala, Donaldson, 
Davis, Kippes, & Carr, 1995) investigated the effect of relaxation and guided imagery 
compared  to  training  in  a  package  of  cognitive  behavioural  coping  skills  (which 
included  relaxation  and  guided  imagery)  on  self-reported  pain.  Ninety-four  patients 
receiving bone marrow transplants were randomised to one of four conditions: therapist-
control, no-treatment control, relaxation and guided imagery and cognitive behavioural 
coping  skills  package.  Relaxation  was  induced  using  progressive  muscle  relaxation 
(PMRT)  and  imagery  involved  imagining  descending  a  staircase  and  visualising  a 
pleasant  place.  The  cognitive  behavioural  package  included  imagery  and  relaxation 
training,  the  use  of  self-statements  (re-training  self-defeating  thoughts),  distraction 
(focussing attention away from noxious physical sensations) and setting and attaining of 
short-term goals (e.g. playing a game). Patients in the two treatment groups reported 
significantly  less  pain  than  patients  in  the  control  groups,  although  the  cognitive 
behavioural  group  did  not  provide  any  additive  beneficial  effects  compared  to  the 
relaxation and guided imagery group. Syrjala et al (1995) concluded that relaxation and 
imagery have a positive impact on pain coping in cancer patients. Although they did 
specify the type of pain experience being studied (oral mucositis pain), they suggested 
that  more  research  is  required  to  ascertain  which  patient  groups  benefit  and  which 
groups don’t benefit from imagery interventions.  Also, although it was shown that   110 
cognitive behavioural coping skills training did not provide any additive effects beyond 
imagery and relaxation, it is not clear whether using guided imagery alone would be as 
beneficial as using imagery in combination with relaxation.  
Others have examined the long-term effects of relaxation and guided imagery on 
psychological distress in cancer patients (e.g. Baider, Peretz, Hadani, & Koch, 2001). 
One hundred and sixteen patients were randomly allocated to an intervention (PMRT 
and  guided  imagery)  or  control  group  (same  standard  of  care  but  no  specific 
intervention).  Dependent  measures  to  assess  psychological  distress  (at  1  month,  3 
months-just  before  intervention  and  6  months  after  intervention)  included  the  Brief 
Symptom Inventory (BSI) and the Impact of Events Scale (IES). Baider et al (2001) 
reported  a  small  but  significant  positive  effect  of  the  behavioural  intervention  on 
psychological  distress.  In  addition  to  the  small  effect  size,  there  were  several 
limitations, such as high drop out rates, use of mixed interventions, failure to include 
low distress patients in the experimental group and failure to measure effectiveness of 
behavioural treatment directly. In a subsequent study, Sloman (2002) investigated the 
effect of single interventions on psychological distress in cancer patients. Twenty-six 
women and thirty men with advanced cancer, who were experiencing depression and 
anxiety, were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions: PMRT, guided 
imagery  training,  both  of  these  treatments  and  therapist  control.  The  Hospital  and 
Anxiety  Depression  Scale  and  the  Functional  Living  Index  Cancer  scales  were 
administered to all patients pre and post test phase. All three treatment conditions failed 
to  produce  significant  improvements  for  anxiety  but  they  all  produced  significant 
improvements for depression and quality of life. However, no one treatment proved to 
be superior and due to the small sample sizes used in the study, firm conclusions could 
not be drawn (Sloman, 2002).  
A systematic review of the literature assessing the efficacy of guided imagery on 
outcome measures including pain, treatment side effects, psychological well being and 
immunodeficiency (Roffe et al., 2005) concluded that although there was no compelling 
evidence for the positive effect of guided imagery on physical symptoms such as nausea 
and  vomiting,  studies  showed  significant  effects  for  emotional  response  during 
chemotherapy  (Troesch,  Rodehaver,  Delaney,  &  Yanes,  1993)  comfort  during 
radiotherapy (Kolcaba & Fox, 1999) and depression and quality of life (e.g. Sloman, 
2002).  A  recent  study  has  also  concluded  that  guided  imagery  and  relaxation  was   111 
successful for alleviating anxiety, depression and body discomfort in cancer patients 
receiving brachytherapy treatment (Leon-Pizarro et al., 2007).   
Possible  reasons  given  for  the  beneficial  effects  of  guided  imagery  include 
increases in patient’s feelings of control and ‘self-efficacy’ (Walker et al, 2007) and 
diversion  of  attention  from  the  adverse  cancer-related  experience  (Lyles,  Burish, 
Krozely, & Oldham, 1982). However, research has often failed to assess the differences 
between guided imagery as a sole intervention and guided imagery used in combination 
with  progressive  relaxation  (Roffe  et  al,  2005).  Also  research  has  not  provided 
evidence-based explanations of the success of guided imagery treatments.  For example, 
perhaps visualisation is an effective relief from psychological distress and other adverse 
effects  of  the  cancer  experience  because  it  replaces  negative  intrusive  imagery  that 
cause the distress in the first place. As described in Chapter 1, Brewin (2001) suggested 
that one way to remove the impact of situationally accessible memories (SAMs) is to 
replace them with competing verbally accessible memories (VAMs). This view is also 
supported in relation to future oriented intrusive images, as information may require 
updating and integration in order for images to be resolved, or at least reduced in terms 
of  their  impact  on  psychological  distress  (Hackmann  &  Holmes,  2004).  Although 
guided imagery therapy has shown to be generally beneficial, it is not known to what 
extent  this  was  due  to  the  imagery  component  or  whether  the  treatment  could  be 
improved  by  replacing  standard  imagery  instructions  (e.g.  visualising  host  cells 
destroying cancer cells) with procedures targeted at patients own idiosyncratic images. 
Moreover,  other  important  factors  in  the  efficacy  of  guided  imagery  are  often 
omitted. For example, it has been suggested that imaging ability should be considered 
when  guided  imagery  is  used  (Kwekkeboom,  Huseby-Moore,  &  Ward,  1998; 
Kwekkeboom, 2000).  A pilot study to predict success with guided imagery for cancer 
pain  (Kwekkeboom,  Kneip,  &  Pearson,  2003)  found  that  imaging  ability  predicted 
mean pain intensity, positive affect and perceived control over pain. The importance of 
imagery vividness should not be underestimated as Walker et al (1999) showed that 
self-reported vividness of imagery significantly correlated with clinical response.  In 
relation  to  this,  it  has  been  suggested  that  very  little  research  has  focussed  on  the 
subjective  experience  of  imagery  itself,  which  is  important  for  the  effective  use  of 
imagery in therapy (Bywaters, Andrade, & Turpin, 2004).   
  Direct imagery techniques focussed on negative imagery, rather than positive 
imagery have also been utilised in cancer patients. Systematic desensitisation (SD) is a   112 
standardised behavioural therapy used to alter maladaptive learned responses (Morrow 
& Dobkin, 1988).  Morrow and colleagues adopted a modified version of progressive 
muscle relaxation therapy as a competing response to maladaptive anticipatory nausea 
and  vomiting  (ANV)  in  cancer  patients  currently  undergoing  chemotherapy  (e.g. 
Morrow  &  Morrell,  1982).  During  systematic  desensitisation,  the  patient  imagines 
scenes from a hierarchy of events related to chemotherapy treatment. For example, the 
patient imagines the evening before treatment, breakfast the morning of the treatment, 
driving to the hospital and entering the waiting room and seeing the clinic nurse. Whilst 
imagining these scenarios, patients are taught relaxation techniques such as tensing a 
particular  muscle  group,  saying  the  word  “relax”  to  themselves  and  focussing  on 
releasing  the  tension  from  the  muscle  group  (Morrow,  1986).    Thus  the  treatment 
stimuli  become  associated  with  relaxation  so  that  when  the  patient  encounters  each 
scenario they respond with relaxation rather than nausea and vomiting. Several studies 
have  supported  the  effectiveness  of  SD  on  ANV  in  cancer  patients.  For  example, 
Morrow & Morrell (1982) randomly assigned 60 cancer patients to SD, counselling or a 
no treatment group and found that only patients in the SD group reported significant 
reductions in frequency, severity and duration of ANV. Morrow (1986) assigned 92 
cancer patients to one of four conditions, i) SD, ii) relaxation only iii) counselling iv) no 
treatment control and found that relative to the other 3 groups, SD patients reported a 
significant decrease in the severity and duration of anticipatory nausea from baseline to 
follow-up. Thus, the positive effects on ANV could not be attributed to relaxation alone 
although  relaxation  and  SD  were  found  to  produce  significant  reductions  in  ANV 
relative to the other groups.  
  Morrow & Dobkin (1988) discussed explanations for the success of SD for the 
treatment  of  ANV.  Several  hypotheses  have  been  proposed,  which  have  included 
explaining ANV as a classically conditioned response (Watson, 1993). The conditioning 
model  suggests  that  ANV  results  because  an  unconditioned  response  (nausea  and 
vomiting) follows an unconditioned stimulus (chemotherapy). Potentially conditioned 
stimuli  (e.g.  sensations,  images,  clinic  nurse)  alter  after  a  number  of  trials  (i.e. 
chemotherapy  treatments)  to  give  rise  to  a  conditioned  stimuli  (e.g.  clinic  nurse) 
eliciting  a  conditioned  response  (ANV).  In  this  context,  SD  works  by  breaking  the 
associative  bonds  between  conditioned  stimuli  and  conditioned  response  and  allow 
patients to learn an adaptive response (relaxation). Other suggestions include the notion 
that  pairing  scenarios  with  relaxation  comprises  a  form  of  distraction  so  that   113 
conditioning no longer occurs (Morrow & Dobkin, 1988). Another hypothesis is that 
pairing  relaxation  with  a  hierarchy  of  feared  events  leading  up  to  chemotherapy 
treatment increases patient’s perceived sense of control so that the subjective feeling of 
helplessness is alleviated. However, Morrow & Dobkins (1988) concluded that although 
these latter explanations are appealing, there are no empirical data to support them.  
Although  a  series  of  studies  have  supported  the  effectiveness  of  SD  in 
alleviating chemotherapy side-effects such as nausea and vomiting, the recognition of 
higher mental processes and the development of therapies encompassing cognitive as 
well  as  behavioural  components    (Watson,  1993;  Moorey,  1991)  means  there  is  no 
recent research assessing the effectiveness of SD in cancer patients. Also, it has been 
suggested that the important elements of desensitisation remain uncertain (Hackmann, 
1998). Some suggested that the use of a hierarchy and progressive muscle relaxation 
was  not  essential  (e.g.  Dawson  &  McMurray,  1978)  and  others  emphasised  the 
importance of the use of imagery by the patient (Wilkins, 1971). For example, imagery 
is not necessarily static according to each hierarchical stage, the image may evolve 
throughout therapy and other associations may come to the fore.  
Psychological  therapies  currently  prevalent  for  alleviating  distress  in  cancer 
patients include Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for cancer patients (e.g. Moorey 
& Greer, 2002) and Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). 
These will now be discussed in relation to how they approach imagery in therapy.  
4.3.2. Psychological therapies for cancer patients with imagery 
components.  
CBT is an approach which was developed by Beck (1976) and is a structured, 
collaborative  short-term  therapy  which  involves  both  behavioural  (e.g.  activity 
scheduling)  and  cognitive  (e.g.  monitoring  automatic  negative  thoughts)  techniques. 
CBT  is  focussed  on  addressing  and  managing  specific  problems  rather  than  global 
issues (Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk, & Clark, 2002). In 1989 the first text describing a 
CBT  intervention  programme  for  cancer  patients  was  published  (Moorey  &  Greer, 
1989) which described the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer. The model, which 
is derived from Lazarus & Folkman’s conceptualisation of stress, appraisal and coping 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) described a series of negative consequences in relation to 
the diagnosis of cancer, where the experience of symptoms and treatment side-effects 
leads to changes in mental and physical abilities, changes in personal and social roles   114 
and change in appearance which may lead to negative beliefs about the self, others and 
the  world.  Threats  to  the  self  vary  according  to  the  meaning  associated  with 
consequences of cancer. For example, a man to whom work is the most important thing 
in life, will appraise 3 months sick-leave as catastrophic, even if he is assured that the 
cancer is curable. Moorey & Greer (2002) explained that threats to the self can also be 
defined more generally as threats to the personal domain, which was defined by Beck 
(1976)  as  aspects  of  life  such  as  friends,  relatives,  goals,  possessions  and  values. 
Emotional responses to cancer can be conceived as interpretations of particular threats 
to the personal domain (Moorey & Greer, 2002). If an individual perceives danger or 
vulnerability, by appraising a situation as threatening to personal and social well being 
or feeling vulnerable based on the appraisal that the patient cannot deal with the threat, 
then anxiety will be the key emotional response. If an individual perceives that their 
personal domain has been unjustifiably attacked, then anger will be the key emotional 
response. Guilt arises from self-blame, where an individual is searching for meaning to 
explain their experience. Finally, sadness and depression result from a sense of loss 
from the personal domain, where loss covers a wide range of potential factors, including 
physical factors, such as loss of strength, mental factors, such as loss of concentration, 
or social factors such as loss of a valued role (e.g. mother, employee).  
The  cognitive  model  of  adjustment  to  cancer  combines  emotional  responses 
resulting from differential appraisals of cancer into a model which includes a person’s 
pre-existing self-schema, their subsequent survival schema, cognitions, emotions and 
behavioural responses (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Cognitive model of adjustment to cancer. Reproduced from Moorey & 
Greer (2002, p 20) 
 
In summary, following the acceptance of cancer as a precipitator of significant 
psychological distress, the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (Moorey & Greer, 
2002) proposed that negative  appraisals and meanings that individuals assign to the 
cancer  experience  determines  individual  emotional  and  behavioural  responses  and 
subsequent adjustment.  
Within CBT for cancer patients, imagery has been described as part of an overall 
treatment package including exposure in imagination, image modification and guided 
imagery  for  cancer  patients  (see  Moorey  &  Greer,  2002).  As  previously  described, 
imaginal exposure is a direct technique focussed on negative imagery. Patients with 
aversions to treatment are asked to imagine, rather than experience “in vivo” the feared 
stimulus while relaxed so that they learn to control their anxiety. This is different from 
SD because the patient is required to imagine the feared scene in its entirety and not 
graded images of a feared scenario. Image modification was described by Moorey & 
Greer (2002) in the case of a woman with successfully treated sarcoma, who reported 
anxiety which was associated with images of herself as a child. At age 11, she had been 
seriously ill and felt helpless and dependent. Cancer had re-activated the memories of   116 
herself as a helpless invalid. In order to remind her that these were images from the past, 
and not facts about the present and future, the woman altered the image of herself as a 
child. Specifically, she imagined herself in hospital, putting on her clothes and leaving. 
This  modification  also  represents  a  direct  imagery  technique  focussed  on  negative 
imagery. Moorey & Greer (2002) suggested that images that are vivid and seem real can 
be modified by imagining them on a television screen and visualising the self watching 
them  with  friends  or  relatives.  This  helps  reinforce  the  idea  that  they  are  mental 
constructs  and  not  perceptions.  Guided  imagery  has  also  been  previously  described  
within the context of CBT for cancer patients and involves creating an image in the 
mind’s eyes, for example, of the cancer being destroyed by the treatment and body’s 
defences (Simonton et al., 2000). Although research has supported the effectiveness of 
cognitive-behavioural based therapies in cancer patients (e.g. Edelman, Bell, & Kidman, 
1999;  Osborn,  Demoncada,  &  Feuerstein,  2006;  Tatrow  &  Montgomery,  2006; 
Andrykowski & Manne, 2006) these studies do not assess the relative effectiveness of 
components of this therapy, including imagery components.  
In line with the framework described by Holmes et al (2007), other imagery-
related  therapeutic  techniques  used  with  cancer  patients  include  mindfulness  based 
cognitive  therapy  which  is  an  indirect  technique  addressing  negative  imagery. 
Individuals  are  taught  to  experience  mental  events  (e.g.  intrusive  images)  in  a 
dispassionate way instead of reacting emotionally to them.  A systematic review of the 
literature  applying  mindfulness  based  stress  reduction  in  cancer  care  (Smith, 
Richardson, Hoffman, & Pilkington, 2005) described 11 clinical trials of mindfulness 
therapy with cancer patients (both controlled and uncontrolled studies) and concluded 
that  mindfulness  based  stress  reduction  has  the  potential  to  be  a  clinically  valuable 
intervention for cancer patients to improve mood, sleep quality and reduction in stress.  
The  main  application  of  imagery  techniques  in  therapy  for  cancer  patients 
includes  guided  imagery  and  systematic  desensitisation.  The  use  of  cognitive 
behavioural therapy and mindfulness based stress reduction also comprise components 
which  target  intrusive  images.  However,  research  investigating  imagery  in  cancer 
patients has mainly focussed on the use of positive imagery with minor emphasis on 
negative imagery in the systematic desensitisation work of Morrow and colleagues (e.g. 
Morrow, 1986). So far, aside from work conducted by Brewin et al (1998a, 1998b) and 
the present thesis, the presence of negative imagery in cancer patients has remained   117 
largely  unexplored.  As  a  consequence,  there  is  no  recent  research  systematically 
exploring the use of direct imagery techniques on negative imagery in cancer patients.  
4.4.  Modular approaches to therapy  
A modular view of therapy suggests that having treatment components tailored 
to  individual  presentation  rather  than  giving  everyone  the  same  overall  treatment 
package may be beneficial (Brewin, 2006). Further, it has been argued that there is a 
lack  of  systematic  research  investigating  mechanisms  of  change  behind  therapy  for 
cancer (Gurevich et al., 2002). Awareness of specific risk and distress symptoms can 
provide a platform to explore personal meaning for cancer patients and decide which 
psychological  processes  are  most  challenging  (White,  2004).    For  example,  mental 
imagery has been identified as a key component of anxiety that needs to be addressed in 
psychological  therapy  (Hirsch  &  Holmes,  2007),  but  studies  of  psychological 
intervention for cancer patients often fail to identify such components. Indeed, although 
stress response symptoms such as intrusive thoughts and images have been identified 
and linked to psychological distress in cancer patients, there is little systematic evidence 
for the benefit of interventions to treat stress response syndromes in cancer (Gurveich et 
al, 2002). There are some exceptions, for example a single-case study showed that a 
trauma focussed intervention successfully reduced PTSD symptoms in a 40-year old 
man, 3 years post-bone marrow transplantation for leukaemia (Duhamel et al., 2000). 
With research identifying cognitive processes associated with psychological distress in 
cancer patients (e.g. intrusive memories, White, 2004) research should take these into 
account when evaluating the effectiveness and applicability of psychological therapy for 
cancer patients.  
A  recent  meta-analysis  of  psychological  treatments  for  PTSD  (Bisson  et  al., 
2007) found that of five therapies assessed in randomised controlled designs, therapies 
targeted at specific traumatic memories and their meaning, rather than treatments which 
were not trauma-focussed had the most significant impact on PTSD symptoms, anxiety 
and depression. Other research specifically with cancer patients has also supported the 
specificity of therapy. In evaluating the effectiveness of expressing writing on intrusive 
thoughts  in  women  with  breast  cancer  (Zakowski,  Ramati,  Morton,  Johnson,  & 
Flanigan, 2004), it was concluded that psychological therapy for cancer patients should 
be tailor-made to individual needs. Further, a meta-analysis of psychosocial intervention 
components  (Graves,  2003)  suggested  that  interventions  designed  to  include  social   118 
cognitive  theory  components  (e.g.  self-efficacy,  outcome  expectations  and  self-
regulation) produced larger effect sizes than interventions lacking those components. 
Little  is  known  about  the  therapeutic  processes  contributing  to  the  effectiveness  of 
psychological interventions for cancer patients (Andersen, Shelby, & Golden-Kreutz, 
2007)  and  evaluating  mechanisms  of  change  is  important  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
Information can help in choosing appropriate interventions, providing explanations for 
the success or failure of therapy, identifying treatment moderators and enhancing the 
translation of tested therapies to clinical practice (Kazdin, 2006). By choosing strategies 
that are most responsible for change, there will be increased efficiency, effect sizes and 
maintenance of intervention effects for patients (Andersen et al, 2007).  
A model that may be useful in conceptualising mechanisms of change in therapy 
is the retrieval competition account of CBT (Brewin, 2006). This account suggests that 
different  therapies  may  work  on  the  same  principle,  and  that  discipline-specific 
strategies  such  as  logical  reasoning  (cognitive  therapy)  and  associative  learning 
(behaviour  therapy),  result  in  the  same  process,  where  an  alternative  and  positive 
representation  is  created  which  is  potent  enough  to  compete  with  negative 
representations for attention at the crucial time of retrieval. Using behaviour therapy as 
an example, and specifically the extinction of fear, Brewin (2006) cited evidence that 
fear is not unlearned through exposure but rather extinction involves learning a lack of 
association in a new context. There are several implications of this account in terms of 
the  success  of  psychological  therapy,  including  the  possibility  that  simply  teaching 
individuals methods of personally disengaging attention from negative representations 
has  the  same  effect  on  reducing  negative  symptoms  as  more  elaborate  and  indirect 
techniques (Brewin, 2006, p 778).  
Specifically, it was suggested that in order for modular therapy to be successful, 
processes meeting the following criteria should be focus; a) they are a common feature 
of  the  disorder,  b)  they  have  been  shown  empirically  to  be  critical  in  mediating  or 
maintaining  the  disorder  and  c)  they  are  amenable  to  direct  modification  (Brewin, 
2006). Modular therapy fits with the law of parsimony (Ockham’s razor) which argues 
that if you explain something adequately without introducing further complexity, then 
the simple explanation is the best explanation (Warburton, 2000). Modular therapy also 
fits with the principles of a transdiagnostic approach to clinical disorders, by identifying 
modifiable, common processes underlying emotional distress. The key question when 
assessing the applicability of therapy to emotional distress may thus focus on which   119 
processes meet the three criteria described above. Once processes have been identified, 
specific therapeutic techniques can be applied. 
Intrusive imagery was identified in Study 1 and Study 2 as a cognitive process 
associated with psychological distress and maladaptive adjustment in cancer patients. 
Intrusive images meet the criteria proposed above because they are a common feature of 
anxiety and depression (Holmes et al, 2007), have a causal role in the maintenance of 
anxiety and PTSD (Hirsch et al, 2004; Jones et al, 2007) and are amenable to direct 
modification. Of the above techniques utilising imagery in therapy, imagery rescripting 
has  recently  received  considerable  attention  (see  Holmes  et  al,  2007  for  a  review). 
Imagery rescripting will now be described and recent empirical evidence supporting its 
effectiveness will be presented.  
4.5.  Imagery rescripting therapy 
Although  the  earliest  form  of  imagery  rescripting  was  described  in  1889  as 
imagery  substitution  by  Janet  (Van  Der  Kolk  &  Van  Der  Hart,  1989),  imagery 
rescripting  was  more  recently  presented  as  a  treatment  of  PTSD  for  survivors  of 
childhood sexual abuse (Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & Niederee, 1995; Arntz & Weertman, 
1999).  The  technique  involves  a  combination  of  imaginal  exposure  (deliberately 
recalling  the  intrusive  imagery)  followed  by  imagery  rescripting  (modifying  the 
negative imagery to produce a positive outcome). For survivors of childhood sexual 
abuse,  patients  are  required  to  evoke  the  negative  image  and  whilst  visualising  the 
intrusive imagery, the patient is encouraged to develop a new scenario to replace the 
negative scene, where the patient as an adult interrupts the abuse, “rescues” the child, 
and provides protection and nurturance. Smucker et al (1995) found the treatment to be 
extremely effective; at 3 month and 6 month follow-up, no patients met criteria for 
PTSD and patients reported enhanced feelings of control, less self-blame and a greater 
capacity to assign responsibility to the perpetrator. 
 In  addition  to  the  treatment  of  traumatic  childhood  memories,  imagery 
rescripting  has  been  described  in  other  populations  of  patients  including  patients 
experiencing posttraumatic symptoms as a result of motor vehicle accidents, epileptic 
seizures  and  industrial  accidents  (Rusch,  Grunert,  Mendelsohn,  &  Smucker,  2000), 
bulimia  (Ohanian,  2002)  and  patients  suffering  from  PTSD  as  a  result  of  industrial 
accidents  (Grunert,  Smucker,  Weis,  &  Rusch,  2003).  The  above  studies  reported  a 
positive and rapid improvement in patients distress associated with intrusive imagery   120 
(Rusch  et  al.,  2000),  maladaptive  behaviour  (Ohanian,  2002),  depression,  anxiety, 
intrusion and avoidance on the Impact of Events Scale (IES) and subjective distress 
(Grunert  et  al,  2003).  One  study  found  that  imagery  rescripting  therapy  was  so 
powerful, that it was effective in only one session (Rusch et al, 2000).  
  Significant progress in the use of imagery rescripting in therapy has been made 
and the special issue “Imagery Rescripting in Cognitive Behaviour Therapy: Images, 
Treatment, Techniques and Outcomes” presented a series of papers reporting intrusive 
imagery in a range of disorders including social phobia (Stopa & Jenkins, 2007), OCD 
(Rachman,  2007;  Speckens  et  al.,  2007),  suicidality  (Holmes,  Crane,  Fennell,  & 
Williams, 2007) and bulimia (Somerville, Cooper, & Hackmann, 2007). Beyond studies 
exploring the frequency and nature of intrusive imagery in various patient groups, the 
special  issue  extends  the  literature  on  the  clinical  application  of  using  imagery  in 
therapy for patients with social phobia (Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2007), PTSD (Arntz 
et al., 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & Christianson, 2007) snake phobia (Hunt & 
Fenton, 2007) and depression (Wheatley et al, 2007).   
 Wild et al (2007) described the use of imagery rescripting for 14 patients with 
social phobia. After assessing the content and meaning (including associated memories) 
of  negative  intrusive  images,  cognitive  restructuring  was  employed  to  verbally 
challenge  beliefs  associated  with  the  image  (e.g.  “I  am  ugly”)  and  rescripting  was 
subsequently  used  to  help  view  the  negative  imagery  from  different  perspectives  in 
order to update the patient’s understanding of the image. Rescripting was conducted in 
three phases; the first stage involved reliving the memory at the age it happened, in the 
second  stage  the  patient  relived  the  memory  at  their  current  age,  watching  what 
happened to their younger self and in the third phase, the patient relived the memory 
again  from  the  perspective  of  their  younger  self  with  their  adult  self  in  the  room 
intervening (Wild et al., 2007). At this point the younger self is asked what they need to 
happen in the image in order to feel better and then imagine this happening. One case 
study was of a patient who had a recurrent image of himself looking extremely self-
conscious, with a red face and big ears. The image was related to a memory of being 
humiliated by a friend at a party. In the imaginal rescripting, the patient intervened in 
the party scene, telling  his friend to leave his younger self alone. He  also chose to 
introduce  friends  and  family  into  the  image  and  confronted  the  bullies  with  their 
support.  Wild  et  al  (2007)  found  that  within  a  single  imagery  rescripting  session, 
patients rated their beliefs associated with the image as significantly weaker and the   121 
images were significantly less distressing and vivid. One week later, patients still rated 
their  images  as  less  distressing  (although  not  less  vivid)  and  patients  reported 
significantly fewer negative social concerns in the previous week (e.g. “I am weird”). 
Following  imagery  rescripting  patients  also  showed  significantly  lower  scores  on  a 
measure assessing the severity of components of social phobia, including anxious affect. 
Further evidence for the success of imagery rescripting in social phobia was provided in 
a  controlled  study,  where  the  control  group  showed  no  significant  changes  and  the 
experimental group showed significant improvements in negative beliefs, image and 
memory distress and vividness, fear of negative evaluation and anxiety in feared social 
situations (Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2008).   
  Arntz et al  (2007)  compared the use of imaginal exposure with  and without 
imagery  rescripting  in  a  sample  of  67  patients  with  posttraumatic  stress  disorder 
(PTSD). Imaginal exposure alone involves recalling the details of a traumatic event in 
the present tense while focussing on accompanying emotions, thoughts and behaviours. 
At toxic moments during the trauma, patients are required to ‘rewind or hold’ an image 
to focus on the most anxiety provoking aspects of the trauma. Imaginal exposure with 
imagery rescripting introduces a new component to exposure in the 5th-10th session, 
where patients are asked to imagine how they wish they had reacted (Arntz et al, 2007). 
Although  the  combination  group  did  not  show  higher  reductions  in  PTSD  severity 
compared  to  the  imaginal  exposure  alone,  patients  in  the  combination  group  were 
significantly less likely to drop out of therapy and also showed greater reduction in 
variables  such  as  anger,  guilt  and  shame.  After  the  trial  Arntz  et  al  (2007)  asked 
therapists to complete an anonymous questionnaire about their preference for imaginal 
exposure alone or in combination with rescripting and it was found that therapists also 
found  the  combination  therapy  more  acceptable.  In  conclusion,  Arntz  et  al  (2007) 
argued that adding rescripting to imaginal exposure may be more acceptable to patients 
and therapists whilst also leading to greater effects on non-fear problems such as anger 
and guilt.  
  Others have suggested that imagery rescripting may not only be beneficial as an 
adjunct therapy to exposure but as a stand-alone therapy for PTSD patients for whom 
prolonged  exposure  (PE)  is  unsuccessful  (Grunert  et  al,  2007).  Twenty-three 
participants with PTSD as a result of industrial accidents and for whom PE had failed 
participated  in  Imagery  Rescripting  and  Reprocessing  Therapy  (IRRT).  There  were 
three stages of therapy; re-experiencing, mastery and consolidation. In the first stage,   122 
patients were required to experience the trauma, including associated emotional and 
physical sensations. In the second stage, patients were encouraged to use mastery and 
adaptive  imagery  to  develop  an  alternative  visual  representation  of  oneself  as  a 
competent survivor helping the “today-self” help the “traumatised-self” to cope with the 
trauma more effectively. The final stage, named “post-imagery re-processing” enabled 
further linguistic processing of the imagery session and consolidation of the alternative 
positive  representation.  Over  the  course  of  treatment,  mean  levels  of  avoidance, 
intrusions (measured by IES), depression and anxiety decreased following treatment and 
concentration levels (WAIS) improved. At the end of IRRT 18/23 (79%) of patients 
made a complete and sustained recovery.  
Imagery rescripting has also been investigated in the treatment of snake phobia 
by  comparing  4  treatment  groups;  imaginal  exposure,  imagery  rescripting,  a 
combination  of  these  or  a  relaxation  control  (Hunt  &  Fenton,  2007).  Fifty-two 
individuals  with  snake  phobia  were  allocated  to  the  four  treatment  groups.  The 
relaxation control group received minimal exposure (e.g. therapist approaching snake 
video) and relaxation technique training such as controlled breathing. The in vivo group 
were required to produce a hierarchy of fear and gradually be exposed to each level of 
fear by getting closer to the feared stimuli (a mature male bull python and a mature 
female corn snake). The imagery rescripting component required individuals to modify 
distorted beliefs about the snake through imagery (e.g. “imagine the snake with no teeth 
like an old man”).Hunt & Fenton (2007) found that imagery rescripting was as effective 
as in vivo exposure in reducing behavioural avoidance and fear of snakes.   
Finally,  two  single-case  studies  were  presented  of  two  clinically  depressed 
patients  receiving  imagery  rescripting  therapy  (Wheatley  et  al,  2007).  Imagery 
rescripting was associated with a significant reduction in distress and it was suggested 
that imagery rescripting in depression may be a viable approach when patients report 
distressing intrusive memories. Imagery rescripting was a relatively short intervention, 
with improvements maintained at 1 year follow-up.  
One  possible  explanation  for  the  success  of  imagery  rescripting  in  reducing 
intrusion frequency and intrusion associated distress can be gleaned from the retrieval 
competition account of CBT (Brewin, 2006). Rather than imagery modification leading 
to direct changes to information represented in memory, Brewin (2006) proposed that 
imagery rescripting functions to increase the activation of positive rather than negative 
images. In therapy, this process involves creating a new but related memory or image to   123 
have  a  positive  outcome,  and  helping  this  representation  to  win  the  retrieval 
competition. According to this account, for the target representation to win over existing 
negative representations, it must be “positive, highly memorable and attention-grabbing 
in the presence of negative cues” (p777). In addition to the immediate positive effects 
on mood, Brewin (2006) argued that altering intrusive images and thoughts can reduce 
the troublesome representations being activated in the future.  
Holmes  et  al  (2007)  emphasised  that  imagery  rescripting  does  not  simply 
function  by  changing  a  negative  image  into  a  positive  image.  Modification  of 
distressing imagery offers patients new perspectives on past events which elicit new 
feelings,  identify  unmet  needs  and  encourage  constructive  processing  of  emotional 
material.  Hackmann  (1998)  also  emphasised  that  modifying  intrusive  imagery  may 
operate on two levels, one encouraging cognitive change (i.e. changing the meaning of 
the content of the image) and one encouraging metacognitive change (i.e. change the 
meaning of having the image). For example, Hackmann (1998) described a case of a 
woman who had a repetitive image of her own gravestone and the happy faces of her 
husband  and  child  when  they  visited  it.  During  therapy,  the  woman  pictured  the 
negative image on a television screen and imagined herself alive and well. She then 
imagined turning off the television and driving away from the house. This changed her 
beliefs about the meaning of having the image, as she no longer felt it reflected her 
future but was only a product of her fearful imagination (Hackmann, 1998).  
Study 1 and Study 2 reported that anxious cancer patients experienced negative 
intrusive images which  were  associated with psychological distress and maladaptive 
adjustment.  Intrusive  imagery  has  been  identified  as  a  cognitive  process  that  is 
amenable to direct modification, may have a causal role in psychological distress and is 
prevalent  across  anxiety  and  mood  disorders.  Imagery  rescripting  has  proved  an 
effective technique for  alleviating distress across clinical groups (PTSD, depression, 
bulimia,  snake  phobia,  social  phobia).  Therefore  imagery  rescripting  targeted  at 
reducing the frequency and negative properties of intrusive images may be an effective 
therapy for anxiety in cancer patients.   
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In Chapter 4, the use of imagery in psychological therapy was discussed and the 
possibility of using imagery rescripting for cancer patients reporting intrusive imagery 
was raised. The following chapter describes a series of single-case studies aimed at 
piloting  the  use  of  this  short  therapy  for  anxiety  in  a  new  patient  group.  Before 
describing  the  case  studies,  the  utility  of  using  single-case  studies  for  assessing 
psychological interventions is addressed. 
5.1.  Single-case studies 
5.1.1. Single-case design 
Single-case  experimental  design  provides  a  methodology  for  studying  behaviour 
change in individuals (Hersen & Barlow, 1978). Following an initial period of baseline 
observation (A phase) the treatment approach is introduced (B phase) and the selected 
target behaviour is continually monitored via behavioural, subjective (e.g. self-report) or 
physiological indices of improvement. The baseline phase of single-case design serves 
two fundamental purposes, to describe the current level of behaviour and to predict what 
the behaviour would be like in the future if no intervention was introduced (Kazdin, 
1982).  Once  the  initial  baseline  has  been  established  and  the  specific  treatment  is 
introduced, a multitude of variations on the AB design can be implemented (Hersen & 
Barlow, 1978).  
Aldridge (1991) argued that the prime feature of the single-case design is that they 
are feasible. The approach is cost-effective and practical as the problems of finding 
large groups of patients are avoided. Further, the design approach is flexible and allows 
for varying levels of scientific rigour (Aldridge, 1991). Single-case designs are also 
noted for providing clinical rather than statistical significance (Hersen & Barlow, 1978; 
Kazdin, 1982) which is important in therapeutic research as statistical significance can 
lead to overestimation of  treatment success (e.g. patients are less depressed but are still 
suicidal) and underestimation (e.g. some individuals in experimental group improved 
drastically but some  do not improve or get worse and thus any effect is cancelled out in 
comparison to a control group). Single-case studies thus have the benefit of focussing 
on individuals and obtaining more detailed information to help identify those for whom 
treatment is not working (Hersen & Barlow, 1978). Further, focussing on the individual 
removes  problems  with  inter-participant  variability  (Hersen  &  Barlow,  1978).  For 
example, although methodologically sound randomised controlled trials (RCTs) aim to   126 
control for possible confounding factors such as age, there are several inter-individual 
factors which still vary and are beyond control, such as compliance with treatment and 
comorbidity  (Kazdin,  2001).  Kazdin  (2001)  also  suggested  that  the  continual 
assessment of outcome measures of the targeted behaviour throughout treatment and 
follow-up provides important feedback about the success of the treatment that pre-post 
treatment assessment of group designs does not allow.  
Some suggest that single-case studies are a useful pre-cursor to costly RCTs, for 
example,  Gedo  (1999)  concluded  that  “perhaps  in  order  to  understand  the  general 
case, we first need a more thorough and subtle understanding of the single-case” (p 
278). Single-case studies also suit a cyclical approach to research (Barkham & Mellor-
Clark, 2003),  as it has been recognised that single-case design can be implemented 
following  large  scale  studies  identifying  a  particular  area  requiring  more  in  depth 
investigation (Gedo, 1999). Following queries and amendments arising from single-case 
design, the treatment approach could once again be subjected to large-scale research 
designs such as RCTs.  
One  of  the  major  criticisms  levelled  at  single-case  design  is  the  inability  to 
generalise findings from individuals to other populations. In answer to this criticism 
single-case research designs do not claim to be generalisable to populations outside the 
study domain. Also, the use of multiple baseline designs can overcome the problem of 
applying general validity to a treatment (Aldridge, 1991). As long as clinicians follow a 
shared  protocol,  by  targeting  a  specific  behaviour,  individual  case  studies  can  be 
analysed as a group and more information regarding the efficacy of treatment can be 
gleaned. 
Another  issue  that  is  central  to  the  usefulness  of  single-case  design  is  that 
measurement of change must be carefully considered  For example, self-report measures 
of the experience of imagery rely on self-monitoring which can be unreliable (Hersen &  
Barlow, 1978) and the manner in which the outcome measure is assessed should be 
replicable. 
5.1.2. Clinical significance  
The clinical significance of a treatment refers to whether the change in a specific 
outcome measure makes any real difference in the everyday life of the client (Kazdin, 
1999),  and  whether  the  treatment  has  met  standards  of  usefulness  set  by  clinicians, 
researchers and consumers (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Although it is unclear what the   127 
standards  should  be,  various  suggestions  have  been  made,  including  a)  a  high 
percentage  of  clients  improving,  b)  a  level  of  change  recognisable  by  family  or 
friends/the individual/the therapist, c) an elimination of the presenting difficulty and d) 
normative levels of  functioning by the  end of  treatment (Jacobson  &  Truax, 1991). 
Clinical significance has been broadly defined as “returning to normal functioning” 
(Jacobson, Roberts, Berns, & McGlinchey, 1999, p 300). Statistical indices have been 
developed in order to ascertain whether the amount of change from outside the normal 
range  towards  the  normal  range  for  individuals  is  large  enough  to  be  considered 
meaningful (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Clinically significant change can be calculated 
in three ways (Jacobson & Truax, 1991); a) the level of functioning post-treatment falls 
outside the range of the dysfunctional population, where range is considered within 2 
standard deviations (in direction of functionality) of the mean of that population, a=M 
of  dysfunctional  population-  2SD  of  dysfunctional  population    b)  the  level  of 
functioning post-treatment falls within the range of the functional population, where 
range is considered within 2 standard deviations of the mean of that population, b=M of 
functional population + 2SD of functional population and c) the level of functioning 
post-treatment is closer to the mean of the functional population compared to the mean 
of the dysfunctional population. This cut off score is calculated using the following 
equation (Jacobson & Truax, 1991): 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge of the functional and non-functional norms is required, which may 
be problematic because this information is not always available. The preferable method 
of establishing clinical significance via the cut-offs stipulated above varies according to 
individual studies and the availability of normative data for outcome measures in 
functional and dysfunctional populations (Jacobson et al, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
c = (SD of functional pop x M of dysfunctional pop) + (SD of dysfunctional pop x M of functional pop) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
SD of functional pop + SD of dysfunctional pop 
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5.1.3. Reliable change   
  Jacobson and colleagues recognised that although clinical significance is a 
useful assessment of whether patients are returning to normal functioning, a second 
criterion is required to establish a reliable clinically significant effect of treatment. To 
determine whether the amount of change observed between pre and post-treatment is 
statistically reliable, Jacobson and colleagues developed the reliable change index (RCI; 
Jacobson, Folette, & Revenstorf, 1984). The formula (see Table 17) ascertains not only 
whether specific outcome measures have changed post-therapy but precisely how much 
change has occurred and whether this is greater than the change that would be expected 
to occur due to unreliability in the outcome measure (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). The 
RCI is a z score, with a score greater than 1.96 indicating reliable change (Jacobson & 
Truax, 1991).  
Table 17 Calculating Reliable Change Index 
Statistical measure  Calculation 
Standard error  (SE)  SD of functional population√ 1- Reliability 
Standard difference 
(Sdiff) 
√2(SE)
2 
Reliable change (RC)  Post intervention score – Pre-intervention score 
Sdiff 
 
The RCI allows more precise evaluation of the efficacy of treatment than clinical 
significance alone (Jacobson et al, 1999) and should not be confused as simply another 
method for determining clinical significance (Jacobson et al, 1999). This is because if a 
client’s change post-treatment is reliable but the patient remains within the range of the 
dysfunctional population the patient is deemed to have “improved but not recovered”, 
whilst if the patient’s change on a specific outcome measure is reliable and within the 
range of the functional population, the patient is considered to have “recovered.”  
 
In summary, based on the finding that anxious cancer patients experienced vivid 
and  uncontrollable  intrusive  imagery,  it  is  important  to  investigate  whether  imagery 
rescripting  therapy  can  be  applied  to  cancer  patients.  This  is  the  first  time  imagery 
rescripting has been investigated in this sample.   
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5.2.  Study 3  
Key research questions included: 
1.  Can  the  frequency,  interference,  vividness,  uncontrollability  and  distress 
associated  with  intrusive  images  be  reduced  by  individual  rescripting  of  the 
image? 
2.  Does imagery rescripting lead to a decrease in anxiety and depression? 
5.2.1. Aims and hypotheses  
It was predicted that imagery rescripting would reduce the frequency, interference, 
vividness and distress associated with intrusive imagery and increase the controllability 
of  intrusive  imagery  and  it  was  predicted  that  imagery  rescripting  would  lead  to  a 
reduction  in  anxiety  and  depression  levels.  It  was  also  expected  that  the  positive 
outcomes associated with imagery rescripting would remain at 3 month and 6 month 
follow-up. 
5.2.2. Method 
I. Participants 
A series of single-case studies were conducted from people reporting intrusive 
imagery in the interview study discussed in Chapter 3. To be invited to take part in 
imagery rescripting, patients had to score above cut-off for anxiety on the HADS (=>8) 
and report frequent (defined as occurring more than half the time in the past week) 
distressing images or memories. They were also required not to be receiving any other 
one-to-one support. Eleven patients met the above criteria and were invited to take part 
in imagery rescripting therapy. The uptake rate was 18%, with 2 patients consenting to 
and completing therapy.  
Of the nine patients who did not take up imagery rescripting therapy, one patient 
withdrew due to work commitments, two patients did not reply to the invitation, two 
wanted to stay with their current counsellor and four expressed that they did not want to 
remove the intrusions. For example, one patient described how she  would prefer to 
continue trying to ignore the intrusions and another patient expressed concern that if he 
were to face his intrusions, they would get worse, not better. The two patients who 
participated in imagery rescripting therapy did not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
measured  by  the  Posttraumatic  Stress  Disorder  Symptom  Scale  (PSS-I;  Foa  et  al.,   130 
1993).  The  names  of  the  patients  have  been  changed  in  order  to  protect  patient 
confidentiality.   
II. Materials  
Patients  were  selected  based  on  their  involvement  in  Study  2  and  thus 
information on the initial intrusive cognitions interview and related materials can be 
found in Chapter 3. This section will include detail of materials used during the imagery 
rescripting sessions.  
 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
  PTSD was assessed with the PTSD Symptom Scale-Interview Version (PSS-I; 
Foa et al., 1993), a 17-item scale corresponding to symptoms of PTSD including re-
experiencing, avoidance and arousal. Each item is rated for severity on a 4 point scale (0 
= not at all, 1 = once per week or less, 2 = 2-4 times per week and 3 = 5 or more times 
per week. The PSS-I shows good internal consistency, test re-test reliability, inter-rater 
reliability and high sensitivity (Foa et al, 1993). 
 Anxiety & Depression 
Anxiety and depression were assessed using the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV (SCID: First et al., 2002) and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS;  Zigmond  &  Snaith,  1983).  The  HADS  scale  has  been  described  in  detail 
elsewhere (p 47).   
 Frequency and nature of intrusive cognitions 
  Five Likert scales were used to assess the frequency (0 = none of the time, 100 = 
all the time), interference (0 =not at all, 100 = severely), uncontrollability (0 = not at 
all, 100 = completely), distress (0 = not at all, 100 = severely) and vividness (0 = hazy 
memory, 100 = clearest and vividest memory) associated with intrusive imagery. The 
scales were based on questions from the interview schedule described in Chapter 2, 
which asked about the frequency and nature of intrusive cognitions.   
 Distress associated with intrusive cognitions 
The IES (Horowitz et al., 1979) is a 15-item self-report scale which examines 
subjective distress as a result of a specific event. The IES is made up of two sub-scales 
of  intrusion  and  avoidance.  The  IES  was  used  to  measure  intrusion  and  avoidance 
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III. Procedure 
Patients were initially monitored over a baseline period of 3 weeks to ensure that 
symptoms were stable, and treatment progress was assessed with weekly administration 
of  the  HADS  and  weekly  ratings  of  intrusive  memories.  Following  Wheatley  et  al 
(2007) and due to high inter-correlations between the five scales, ratings were summed 
to provide a single measure of intrusive memories. Emotion ratings associated with the 
intrusive memories were collected at various points throughout the imagery rescripting 
sessions.  
The treatment protocol was based on previous work of Wheatley et al (2007) 
and following the imagery rescripting treatment manual (Wheatley & Brewin, 2005). 
The intervention took between 3 and 7 hour-long sessions and intrusion and affect were 
measured continuously throughout this period. The main aim of imagery rescripting was 
to  encourage  cognitive  (changing  the  meaning  of  the  imagery)  and  metacognitive 
(changing beliefs about the image) change by intervening with mental phenomena that 
maintain distress (Wheatley & Brewin, 2005). This was attained by encouraging the 
patient to construct a competing image which has strong associations with the negative 
image, is easier to remember and retrieve and involves positive rather than negative 
affect. In session 1, patients were given a rationale for working with negative imagery.  
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Table 18 Rationale for imagery rescripting therapy (from Wheatley & Brewin, 
2005).  
 
 
“Intrusive visual memories are very common.  Sometimes these can be very pleasant, 
such as images of a special day we remember well.  When we recall that day we might 
recall  smells  and  sensations  as  well  as  mental  pictures.    However  when  bad  things 
happen we may be left with distressing images and memories that haunt us and colour 
our  present.    Sometimes  these  distressing  memories  reflect  negative,  self-defining 
moments that are stored with the meanings they had at the time of the event and without 
a time code.  It can feel almost as if the past event is happening all over again, and it is 
not unusual for people to feel emotions or even physical sensations that they had at the 
time.  These memories need to be updated, and need to find their proper place amongst 
your other memories.  The best way to do this is to access and reflect on the contents of 
these  distressing  fragments  of  memory.    The  meanings  of  the  memory  can  then  be 
carefully thought about, and it may be that some of them are distorted or out of date.  If 
we decide that this is the case we can then change the images/memories in various ways 
using creative imagery. 
A common response to distressing visual images is to avoid them or to block them out 
in some way.  This is understandable, especially if you experience similar emotions or 
sensations to those you experienced at the time of the original event. Some common 
ways to try and block things out are cleaning excessively, drinking alcohol or avoiding 
people or places that remind us of past events.  Rather than try to avoid the memory you 
need to bring it into awareness and learn how to respond to it.  Instead of having the 
memory lurking in the shadows, we need to bring it into the light where we can see it.  
Its important to note that we are not trying to get rid of these distressing memories or 
erase them from your mind, we are trying to learn new ways of responding to them so 
that they don’t cause you so much distress.” 
 
Patients  were  also  given  personalised  case  formulations,  devised  to  aid 
understanding of the mechanisms behind intrusive imagery (e.g. how images may lead 
anxiety). See Figure 3 for a generic example of case formulation.  
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Activation of visual memory network (b)
Negative beliefs about self, others and world (c)
Experiences of images as uncontrollable (d)
DEPRESSION/ANXIETY
a) Trigger: Negative thoughts, emotions, rumination, 
environmental cues such as row with partner, TV shows, 
places associated with a lost loved one
b) Activation: Visual, verbal, emotional, kinaesthetic, olfactory 
images ‘Ghosts from the past’ 
c) Enduring beliefs of worthlessness, hopelessness, etc
d) Experience of intrusive memories as uncontrollable, and a 
sign of madness or weakness
TRIGGER (a)
 
Figure 3 Case formulation given to participants in Session 1.    134 
Following rationale and case formulation, patients were encouraged to develop a 
positive image of a ‘safe place’ (e.g. a beach), in case they felt overwhelmed by the 
negative imagery. Patients were then required to describe intrusive images in detail. The 
therapist helped cue the intrusive imagery using specific trigger questions. Patients were 
also helped to identify potential triggers, associated emotions, meaning and possible 
avoidant behaviours. At the end of the first session patients were encouraged to think of 
the possibility of modifying the negative images. Examples of trigger questions used in 
therapy are presented in Table 19.  
Table 19 Imagery Rescripting trigger questions  
To bring image 
online 
•  Can you describe what you see in your mind’s eye?  
•  Where are you in the image? What do you look like? 
•  What/who else is there? 
Other sensory 
modalities 
 
•  Can you hear anything? Apart from your own voice? 
•  Breathe in and tell me what you smell in the image. 
•  Can you taste anything in the image? 
Perspective  •  Can you see yourself in the image?  
•  Are you on the outside looking in or are you looking out 
from behind your own eyes?  
Associated 
emotions/triggers  
•  What types of emotions are brought up by this image? 
•  How intense are these feelings from 0-100? 
•  What were you doing, thinking or feeling immediately 
before you had the intrusive image? 
Meaning   •  What does the image say about you/others/the world? 
•  What is the worst thing in the image? (e.g. its 
intrusiveness, content, the way it makes you feel) 
Avoidance   •  Are you aware of actively suppressing or avoiding images 
when they occur? 
•  What are you afraid might happen if you do not push it 
away?  
Considering 
transformation  
•  How do you need to feel when you have this intrusive 
image? In control? Protected? 
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In session 2, patients were required to bring intrusive imagery into awareness in 
the same way as in Session 1. Following imagery exposure, the possibility of image 
modification was approached and the following sessions involved coming up with a 
detailed  alternative  to  the  negative  image.  Transformation  of  negative  imagery  was 
encouraged by asking patients to change the perspective of the image (e.g. “Imagine 
yourself looking at the image as though it is on a television, then switching it off or 
making it smaller or dimmer.”), change its physical features (e.g. “Can you make things 
bigger/smaller?”) or prevent the image from freezing at the worst point (e.g. “What 
would happen if you allowed the image to continue?”) Other options included changing 
personal  characteristics  (e.g.  making  self  stronger),  or  making  themselves  feel  safe. 
Patients  were  also  encouraged  to  introduce  new  information  into  the  image,  for 
example, themselves or someone else entering the image. At the end of transformation 
sessions, patients were debriefed by asking what it was like for them to transform the 
image. Once one image had been dealt with, new images were addressed in an identical 
way. For case 1, Sessions 4-7 involved fine tuning alternative images via rehearsal until 
the patient was happy with them. Consolidation was the final step in imagery rescripting 
and required patients to consider how new images were beneficial and what they meant 
about the self/others the world and the future. 
IV. Supervision 
  All  sessions  were  conducted  at  the  Royal  Marsden  NHS  Foundation 
Trust by Katriina Whitaker (doctoral student). On site clinical supervision was provided 
by  Dr  Maggie  Watson.  Before  commencing  therapy,  Katriina  attended  an  imagery 
workshop conducted by Professor Chris Brewin and Dr Jon Wheatley. Katriina also 
attended  several  sessions  of  supervision  at  University  College  London  (UCL)  in 
preparation  for  conducting  imagery  rescripting  therapy.  These  included  listening  to 
taped sessions of imagery rescripting with depressed patients (Wheatley et al, 2007) and 
discussing the treatment manual with Chris Brewin and Jon Wheatley. All therapeutic 
sessions  were  audiotaped  to  ensure  adherence  to  the  treatment  manual.  Weekly 
supervision was provided at UCL with Chris Brewin.  
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5.2.3. Case 1- John  
I. Background information 
John  was  52,  a  former  brick  layer  and  had  been  diagnosed  with  multiple 
myeloma on 18
th July 2006. Multiple myeloma is an incurable cancer of plasma cells 
which  is  associated  with  back  pain  as  it  affects  the  bones  of  the  spine.  John  had 
experienced  loss  of  height  due  to  his  myeloma.  Other  symptoms  include  excessive 
tiredness  and  lethargy,  repeated  colds,  coughs  and  infections  due  to  a  shortage  of 
normal antibodies, loss of appetite and unexplained bruising. John presented with high 
depression and anxiety scores on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (11 and 16 
respectively)  and  he  met  full  criteria  for  current  major  depressive  episode,  with 
numerous  previous  episodes,  and  also  met  criteria  for  current  Generalised  Anxiety 
Disorder.  When  asked  whether  his  cancer  diagnosis  was  involved  in  the  reported 
symptoms,  John  reported  that  he  had  a  history  of  anxiety  and  depression  and  a 
combination of factors were contributing to him feeling this way, including the cancer 
diagnosis.  
For John, feelings evoked since being diagnosed with cancer had triggered off 
memories from the past including distressing flashbacks where he felt frightened or 
vulnerable and also where he had acted like a bully. Moorey & Greer (2002) suggested 
that  the  personal  meaning  attached  to  illness  and  its  consequences  determines  the 
adjustment to cancer and these personal meanings are shaped by an individual’s core 
beliefs and cognitive rules and assumptions about the self, the world and others as well 
as their beliefs and assumptions about illness and death. Figure 4 demonstrates John’s 
schema,  appraisals,  cognitions,  emotions  and  behaviour  associated  with  the  cancer 
diagnosis. 
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Survival schema
-View of cancer as debilitating.
-View of cancer as destroying 
physical strength (lost several inches 
in height due to spinal cord 
compression). 
-Hopeless about the future.
Cognitions
-I feel vulnerable in social situations
-I’m weak
-I’m worthless
-Images of self in humiliating situations were being 
bullied/bullying others
Emotion and Physiology
-Frightened/panicked -Muscular tension
-Angry -Breathlessness
-Humiliated -Heart racing
-Worthless -Unsteady/shaky
-Low mood -Hot/cold sweats
-Anxious -Flushed
-Dizzy
Confirmation
-Avoiding contact with people and thus 
confirm feelings of worthlessness/
helplessness.
-Constant reliving of emotional and 
physical feelings felt during specific 
negative events in the past, experienced as 
intrusive memories in the present. 
Behaviour
-Avoiding social situations
-Avoiding people
-Avoiding places that are 
associated with intrusive 
memories
Self schema
-View of the self as weak & worthless. 
-View of the world as an extremely 
negative and dangerous place.
-View of other people as threatening. 
 
Figure 4 The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer applied to John (from 
Moorey & Greer, 2002).  
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5.2.4. Case 1- Treatment overview 
I. Session 1 
The  first  intrusive  memory  that  John  reported  was  of  an  incident  that  had 
happened 3 years previously, when he was working as a bricklayer for a small firm. The 
memory that kept coming back involved his boss coming over to the area where he was 
working and criticising his work, getting more and more aggressive, belittling his work 
and saying he didn’t want him there. John was finishing the job that day and asked for 
the money he was owed for 3 days work but his boss refused to pay him. John kept 
reliving the memory, wishing that rather than walk away from the situation he had stood 
up for himself and confronted his boss, by using violence and not being such a coward. 
John  reported  feeling  100%  anger,  100%  worthlessness,  100%  humiliation  and  the 
memory  was  associated  with  physical  feelings  of  panic,  for  example,  heart  beating 
faster, difficulty breathing and tenseness in forehead and chest. John was trying to avoid 
thinking about the intrusive memory, or would try to pinch himself to stop himself from 
thinking about it.  
At the end of session 1, the notion of rescripting the image was introduced and 
some possible ideas were discussed. John felt that he wanted his boss to be humiliated 
in the image, rather than him. The session ended with John thinking about how he could 
create an alternative image, which would make him feel less angry, humiliated and 
worthless. By the end of the first session, John reported that he already felt less foolish, 
as it was the first time he had spoken about the memory. He said that the memory was 
not as intense as it initially was and two emotion ratings had reduced slightly; 65% 
worthlessness, 80% humiliation. Anger remained at 100%.  
II. Session 2 
At the beginning of session 2, emotion ratings were 70% anger, 50% humiliation 
and 50% worthlessness in relation to the intrusive memory at work.  John realised that 
he didn’t want to hurt his boss in the image and he had conflicting emotions about being 
a coward and being a bully. When asked what needed to change in the image for him to 
feel better, John described how he would like to be in control by being more laid back 
and finding the situation amusing rather than humiliating. John began rescripting the 
image by imagining his boss as an exaggerated character, breathing heavily and puffing 
out, with steam coming out of his ears. John decided that his boss seemed as though he 
was going to explode and he could imagine him like a balloon, becoming bigger and   139 
bigger until he burst. John felt that an image of his boss bursting with air was amusing 
and made him feel better about the situation. John also spontaneously imagined his boss 
spinning out of control, so that he was drilling down into the ground. Then, as his boss 
approached him, he would start filling with air, his eyes very large and his cheeks blown 
out and John said “it made me realise, he was just as desperate as I was.” By the end of 
session 2, John felt less than 50% anger, 50% humiliation and 50% worthlessness in 
relation to the memory.  
III. Session 3 
At the beginning of session 3, emotion ratings were 30% anger, 30% humiliated 
and 30% worthlessness. John also reported feeling 30% happiness in response to the 
alternative image. John reported that the frequency of intrusive memories in general (i.e. 
not just the intrusive memory described so far) was greatly reduced and he felt more 
relaxed and fewer physical sensations in relation to the intrusive memory. John had 
developed the intrusive memory further so that he imagined his boss as a toy soldier, in 
a marching pose, marching towards him. Instead of blowing up like a balloon, his boss’s 
head starts spinning round and round, with steam coming out of his ears. He is wearing 
a military uniform and his face is painted like a puppet with red rouge on his cheeks, a 
jutting chin and painted red lips. Whilst describing the uniform, John experimented with 
the uniform his boss was wearing, changing it to a pink colour and then changing it to a 
floral dress with builder’s boots and a grey jumper. John pictured himself laughing at 
his boss, who moved towards him with a powerful jet of stream coming out of his nose 
and ears, spinning out of control. By the end of the session, John reported that he felt 
happier with the image, less tense in his chest and amused by the memory rather than 
afraid of it. 
IV. Session 4  
In Session 4, John reported that he was having a number of different memories 
and therefore in order to deal with them he was using a calming image of a waterfall. It 
was explained that although using a general positive image such as a waterfall may be 
useful  as  a  distraction  technique,  it  does  not  have  the  same  impact  as  transforming 
individual  images.  The  rationale  for  rescripting  was  discussed  again.  In  addition  to 
using the calming theme, John reported that he was still using an alternative image of 
the scene with his boss and now his boss was a clown figure, still with large boots and   140 
red rouge on his cheeks. Emotion ratings in relation to the first memory were 50% 
anger, 40% worthlessness and 30% helplessness.  
John reported another intrusive memory of a scene in a shopping centre, where 
he  had  punched  a  man  in  the  face  and  knocked  him  to  the  ground  because  he  felt 
threatened by him.  John had a clear image of people standing around looking at him 
following the attack, with accusing faces. He talked about how the image encapsulated 
how he feels about his life, that he is a bully but feels bullied, that he feels complete 
frustration because people do not understand him and do not know the whole story 
before making a judgement. John felt frightened by the man in this second image, and 
felt that he hit him in self-defence. The emotions he associated with the shopping centre 
image were guilt (80%), sadness (80%) and frustration (80%). John suggested that he 
wanted to feel less guilty in the image and to feel that the man wasn’t hurt and would be 
ok.  
When initially trying to rescript the image, John decided he didn’t want to hit the 
man in the image, and following his provocation, he apologises and smiles and the man 
smiles  back  and  John  sees  the  man  walking  away,  smiling.  John  described  how  it 
wanted to become more of a “middle man” in the images, and to react better than he did 
at the time. He talked again about how he switches from being a frightened, bullied boy 
or a huge powerful bully. He touched on the fact he has other memories from childhood 
of  his  father  beating  him,  but  they  were  too  disturbing  to  talk  about.  John  left  the 
session with the second transformation in mind, with homework to use the alternative 
images when either of the two distressing memories arose.  
(Note: In session 4, overall intrusion score reaches highest point (42/100, compared to 
82/100 originally). This also corresponds to an increase in anxiety and depression. (see 
peaks on figures 1 & 2).  
V. Session 5  
At the beginning of session 5, John reported that the images were even less 
frequent. He also reported a third image, which involved another incident where he had 
been violent towards another man. In terms of the second image of the shopping centre, 
John reported that his guilt, sadness, rejection and frustration associated with the image 
had dropped to 10%. For the first image at work, the clown transformation was vivid 
and he had elaborated the image so that his boss was wearing a one piece clown suit, 
with yellow dots and red shoes. He described the clown as a “harmless figure”.    141 
In session 5, John started to talk about transforming his third most prominent 
intrusive memory, which was where he had been drunk in a pub and attacked a man for 
making racist comments about English people. He regretted hitting the man, and wanted 
to feel less guilty in the image. John talked about wanting to shake the man’s hand in 
the image, instead of fighting.   
Although  John  had  grasped  the  idea  of  imagery  rescripting,  he  was  creating 
rescripts which tried to prevent the negative event from happening at all. When probed 
whether this was completely successful, John admitted that he was finding it difficult to 
wipe away the memories. The therapist considered that John was reverting back to an 
avoidance strategy. In addition to this, John was also not willing to talk about other 
intrusive distressing memories because he had never talked to anyone about them before 
and he was worried about “opening a can of worms”. John was reassured that he would 
only  be  asked  to  talk  about  memories  that  he  was  happy  to  discuss  and  there  was 
another possibility for rescripting that we had not yet discussed.  
Based on previous work conducted by Lee (2005) and described in Compassion 
by Paul Gilbert (Lee, 2005), the therapist introduced the idea of a Perfect Nurturer to 
John,  someone  that  could  enter  the  various  images  and  change  the  meaning  of  the 
image.  When  asked  what  his  perfect  nurturer  would  be  like,  John  found  it  easy  to 
conjure up an image of a religious figure, an angel which was devoid of aggression and 
nastiness and full of understanding and forgiveness. The rest of session 5 was used to 
develop  a  full  image  of  a  perfect  nurturer  figure  and  John’s  homework  was  to 
consolidate the image and to consider how he would apply it to the current intrusive 
memories he was willing to discuss. 
VI. Session 6  
At the beginning of session 6, John described the image he had come up with of 
his Perfect Nurturer (see Table 20). 
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Table 20 Description of Perfect Nurturer (John) 
Compassionate image: Perfect nurturer. Description of attributes, physical appearance, 
qualities. 
“It’s an angel, it hasn’t even got features, I just know its there, it’s a human form, with 
very bright white light. I have a very strong sense of what is it, I can’t describe it but I 
know what it is….its a protector, its very kind, devoid of aggression, nastiness……but  
very strong, a destructor of evil forces. I know it can do things, I get a sense when it 
arrives, it envelops me, protects me, I have total trust in it, it has the power to take away 
my anxiety and suffering…virtually nothing can destroy it.” 
As the patient was coming up with the image, he used an image of his Grandfather to 
help decide the characteristics he wanted the angel to have. His Grandfather was 
always firm but fair, warm and consistent. Patient wanted the PN to have these qualities 
too.  
Description of physical response associated with image 
“I’m aware I am carrying a lot of tension in my head and tightness in my chest, and it 
removes that accumulated stress over many years. The angel touches me on the head 
and I feel physical warmth go through my chest…….just a touch can take out this 
terrible anxiety, suffering, fear.” 
Description of emotional response associated with image  
“The image makes me feel as though I count, as though a lot of bad things aren’t 
necessarily my fault.” 
“Not nasty, somebody cares for me, protected. It knows every atom about me; it takes 
away my guilt, and offers me forgiveness.” 
Examples of what PN says 
The angel enters the images at stressful points and says “John, I understand, don’t 
worry”. The angel is kind and firm, “don’t be frightened, don’t worry, you are 
protected”. The angel is very powerful, a power beyond our understanding. 
“I understand, don’t hate yourself, this man will be ok. I’m here to protect you and this 
man. He won’t be damaged long-term.”  
“You’re not bad, you’re not a bad person, it’s not your fault” 
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In  the  session,  John  demonstrated  that  he  had  applied  the  PN  to  the  three 
intrusive  memories  discussed  in  previous  sessions.  For  the  memory  of  his  boss 
humiliating  him  at  work,  in  addition  to  transforming  the  image  so  the  boss  is  less 
threatening (by making him a clown with ridiculous features etc), the PN comes in at 
the  end  of  the  image  and  reassures  John  that  he  has  done  the  right  thing.  The  PN 
touches him on the forehead and takes away the residual fear and pain. For the shopping 
centre image, the PN comes in after John has punched the man and says “Don’t worry, I 
saw everything and I understand”. He also approaches the man on the floor and says 
“you are going to be ok”. For the people looking at John accusingly, the PN turns to 
them and says “you don’t understand the whole situation; this man was frightened and 
acted in self-defence”. The crowd then lose the look of accusation and the scene calms 
down. For the pub scene, following the dispute with the man at the bar, when the scene 
is at its most chaotic (i.e. 6 men have jumped on John to restrain him), the PN appears 
and everything stops, the image freezes. John was still working on this third image by 
the end of Session 6 so it was decided that Session 7 would be the consolidation and 
final session. 
VII. Session 7  
John  reported  that  he  had  learnt  to  control  his  intrusive  memories  and  was 
finding the PN image very helpful. He reported that he felt a lot less angry and less 
tormented by feelings of worthlessness and hopelessness. John reported that physical 
sensations had also reduced (e.g. heart racing, tenseness in forehead and chest) and he 
was more accepting of himself. John realised that he perhaps was a more placid and 
quiet person than he had believed and that his true personality was not of someone who 
liked conflict.  
John talked about how the PN accepted him totally and reassured him that he was 
not worthless but was in fact, valuable. His beliefs about himself had shifted so that he 
felt  less  worthless  and  his  view  of  other  people  was  that  perhaps  they  are  less 
judgemental than he had believed. John asserted that he realised that you can’t change 
people but you can change your reaction to other people.  
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5.2.5. Case 1- Outcome and Experience of Treatment 
The  client’s  raw  data  for  anxiety,  depression  and  intrusions  are  presented 
graphically in Figures 5 and 6.  John’s scores on the anxiety subscale of the HADS 
showed a decreasing trend, moving from the severely anxious to the mildly anxious 
range. As normative data for the dysfunctional population was not available, Jacobson 
& Truax’s (1991) method for establishing clinical significance using normative data 
from the functional population was utilised (see Table 21). Cut-off b is operationalised 
as  the  level  of  functioning  subsequent  to  therapy  falling  within  the  range  of  the 
functional population, where range is defined as within two standard deviations of the 
mean  of  that  population  (Jacobson  &  Truax,  1991).  Once  the  cut-off  has  been 
calculated, it can be compared to the post treatment and follow-up scores to establish 
whether the change has reached clinical significance. Cut-off b for establishing clinical 
significance  is  sometimes  considered  too  lenient  when  functional  and  dysfunctional 
populations overlap (Jacobson & Truax, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1999) and thus the scales 
own  cut-offs  were  also  utilised  (see  Table  21)  in  order  to  avoid  overestimation  of 
recovery.  
Table 21 Functional population means, standard deviations, scale reliability and 
scale cut-offs 
Scale  Mean 
(S.D.) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha  
Scale cut-offs  References 
HADS-
anxiety 
6.14 
(3.76) 
.82  0-7 = not anxious 
8-10 = mild anxiety 
11-14 = moderate anxiety 
15-21 = severe anxiety 
(Snaith & Zigmond, 
1994; Crawford, 
Henry, Crombie, & 
Taylor, 2001) 
HADS-
depression 
3.68 
(3.07) 
.77  0-7 = not depressed 
8-10 = mild depression 
11-14 = moderate depression 
15-21 = severe depression 
(Snaith & Zigmond, 
1994; Crawford et al, 
2001) 
   
For  HADS-anxiety  cut-off  b  was  calculated  [b=  6.14  +  (2  x  3.76)  =13.66], 
showing that the patient had recovered by moving from the severely anxious (HADS 
anxiety  =16)  into  the  normative  range  (HADS  anxiety  =  9,  <  13.66).  The  Reliable 
Change Index (RCI = 3.10, > 1.96), showed that the client had reliably improved on 
anxiety measured by the HADS. According to HADS cut-offs the patient had moved   145 
from severely anxious to mildly anxious range. The client’s scores on the depression 
subscale of the HADS also showed a decreasing trend, moving from the moderately 
depressed (HADS depression = 11) to not depressed range (HADS depression = 6).The 
RCI (RCI = 2.40, > 1.96) and cut-off b [b = 3.68 + (2 x 3.07) = 9.82] calculations 
showed the client had recovered on the depression subscale. The increase in anxious and 
depressive symptoms at session 4 can be attributed to the reports of further intrusive 
memories and the subsequent misuse of imagery rescripting described above (p 139). At 
3 month and 6 month follow-up John no longer met criteria for anxiety on the HADS (a 
score of 7 (RCI=3.98) and 5 (RCI= 4.87) respectively) and he also remained in the not 
depressed range (score of 2 at both follow ups RCI= 4.33).  
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Figure 5 HADS anxiety and depression for baseline, during therapy and 3-month 
and 6-month follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session, HADS = Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale) 
 
For parsimony, the measure of intrusive symptoms is presented as an aggregate 
of  scores  for  frequency,  distress,  vividness,  interference  with  daily  life  and 
uncontrollability (Wheatley et al, 2007). When more than one memory was reported a 
single  rating  of  the  frequency,  distress,  vividness,  interference  with  daily  life  and 
controllability of intrusive memories was taken each week.  The particular memory   146 
referred  to  in  the  scale  therefore  changes  as  the  therapist  shifts  to  work  on  a  new 
memory.  Intrusive symptoms also showed a decreasing trend across sessions, with an 
average  68  point  drop  in  intrusive  symptoms  from  baseline  to  end  of  treatment.  In 
correspondence with an increase in anxiety and depression in Figure 5 and session 4, 
there was an increase in intrusive symptoms to 42/100. This can also be attributed to the 
reports of further intrusive memories and the misuse of imagery rescripting in session 4. 
At  3  month  and  6  month  follow-up,  the  average  point  drop  in  intrusive  symptoms 
stabilised at 50.  
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Figure 6 Aggregate intrusive symptoms score (including frequency, interference, 
uncontrollability, distress, and vividness) at baseline, during therapy and 3-month 
and 6-month follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session)  
 
Pre-treatment and post-treatment measures also included the IES. The client’s 
subjective distress associated with intrusive memories (IES) fell 10 points, from a total 
of 53 (24 avoidance, 29 intrusion) to a total of 43 (26 avoidance and 17 intrusion). As 
there are no functional population means for using the IES as a measure of subjective 
distress  associated  with  intrusive  cognitions,  a  statistical  approach  to  clinical 
significance  could  not  be  utilised,  although  the  reduction  in  subjective  distress 
associated  with  intrusive  memories  is  in  concordance  with  the  reduction  in  overall 
intrusion  rating  in  Figure  6.    There  was  a  further  reduction  in  subjective  distress   147 
associated with intrusive memories at 3 month follow-up, with a total score of 20 on the 
IES (12 avoidance and 8 intrusion). However, at 6 month follow-up, this had levelled 
out to match the post-treatment drop of 10 points, with a total of 42 (27 avoidance and 
15 intrusion).  
By the end of treatment, John also showed changes in his desire for behavioural 
change, by volunteering that he would be keen to go back to work and this would be a 
new  short-term  goal  for  him.  By  the  end  of  treatment  the  patient  reported  that  the 
original  distressing  intrusive  memories  had  become  extremely  rare,  although  he  did 
sometimes picture the transformed images in his mind’s eye at times of stress.  The 
patient also expressed an interest in using the perfect nurturer image for other intrusive 
memories that he was not willing to discuss during treatment.  
5.2.6. Case 2- Sarah 
I. Background information 
Sarah was 43 years old and had been diagnosed with early stage breast cancer on 
27
th October 2005. She was currently on hormone therapy (Zoladex) after completing 
other treatments including chemotherapy, a mastectomy and radiotherapy by September 
2006.  Following  her  breast  cancer  diagnosis,  Sarah  left  her  job  as  an  operations 
manager  and  subsequently  took  her  employer  to  an  employment  tribunal  for  unfair 
dismissal and sexual discrimination. Sarah felt that she had been pushed out of her job 
due to her diagnosis and people’s mistaken assumption that she was no longer able to 
fulfil her role at work.   
Sarah presented with high depression and anxiety scores on the Hospital Anxiety 
and  Depression  Scale  (15  and  12  respectively)  and  she  met  full  criteria  for  current 
adjustment disorder with anxiety. Sarah reported that her anxiety had started since the 
cancer diagnosis and thus the symptoms reported were a direct result of cancer-related 
concerns.  For  example,  post-surgery  Sarah  experienced  hyperventilation  and  panic 
attacks whenever confronted with crowded places. The cancer diagnosis also affected 
how Sarah felt about herself, as it challenged core beliefs about herself (e.g. confident, 
successful) other people and the world (e.g. people/the world is unfair as I have been 
pushed  out  of  the  job  I  love).  Figure  7  demonstrates  Sarah’s  schema,  appraisals, 
cognitions, emotions and behaviour associated with the cancer diagnosis, in line with 
Moorey & Greer’s cognitive model of adjustment (Moorey & Greer, 2002).  
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Survival schema
-View of cancer as physically 
debilitating (e.g. breast implants gone 
wrong, image of self as distorted)
-View of cancer as destroying career
-Fearful of the future (e.g. financial 
concerns)
Cognitions
-I am useless
-I am not the person I used to be
-I lack confidence
-I am unemployable
-Images of self being suffocated and humiliated by 
ex-colleagues
Emotion and Physiology
-Frightened/panicked -Muscular tension
-Worthless -Stomach churning
-Helpless -Pins and needles
-Anxious -Hyperventilation
Confirmation
-Constant reliving of emotional and 
physical feelings felt during specific 
negative events in the past, experienced as 
intrusive memories in the present. 
Behaviour
-Avoiding people associated with 
previous job
-Avoiding places that are 
associated with intrusive 
memories
-Avoiding applying for jobs
Self schema
-View of the self as awful/useless and 
not the person used to be
-View of the world as against her
-View of other people as 
unsupportive/untrustworthy 
 
 
Figure 7 The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer applied to Sarah (from 
Moorey & Greer, 2002). 
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5.2.7. Case 2-Treatment overview 
I. Session 1 
The  first  intrusive  memory  that  Sarah  reported  was  of  an  incident  that  had 
happened following her breast cancer surgery. The most frequent intrusive memory was 
Sarah’s first day back after surgery- she felt so happy to be returning to work and people 
were very pleased to see her. But as she got to her desk, all her belongings had been put 
in a cloakroom and a male colleague came over to her and was shouting and swearing 
“If you can’t do your job I’ll f****** do it for you”. A female colleague joined him and 
started whispering in his ear, “Sarah’s done this wrong, Sarah’s done that wrong”. 
Sarah felt as though it was unjust and wanted a chance to explain but they wouldn’t let 
her speak. 
 At this point in the description of the image, Sarah started to hyperventilate in 
the session and therefore we spent some time using a safe image she had created of a 
sandy  beach  and  her  friends  and  family  to  try  and  help  her  relax.  Sarah  found  it 
challenging to do this and reported difficulty in getting to the beach. She could see her 
nieces playing there but was unable to get to them. When asked about what emotions 
she  associated  with  the  intrusive  memory  she  reported  feeling  100%  panic,  100% 
worthlessness,  100%  helplessness.  In  addition  to  hyperventilation,  the  memory  was 
associated  with  other  physical  sensations  including,  stomach  churning  and  pins  and 
needles in hands and feet. Sarah reported that the worst thing about the mental picture at 
work was feeling out of control. On experiencing the intrusive memory, Sarah avoided 
it by reading books, listening to music or phoning a friend. At the end of the session, the 
emotion ratings were still extremely high (100% for all). The notion of rescripting the 
image  was  introduced  and  some  possible  ideas  were  discussed.  Sarah  felt  that  she 
wanted to feel in control, to speak up for herself and make them listen. The session 
ended  with  Sarah  thinking  about  how  she  could  create  an  alternative  image,  which 
would make her feel less panicked, worthless and helpless. For example, she imagined a 
real  scenario  where  her  male  colleague  had  fallen  off  his  chair  in  a  bar  and  was 
humiliated. This helped the session to end on a more positive note, and gave Sarah some 
content to work with over the following week.  
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II. Session 2 
At the beginning of session 2, emotion ratings remained at 100% panic, 100% 
worthlessness, 100% helplessness in relation to the intrusive memory at work.  Sarah 
reported that she had also found the safe image distressing, because it triggered fears 
that  something  was  wrong  with  her  nieces.  During  the  past  week,  Sarah  had 
spontaneously used an image of one of her nieces coming out of school with a smile on 
her face to counteract the negative beach scene. This was encouraged as an example of 
imagery  rescripting-challenging  a  negative  image  with  a  more  positive  one.  At  this 
point, some time was spent elaborating the safe image on the beach so it was no longer 
frightening. Sarah imagined herself being buried in the sand by her nieces, which meant 
she wouldn’t be outside the image, looking in, but a strong part of the image. Once 
Sarah was satisfied with the safe image, the distressing negative memory from session 1 
was discussed.  
  As Sarah had hyperventilated while describing the image for the first time, it 
was decided that before we would start reliving the image, we would have some ideas in 
mind to use as we went along.  When asked, what would need to happen in the image 
for it to be less distressing, Sarah suggested that she would like to go back in time and 
defend herself- she recalled something she had said in court-“I lost my boob, not my 
brain.” To start with, Sarah struggled to come up with an alternative image and we 
discussed changing the main characters in the image. After the use of prompts (e.g. 
“what  would  you  like  to  happen  next?”)  and  suggested  transformation  options  (e.g. 
“imagine the key character one foot high. Shrink the shouting face that you see and 
make the voice squeaky”), Sarah decided she wanted to turn the male colleague into a 
snake and the female colleague into a rat which then shrank and scurried away.  
The  negative  image  was  brought  online  and  the  alternative  images  were 
conjured up when required. Sarah started rescripting the image by imagining the scene 
and using a purple wand to change the characters into a snake and rat respectively. 
Sarah  imagined  the  snake  slithering  down  a  little  hole  and  the  rat  scurrying  off  to 
nowhere. Once they have gone, other members of staff become central in the image, 
including two receptionists. The two receptionists begin to cheer shouting “Well done 
Sarah”. Sarah asks them “Where were you when I needed you?” At this point, Sarah 
realised that the receptionists had not betrayed her; they were just scared themselves, 
and scared for their own jobs. Unfortunately, Sarah then imagined that the snake had 
come back out of the hole. Although this was distressing, Sarah recognised that this   151 
may be necessary as it is symbolic of the way she wanted to protect her staff from her 
bullying colleagues. She chased the snake away and concreted over the hole. The end of 
the image involved her hugging the two receptionists. Sarah felt very relieved at this 
point, in realising that not everyone was against her and reported emotion ratings were 
as  follows;  100%  relieved,  100%  exhausted,  0%  helpless,  80%  worthless  and  20% 
panicked.   
Following the success of transforming the first intrusive memory, Sarah reported 
a second intrusive memory which had not been discussed previously but which was 
triggered from thinking about who betrayed her when she returned to work following 
breast cancer surgery. The image was of other work colleagues taunting her when she 
was out having a meal in a restaurant. Sarah said this image was also associated with 
extreme feelings of worthlessness (100%) and helplessness (100%) and she couldn’t 
believe people could make her feel so bad. As we were coming towards the end of the 
session, we discussed thinking about transformations for the second image, to review in 
Session 3. Sarah was also given an intrusive image record form in order to write down 
specific images that came up over the next week and the use of the alternative image.  
When asked how it felt to try and transform the first image, Sarah said she felt good 
trying to change it although she wasn’t sure what the current emotion ratings were- it 
depended on whether she could “keep the snake bolted down”.  
III. Session 3 
At  the  beginning  of  session  3,  Sarah  reported  experiencing  no  intrusive 
memories in the past week- in fact, all scores on the intrusion rating scale fell to 0 and 
Sarah no longer met criteria for anxiety or depression on the HADS. Sarah had been on 
holiday for the previous week which she found relaxing. Emotion ratings for the first 
intrusive  memory  were  100%  in  control,  50%  confidence,  0%  helplessness,  0% 
worthlessness and 0% panic. A recap of the alternative image revealed that it was the 
same as before, and blocking up the hole after the snake went down it was successful. 
The image had been elaborated somewhat, so that the rat scurried away and ends up in a 
garden being eaten by a one-legged fox. When the snake tried to return, Sarah slammed 
it down the hole and it doesn’t come back. After the scene where the receptionists were 
cheering, Sarah walked away with her head held high.  
Due to the success of the transformation of the first image, Session 3 was spent 
mainly working on the second image. The image was explored in more detail and it   152 
transpired that it was of five (female) ex-colleagues sitting at a table in a restaurant. The 
women are laughing at her, getting closer and closer, surrounding Sarah so she feels 
claustrophobic.  Sarah  recognised  that  although  the  image  is  based  on  an  event  that 
actually happened, the intrusive image that keeps coming back is an abstracted version 
of the memory. Emotion ratings for the second image were 100% fear/anxiety, 100% 
panic. Sarah could hear laughter in the image and the restaurant slips away and Sarah 
can just see her colleagues crowding in on her, taunting her. When asked what meaning 
the image had for her, Sarah reported that it made her feel like a complete failure and 
that she wanted revenge for the way they had treated her following her breast cancer 
diagnosis. The worst thing about the image was the women cackling at her. When asked 
to consider some alternative images, Sarah found it very difficult to imagine how the 
image  could  be  changed.  Using  the  cackling  element  as  key  to  the  image,  it  was 
suggested  that  the  women  could  be  imagined  as  witches.  With  the  mention  of  this 
theme,  Sarah  instantly  began  thinking  about  a  transformation.  Sarah  imagined  the 
women as witches, with big pointed noses, bad teeth and bad hair. Sarah imagined that 
in the middle of the table was a cauldron, with frogs, eyeballs, a snake and a rat. The 
snake and rat were symbolic of the other ex- colleagues that had been tackled in the 
previous image. Sarah introduced the purple wand which was used to make the witches 
shrivel into nothing; they melt away (Sarah likens this melting to a scene in the Wizard 
of Oz where the witch melts away). The nasty scene fades away and Sarah is left with a 
friend who was there in real life, who hands her a long island iced tea.  
At the end of session 3, we agreed that Sarah would practice the second image 
and we would recap the image in session 4 and continue with any other prominent 
intrusive memories.  
IV. Session 4  
Sarah did not attend for session 4 as she went on a last minute holiday. She 
telephoned on her return to say she had not been experiencing intrusive memories and 
felt  she  did  not  need  to  continue  with  the  therapy  for  now.  It  was  explained  that 
although  we  can  learn  new  ways  of  responding  to  negative  images,  they  will  not 
necessarily disappear completely. Sarah reported that she felt she had learnt a new skill 
which could be used in the future if the imagery re-emerged. Sarah was reassured that 
she could telephone at any time if she wanted to consolidate the imagery rescripting 
sessions. Due to Sarah’s non-attendance at the final session, end of study questionnaires   153 
were sent in the post to Sarah. However, these were not returned for 3 months and 
therefore although there is not a full set of end of study data, there is full data for 3 
month follow-up.  
5.2.8. Case 2- Outcome and Experience of Treatment 
The  client’s  raw  data  for  anxiety,  depression  and  intrusions  are  presented 
graphically in Figures 8 and 9. Sarah’s scores on the anxiety subscale of the HADS 
showed a decreasing trend and she moved from the severely anxious (HADS anxiety = 
15) to the not anxious range (HADS anxiety = 4). The RCI (RCI = 4.87, > 1.96) and 
cut-off b (b = 13.66) showed that the client had recovered according to the anxiety 
subscale of the HADS. At 3 month follow-up, the patient had still recovered (RCI=3.54, 
>1.96, HADS anxiety =7). The client’s scores on the depression subscale of the HADS 
also  showed  a  decreasing  trend,  moving  from  the  moderately  depressed  (HADS 
depression = 12) to not depressed range (HADS depression =1). The RCI (RCI = 5.29, 
> 1.96) and cut-off b (b = 9.82) showed that the client had recovered on the depression 
subscale. This achievement remained at 3 month follow-up (RCI= 5.29, >1.96), with the 
patient no longer meeting criteria for depression on the HADS (HADS depression = 1).   
As before, the measure of intrusive symptoms is presented as an aggregate of 
scores  for  frequency,  distress,  vividness,  interference  with  daily  life  and 
uncontrollability  (Wheatley  et  al,  2007).  The  intrusive  symptoms  also  showed  a 
decreasing trend across sessions, with an average 56 point drop in intrusive symptoms 
from baseline to 3 months follow-up. 
The client’s subjective distress associated with intrusive memories (IES) fell 25 
points, from a total of 63 (32 avoidance, 31 intrusion) at pre-treatment to a total of 38 
(20 avoidance and 18 intrusion) at 3 month follow-up. Again, a statistical approach to 
clinical  significance  could  not  be  utilised  for  the  IES,  although  the  reduction  in 
subjective  distress  associated  with  intrusive  memories  was  in  concordance  with  the 
reduction in overall intrusion rating in Figure 9.    154 
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Figure 8 HADS anxiety and depression at baseline, during therapy and at 3 month 
follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session, HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale).  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
B1 B2 B3 S1 S2 S3 3 months
Baseline/Session
S
c
o
r
e
Intrusions
 
Figure 9 Aggregate intrusive symptoms score (including frequency, interference, 
uncontrollability, distress, and vividness) at baseline, during therapy and at 3 
month follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session).    155 
5.2.9. Discussion 
The  two  cases  illustrated  that  imagery  rescripting  was  associated  with  a 
clinically  significant  reduction  in  distress  and  a  significant  reduction  in  negative 
characteristics  of  intrusive  images  and  supports  the  notion  that  it  may  be  a  viable 
therapy  for  cancer  patients  reporting  negative  intrusive  imagery.  The  effects  were 
relatively  long-lasting  with  Sarah  and  John  remaining  in  the  not  depressed  and  not 
anxious range at 3 month follow-up and John remaining in this range at 6 month follow-
up.  Wheatley  et  al  (2007)  reported  similar  success  in  using  imagery  rescripting  in 
patients with severe and recurrent depression and also reported long-lasting effects after 
1 year follow-up.  
Throughout  the  therapy  sessions,  the  negative  imagery  that  was  addressed 
directly accessed feelings about themselves (worthless, hopeless), others (threatening, 
unsupportive)  and  the  world  (dangerous/adverse).  According  to  Moorey  &  Greer’s 
(2002) cognitive model of adjustment to cancer, viewing the world and other people as 
threatening leads to feelings of anxiety and feeling as though one is being attacked leads 
to anger. Both John and Sarah felt anxious and angry with respect to their intrusive 
images. Also, the model predicted that the belief that cancer has led to a personal loss, 
in John’s case, of physical strength can lead to feelings of depression. In line with this, 
different types of imagery rescripting were utilised and seemed to have varying effects 
on reported emotions. For example, for John’s first imagery rescript we used mastery 
imagery where he regained control of the situation of the image by reducing his boss to 
a  comical  character.  This  led  to  decreased  feelings  of  helplessness  and  anger  and 
increased  reports  of  self-efficacy.  The  success  of  mastery  imagery  with  John  is 
exemplified by his own recognition in session 7 that “you can’t change people but you 
can change your reaction to other people.” In the later images, where John felt to blame 
for  various  situations,  compassionate  imagery  (Lee,  2005)  was  used  to  help  reduce 
feelings of guilt, worthlessness and hopelessness.  
Sarah had reported that the worst component of her intrusive images was being 
out of control and thus for Sarah, mastery imagery was used to help regain her self-
efficacy and reduce feelings of helplessness and worthlessness. In addition to changing 
the  meaning  of  the  imagery  for  John  and  Sarah,  rescripting  also  encouraged  meta-
cognitive change. For example, in session 1, John mentioned that he already felt less 
foolish by talking about the imagery. This may be because previously John appraised 
negative imagery as meaning that he was losing control, or couldn’t cope (assessed   156 
using Response to Intrusions Questionnaire when participating in Study 2) and talking 
about the imagery for the first time allowed him to feel that he wasn’t going mad. 
Accessing the meaning of imagery content and the meaning of the presence of imagery 
are both important (Hackmann, 1998; Wheatley & Brewin, 2005).  
 In accordance with  previous research (Wells & Hackmann, 1993, Hackmann, 
1998) accessing intrusive imagery provided an alternative and quick route to accessing 
generic  belief  systems  and  meanings  underlying  emotional  responses.  The  special 
relationship  between    imagery  and  emotion  (Holmes  &  Mathews,  2005)  has  been 
explained  by  suggesting  that  imagery  provides  direct  access  to  emotional 
representations because imagery may mimic real-life perceptual events and therefore 
provide  privileged  access  to  related  representations  in  autobiographical  memory 
(Conway,  2001).  This  explanation  was  supported  by  research  which  showed  that 
imagery was associated with greater self-involvement and stronger associations with 
autobiographical  memory  than  verbal  thoughts  (Holmes  et  al,  2008)  and  intrusive 
imagery is often accompanied by a sensation of reliving and accompanying emotional 
sensations felt at the time of the original memory (e.g. Study 1).   
The  success  of  alternative  imagery  in  reducing  the  toxic  nature  of  intrusive 
memories can be explained using the retrieval competition account of CBT (Brewin, 
2006). This account suggests that by using an alternative positive image and providing 
elaboration of the image, therapy provides a representation in memory which will win 
the retrieval competition when pitched against the original negative memory. In line 
with the notion that imagery may mimic earlier perceptual encoding (Conway, 2001), 
evidence  has  suggested  (Smith,  Henson,  Dolan,  &  Rugg,  2004)  that  encoding  and 
retrieval of emotional material activates common areas of the brain, including the left 
amygdala  and  left  angular  gyrus.  Thus,  when  a  negative  memory  is  triggered  and 
recalled, there is recapitulation of brain activity involved in the original experience of an 
emotional  state  (Buchanan,  2007).  Transforming  intrusive  memories  by  creating  a 
strong alternative image may thus alleviate this reactivation, and lead to a reduction in 
the intensity of  accompanying  emotional sensations. Brewin  (2006) emphasised that 
imagery rescripting works on associative principles rather than logical reasoning so that 
there are direct and automatic changes in the accessibility of representations in memory 
rather indirect manipulation of belief through standard verbal challenging.  
The dual role of imagery in maintaining dysfunctional states (e.g. Hirsch et al., 
2004)  and  resolving  such  states  (Conway  et  al.,  2004)  can  also  be  explained  by   157 
conceptualising images as goals (see also Chapter 2). Conway et al (2004) argued that 
images are a type of mental representation which holds information about our personal 
goals. Intrusive images often arise at moments when our personal goals are challenged. 
For example, John experienced feeling helpless, worthless and humiliated when he was 
unable to stand up to his boss. The image represented a self-defining moment when 
John’s goals (to be strong and protect himself) were challenged. Sarah reported feeling 
helpless,  worthless  and  panicked  when  she  was  forced  out  of  the  job  she  loved 
following  her  breast  cancer  diagnosis.  Sarah’s  imagery  also  reflected  self-defining 
moments where the goal, to move on from her cancer diagnosis and be back at work, 
was challenged.  
According  to  Carver  &  Scheier  (1998),  behaviour  can  be  explained  in  the 
context of self-regulating feedback systems. These systems are based on an individuals 
concrete (e.g. successful research career) and abstract (e.g. wants to be respected) goals. 
Goal pursuit involves having a goal (referent), assessing where one is in relation to the 
goal  (input)  and  taking  steps  to  reduce  the  discrepancy  between  input  and  referent 
(behaviour). If goals are desirable, individuals take measures to reduce the discrepancy 
between the input and referent (negative feedback loop) and if goals are undesirable, 
individuals  take  measures  to  enlarge  the  discrepancy  between  input  and  referent 
(positive feedback loop). The latter type of feedback loop thus leads to avoidance and 
has no endpoint, because there is no target to be reached. Thus negative feedback loops 
are required to constrain the unlimited task of enlarging the discrepancy between input 
and referent. Feedback loops also have comparators which monitor rate of progress by 
comparing  the  distance  between  input  and  referent.  If  the  comparator  reveals  that 
positive or negative feedback loops are unsuccessful, it leads to negative affect. If the 
comparator reveals that positive or negative feedback loops are successful, it leads to 
positive  affect  (Carver,  2006).  In  terms  of  the  single-case  studies  described  in  this 
chapter, avoiding undesirable referents (intrusive imagery) is unsuccessful because 1) 
there  is  no  specified  end  point  and  2)  avoidance  paradoxically  leads  to  increased 
intrusive  symptoms  (Ehlers  &  Steil,  1995).  Thus,  another  explanation  for  distress 
associated with intrusive images is that due to failure to avoid intrusive images and thus 
reduce the discrepancy between input and referent, John and Sarah experienced negative 
affect. Applying imagery rescripting to help create positive alternative imagery allowed 
for new desirable goals to be associated with negative intrusive imagery. In this respect, 
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because  although  the  positive  feedback  loop  remained  (with  goal  to  avoid  feeling 
humiliated/like  a  failure),  a  strategy  of  avoidance  was  replaced  with  a  strategy  of 
creating new goals. Creating new goals which can then be targeted within a negative 
feedback loop can thus lead to feelings of positive affect in accordance with the affect-
generating systems described above and in Chapter 2.  
To  expand  on  the  case  studies  described  above,  using  imagery  rescripting, 
negative  feedback  loops  were  introduced  with  new  referents-  John  as  the  stronger 
character and Sarah as the person in control/respected at work. Both John and Sarah 
realised through rescripting the image that it was other people in the image who were 
out of control, not them. John’s goal “to be strong/in control” was reinstated because he 
realised that in the first image he had behaved in a desirable way and overall he was a 
calmer, more passive person than he realised. Sarah realised that she was still respected 
by important work colleagues and had been pushed out of her role unfairly.  For both 
patients, the use of positive imagery introduced a negative feedback loop with desirable 
goals  (e.g.  to  feel  in  control)  and  continued  practice  of  positive  imagery  and 
consolidation of the rescripted images led to discrepancy-reduction between the loop’s 
input and referent.  
There were specific limitations for both case examples. For example, although 
John rescripted several images during therapy, some memories were not discussed or 
worked on. Despite this, John no longer met criteria for anxiety or depression on the 
HADS and thus the results provide powerful evidence that accessing imagery affords 
significant emotional shifts in therapy.  For Sarah, there were only 3 sessions, with no 
consolidation of the imagery rescripting from session 3. However, previous research has 
shown that imagery rescripting may be effective in as little as one session (Rusch et al., 
2000) and the suggested number of sessions is between 3 and 6 (Wheatley & Brewin, 
2005). Based on the notion that imagery provides direct access to meaning and emotion 
associated  with  previous  events,  it  may  be  that  3  sessions  was  enough  to  provide 
alternative coping strategies in response to intrusive memories. The finding that Sarah 
reported a reduction in the frequency and negative properties associated with intrusive 
cognitions  and  a  reduction  in  anxiety  and  depression  and  this  was  maintained  at  3 
month follow-up supports the suggestion that imagery rescripting was successful. 
Despite these case-specific limitations, both single-case studies illuminate the 
potential  role  of  imagery  rescripting  in  cancer  patients  reporting  a  wide  variety  of 
concerns, leading to intrusive imagery. Rescripting was successful for a patient with a   159 
history of depression, an incurable type of cancer and a sense of loss associated with 
changes in physical strength. The therapy was equally as successful for a patient with 
adjustment disorder with anxiety, a curable type of cancer and a sense of future-related 
anxiety due to changes in a valued work role.  
Overall limitations of the case examples include the use of cut-off b to assess 
clinically  significant  change.  When  dysfunctional  and  functional  populations  are 
overlapping, cut-off b can be considered too lenient (Jacobson & Truax, 1991; Jacobson 
et al., 1999). However, in order to avoid overestimating recovery, other methods of 
establishing clinical significance were utilised such as using scale cut-offs. As can be 
seen from the follow-up data, the patients moved into the not anxious and not depressed 
range on the HADS. As clinical significance is broadly defined as “returning to normal 
functioning”  (Jacobson  et  al.,  1999)  the  present  findings  suggest  that  the  patients 
recovered.  
Other limitations include the reliance on self-report measures and the possibility 
that patients would have over-estimated improvements. However, behavioural changes 
were also noted. For John, he decided he wanted to go back to work and for Sarah, the 
reason  she  stopped  therapy  was  that  she  went  away  on  holiday  and  seemed  to  be 
embracing life more readily. In fact, the explanation for the 3 month delay in sending 
back the follow-up questionnaires was that Sarah had been on a number of holidays and 
was  extremely  busy.  The  follow-up  data  sent  by  mail  also  suggests  that  demand 
characteristics are unlikely to explain the findings. Longer term follow-up would help to 
clarify this further and also allow assessment of longer-term improvements of intrusive 
symptoms  and  psychological  distress.  The  use  of  simple  non-validated  measures  of 
intrusion characteristics is also a limitation, although currently no validated measures 
exist to rectify this. Other important factors to the success of imagery rescripting, such 
as the extent to which imagery is brought online are difficult to measure and require 
further  consideration  in  imagery  rescripting  research.  In  general,  adherence  to  the 
imagery  rescripting  manual  and  competence  in  therapy  were  closely  monitored  in 
weekly sessions with Professor Chris Brewin.   
An  important  limitation  of  the  present  study  concerns  the  low  uptake  for 
imagery rescripting by cancer patients reporting intrusive cognitions. Specific reasons 
for  refusal  included  the  desire  to  avoid  facing  distressing  intrusive  cognitions.  This 
suggests  that  imagery  rescripting  and  the  possibility  of  intense  focus  on  intrusive 
images may seem like a daunting prospect for some patients. Previous research has   160 
suggested that tasks aimed at desensitising individuals to intrusive imagery by reducing 
vividness and emotional distress (e.g. EMDR, visuospatial tapping tasks) may prove a 
useful  precursor  to  therapies  aimed  at  reducing  intrusive  imagery  and  alleviating 
distress (Andrade et al, 1997; Kavanagh et al, 2001). Kavanagh et al (2001) proposed 
that if tasks aimed at competing for resources required for imagery blunt the emotional 
impact  of  negative  intrusions,  without  affecting  the  course  of  treatment,  they  could 
operate as a treatment aid in early stages of therapy.   
Broadening  outcome  measures  in  the  present  study  would  help  elucidate  the 
success  of  imagery  rescripting  for  cancer  patients  as  assessment  of  other  types  of 
distress  may  also  prove  beneficial.  For  example,  the  meaning  cancer  has  for  an 
individual is a core component of the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (Moorey 
& Greer, 2002) and others have recognised the important of assessing global meaning 
as well as situational meaning in cancer patients (White, 2004).  In the present study, 
although meaning was not formally assessed, transformation of imagery had a direct 
impact on changing the meaning of intrusive imagery as documented in both cases. 
Another potential outcome measure is the Mini-MAC (Watson et al, 1994), a measure 
of  maladaptive  adjustment  linked  to  the  presence  of  intrusive  cognitions  in  cancer 
patients (e.g. Brewin et al, 1998a; Study 1 & 2). It would be interesting to investigate 
whether  a  reduction  in  intrusive  imagery  led  to  improved  adjustment  such  as  less 
hopelessness/hopelessness  and  anxious  preoccupation  in  cancer  patients  completing 
imagery rescripting therapy.  
Others have suggested that a difficulty with assessing the benefits of imagery 
rescripting  therapy  lies  in  distinguishing  separate  components  of  therapy,  including 
reliving and rescripting components (Hunt & Fenton, 2007; Wild et al., 2007). In the 
present study, patients were asked to vividly evoke the memories, describing them in 
the present tense. This is considered a reliving component of therapy (Wild et al, 2007) 
which  is  successful  because  it  allows  for  habituation,  reflection  and  spontaneous 
cognitive  change  (Hackmann,  2005).  Future  research  with  cancer  patients  could 
compare reliving and rescripting components, following work with PTSD (Arntz et al., 
2007)  and  snake  phobia  (Hunt  &  Fenton,  2007)  samples.  Combination  therapy 
emphasising these components supports the approach of cognitive behaviour therapy in 
cancer  patients  (Moorey  &  Greer,  2002)  which  uses  a  variety  of  approaches  in 
treatment, including those with imagery components. Typically when CBT for cancer 
patients is described the emphasis is on challenging verbal thoughts, and the recognition   161 
of imagery in therapy may require rejuvenation. Wild et al (2007) also suggested that 
future research could investigate whether belief change is compulsory to the success of 
imagery rescripting therapy, or whether creating a competing image with positive affect 
is sufficient for a shift in symptomatology (Brewin, 2006).  
In summary, the case examples presented here showed a clinically significant 
reduction in anxiety and depression and substantial reductions in the negative properties 
of intrusive imagery, including frequency, distress, interference, uncontrollability and 
vividness. Further empirical work is required to assess whether imagery rescripting is 
beneficial more widely, and inclusion of a control group would be necessary to make 
more  robust  conclusions.  However,  these  preliminary  findings  at  least  support  the 
suggestion that mental imagery manipulation be considered a core cognitive therapy 
skill  (Wheatley  et  al,  2007)  and  intrusive  imagery  should  be  assessed,  and  where 
appropriate, targeted in cancer patients receiving psychological therapy.   
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The present thesis began by discussing the application of a PTSD framework for 
understanding psychological distress in cancer patients. This chapter revisits the central 
assumptions and criticisms of this approach and reflects on how the thesis has addressed 
these issues by utilising a wider literature to approach the phenomenon of intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients. The hypotheses and findings of the present research are 
summarised  and  an  overall  comparison  of  the  findings  with  previous  research  is 
provided.  The  clinical  implications  of  the  findings  and  research  limitations  are 
discussed with suggestions for future research.  
6.1.  PTSD and cancer: An alternative approach 
Cancer  is  a  life-threatening  illness  which  is  considered  traumatic  because  it 
threatens core assumptions about the self, others and the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992) 
and  is  unpredictable  and  uncontrollable  (Ehlers  &  Steil,  1995).  Following  the 
introduction of life- threatening illness as a stressor that could precipitate PTSD, several 
studies assessed the prevalence of PTSD in cancer patients. Low prevalence rates (e.g. 
Mundy et al, 2000) led some to suggest that PTSD may be an inappropriate model for 
understanding psychological distress in cancer patients (e.g. Green et al, 1997; Gurevich 
et al, 2002 and Kangas et al, 2002). For example, cancer is a qualitatively different type 
of stressor and reflects an ongoing sense of threat. Traumatic stress for cancer patients 
may manifest in different ways (Baum & Posluszny, 2001) where major stressors (e.g. 
diagnosis of life-threatening disease) are quickly superimposed with other stressors (e.g. 
treatment). Stressors do not necessarily reflect life threatening events but reflect more 
widespread concerns triggered by the cancer experience in general, for example, future 
concerns relating to financial or work commitments (Moorey & Greer, 2002). These 
latter problems are defined as critical life events which are normative and expected to 
happen to individuals (Birrer et al, 2007). Traumatic events are non-normative (Birrer et 
al, 2007) and entail actual or threatened death, serious injury or a threat to physical 
integrity to the self or others (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). Although some aspects of the 
experience of cancer meet this criterion, other aspects such as relationship breakdown, 
job loss or financial concerns do not. Research has found that patients themselves don’t 
always perceive their cancer as a threat to life or as a traumatic stressor precipitating 
fear, helplessness and horror (Cordova et al., 2007). 
In addition to the problems with identifying the specific stressor precipitating 
PTSD symptoms in  cancer patients, another major limitation of the approach is the   164 
considerable  overlap  of  arousal  symptom  clusters  with  symptoms  associated  with 
PTSD. For example, insomnia, irritability and poor concentration are also side effects of 
cancer  treatments  such  as  chemotherapy  and  thus  difficult  to  separate  from  arousal 
symptoms.  Avoidance  symptoms  (e.g.  forgetting  aspects  of  the  trauma,  avoiding 
places/people), are not always applicable to cancer patients due to constant follow-up 
hospital  appointments  and  the  internal  and  thus  inseparable  nature  of  cancer  as  a 
stressor (Green et al, 1997).  
  Several studies recognised that although cancer patients often failed to meet all 
symptom clusters of PTSD, intrusive recollections were relatively common (e.g. Palmer 
et al 2004; Matsuoka et al, 2005). A new surge of research assessed the incidence of 
intrusive  thoughts  in  cancer  patients  (Kangas  et  al,  2002),  using  the  IES,  a  scale 
developed  to  assess  intrusiveness  and  avoidance  in  response  to  a  traumatic  event. 
However,  limitations  of  the  IES  include  its  failure  to  assess  the  type  of  intrusive 
cognitions  (e.g.  visual/verbal),  valence  (e.g.  positive/negative),  content  and 
characteristics of intrusive cognitions. The items of the IES also allude to the traumatic 
event being in the past, but cancer as a traumatic stressor is experienced in the present 
and  also  involves  a  number  of  potentially  stressful  future  events  (e.g.  recurrence, 
treatment side-effects). A few studies asked cancer patients about intrusive cognitions 
without  using  the  IES,  but  were  still  restrictive  in  their  definitions  of  what  was 
considered  traumatic.  For  example,  Matsuoka  et  al  (2002)  defined  cancer  related 
intrusive  thoughts  as  uncontrollable  thoughts  about  the  disclosure  of  the  cancer 
diagnosis coming to mind at any time since diagnosis or over a period of more than 4 
weeks. 
  At the same time as psycho-oncology was focussing on assessing the incidence 
of intrusive thoughts in cancer patients, clinical psychology was revisiting the area of 
intrusive cognitions in various clinical samples, including PTSD, depressed and anxious 
groups. Strikingly, different types of visual intrusions considered a hallmark of PTSD 
patients  were  found  to  be  experienced  in  these  groups  and  demonstrate  similar 
characteristics  (Brewin,  1998;  Hackmann  &  Holmes,  2004).  For  example,  although 
intrusive imagery was reported less frequently in a depressed sample compared to a 
PTSD sample, when depressed patients did experience intrusive memories, they were 
similar to intrusive memories reported by PTSD patients (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). 
Both groups experienced vivid, distressing memories that occurred several times a week 
and lasted between several minutes and hours. Hackmann & Holmes (2004) suggested   165 
that reports of intrusive imagery in anxious samples were also showing patterns similar 
to those found in PTSD samples. For example, frequent uncontrollable intrusive images 
were reported in social phobia (Hackmann et al, 2000), agoraphobia (Day et al, 2004) 
and OCD (Speckens et al, 2007). Images were distressing, vivid and often related to 
actual memories of traumatic events.  
In the context of PTSD and as discussed in Chapter 1, cognitive models have 
included processes linked to the maintenance of intrusive memories and PTSD (Ehlers 
&  Steil,  1995).  However,  research  had  not  clarified  which  processes  linked  to  the 
maintenance  of  intrusive  cognitions  in  other  clinical  samples.  Recent  research  with 
bereaved, non-clinical and depressed samples has applied the cognitive model to the 
maintenance of intrusive symptoms in other populations (Boelen et al, 2003; Starr & 
Moulds,  2006,  Moulds  et  al,  2008)  and  found  that  similar  processes,  such  as  the 
meaning individuals give to intrusive cognitions, rather than the intrusions themselves, 
is associated with psychological distress (Starr & Moulds, 2006).  
 Based on the finding that intrusive symptoms are the predominant symptom of 
PTSD reported by cancer patients and intrusive cognitions are ubiquitous and similar 
across clinical groups, the present thesis took an alternative, transdiagnostic approach 
and  moved  beyond  the  PTSD  model  to  incorporate  literature  assessing  intrusive 
cognitions across clinical groups. Following from previous research (e.g. Patel et al, 
2007) intrusive cognitions were operationalised into three categories. Intrusive thoughts 
were  defined  as  verbal  intrusions  that  could  relate  to  any  time  scale  (past,  present, 
future), intrusive memories were defined as memories of a specific event that occurred 
in the past and intrusive images were defined as images referring to any time-scale. 
Past-oriented  intrusive  images  were  distinguished  from  intrusive  memories,  because 
they lacked autobiographical context and were more like “snapshots.” In later analyses, 
images  and  memories  were  combined  and  considered  visual  intrusions,  as  both  are 
pictorial, rather than verbal representations. 
  Indeed,  although  psycho-oncology  research  adopted  a  PTSD  framework  to 
understand  psychological  distress  in  cancer  patients,  visual  imagery,  a  hallmark 
symptom  of  PTSD,  was  rarely  considered.  The  most  recent  literature  investigating 
imagery  in  cancer  patients  was  in  the  context  of  using  guided  imagery  to  alleviate 
psychological  distress,  treatment  side-effects,  pain  and  enhance  the  immune  system 
(Roffe et al, 2005). For example, Walker and colleagues (e.g., Walker et al, 1999) found 
that the use of cancer-related images (e.g. immune system attacking cancer cells) was   166 
successful  in  alleviating  psychological  distress.  However,  the  mechanism  by  which 
guided imagery alleviated distress was unclear and guided imagery was mainly used 
alongside  progressive  muscle  relaxation  and  thus  the  specific  role  of  imagery  was 
difficult to identify.  
Based  on  the  rejuvenation  of  interest  in  imagery  within  the  field  of  clinical 
psychology (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004) and the relative lack of interest in imagery in 
cancer patients, the starting point of my thesis was developed during my MSc based on 
work conducted by Baddeley & Andrade (2000), which emphasised the importance of 
memory in the vividness of imagery by focussing on the detrimental effects of various 
concurrent memory tasks on imagery vividness. The work tested further hypotheses 
about the determinants of imagery vividness, for example, valence (positive, negative, 
neutral)  and  motion  (static,  dynamic)  in  non-clinical  populations.  It  was  found  that 
negative and positive imagery were significantly more vivid than neutral imagery and 
dynamic imagery was significantly more vivid than static imagery. This work led me to 
become familiar with the potential application of understanding imagery for clinical 
practice. Determining the factors that influence imagery is an important task, because 
imagery is useful in therapy (see Chapter 4) and has a significant impact on emotion 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005). 
With this recognition of the ‘special’ relationship between imagery and emotion, 
it soon became clear that investigating intrusive imagery as well as intrusive thoughts in 
cancer patients would be an important next step in research. The present thesis began by 
acknowledging that although there was cause for considering intrusive symptoms in 
cancer patents, intrusions were not sufficiently assessed and important models used to 
understand how intrusions lead to psychological distress were not utilised.   
In summary, starting from a PTSD framework, it became clear that identifying 
common  experiences  and  processes  associated  with  psychological  distress  in  cancer 
patients  is  a  viable  alternative  to  classifying  individuals  according  to  diagnostic 
categories  (Birrer  et  al,  2007).  In  Chapter  3,  this  was  likened  to  a  transdiagnostic 
approach  to  psychological  disorders  (Harvey  et  al,  2004),  which  assumes  that 
experiences such as intrusive thoughts and images exist on a continuum from clinical to 
non-clinical populations.  
   The  thesis  addressed  the  limitations  of  previous  research  assessing  intrusive 
cognitions by asking generally about individuals intrusive experiences in the last week 
(i.e. there were no assumptions about what the content of the intrusions would be).   167 
From the broad literature of intrusive symptoms in clinical disorders, research questions 
included  whether  cancer  patients  experienced  different  types  (e.g.  visual/verbal, 
future/past) of intrusive cognitions, how similar in quality these were to clinical samples 
and whether they were associated with anxiety and maladaptive adjustment. The thesis 
also set out to investigate how patients appraised and coped with intrusive cognitions 
and whether therapeutic interventions could be used to alleviate their frequency and 
impact. Interview methods were utilised throughout in order to provide detail so far 
denied by work assessing intrusive thoughts in cancer patients.  
  Before discussing the specific hypotheses and findings of the present research in 
more detail, a note on outpatient recruitment is warranted. In Study 1 and in order to 
determine  whether  intrusive  cognitions  were  related  to  anxiety  in  cancer  patients,  a 
series of outpatients were screened for anxiety using the HADS. The rationale was to 
compare matched anxious and non-anxious samples to delineate whether the experience 
of  intrusive  cognitions  was  related  to  psychological  distress.  During  this  screening 
process with prostate cancer patients, I worked with urology consultants on analyses 
which are not reported in this thesis (see Burnet, Parker, Dearnaley, Brewin, & Watson, 
2007)
2. We were interested in whether there were implications for different medical 
treatments in terms of psychological distress. Specifically, we wanted to assess whether 
a  relatively new approach to the management of prostate cancer (Active Surveillance), 
which involves actively monitoring, rather than radically treating early stage prostate 
cancer patient was associated with increased distress. Our study (Burnet et al, 2007) 
reported that there were no significant differences in anxiety and depression for prostate 
cancer patients left untreated and those who received radical treatment (radiotherapy, 
hormone therapy). From a treatment perspective, it was important for the consultants to 
consider whether living with untreated prostate cancer was associated with increased 
psychological morbidity. From a psychological perspective, one potential avenue would 
be to investigate whether the differences in psychological distress across the treatment 
groups was mediated by experiences such as intrusive cognitions. Although the lack of 
differences between the treatment groups precluded an exploration of this question, the 
extra analyses showed that in addition to investigating mechanisms underlying anxiety 
in  cancer  patients,  screening  for  anxiety  was  a  useful  practice.  Later  exploratory 
analyses in Study 2 found, as would be expected if intrusions were a mediating variable 
                                                 
2 Note, name changed from Burnet to Whitaker in 2007 due to marriage   168 
in  anxiety,  that  there  was  no  effect  of  treatment  type  on  whether  patients  reported 
intrusive cognitions.  
6.2.  Overview of hypotheses and findings 
6.2.1. Study 1  
The thesis includes three studies. Study 1 was a cross-sectional controlled study 
comparing  anxious  and  non-anxious  cancer  patients  (see  Chapter  2),  where  it  was 
hypothesised that: 
1) There would be a higher number of intrusive thoughts, memories and images in 
anxious patients compared to non-anxious matched controls. 
2)  The  presence  of  intrusions  cognitions  would  be  associated  with  maladaptive 
adjustment. 
3) Asking participants about intrusive thoughts, memories and images would not be 
associated with elevated levels of distress.  
The findings of Study 1 supported these hypotheses. Anxious prostate cancer 
patients  were  significantly  more  likely  to  report  intrusive  thoughts,  images  and 
memories  compared  to  non-anxious  prostate  cancer  patients  and  there  was  a  linear 
relationship between anxiety and the number of intrusive cognitions. Anxious cancer 
patients experienced distressing, negative intrusive cognitions which were interfering 
and difficult to control. The content of intrusive cognitions reported was similar to the 
content of intrusive memories reported by depressed cancer patients regarding illness, 
injury or death and specifically about the experience of cancer (Brewin et al, 1998a). 
However, there were a number of intrusive cognitions that were not specifically related 
to illness, injury or death. Unrelated intrusions often reflected individuals feeling of 
failure in life, for example, of negative personal experiences (e.g. work, relationships). 
Also,  the  majority  of  intrusive  cognitions  were  future-oriented  and  thus  in  order  to 
encompass  the  broad  array  of  concerns  precipitated  by  a  cancer  diagnosis,  asking 
patients about the experience of intrusive cognitions more generally, rather than in the 
context of PTSD would prove beneficial. This would also help divert from the problem 
labelled  ‘conceptual  bracket  creeping’  where  an  increasingly  number  of  events  are 
considered traumatic and can precipitate a PTSD diagnosis (McNally, 2003). 
In  line  with  intrusions  reported  in  PTSD  samples,  intrusive  memories  were 
associated with a sense that the event was happening all over again. This reflects the   169 
maladaptive processing associated with intrusive memories, where failure to integrate 
traumatic  experience  into  autobiographical  memory  leads  to  a  lack  of  information 
updating  and  subsequent  feelings  of  ‘nowness’.    The  intrusions  were  most  often 
associated  with  feelings  of  sadness  and  helplessness  and  were  also  related  to 
maladaptive  adjustment  including  anxious  preoccupation  and  helplessness-
hopelessness, after controlling for anxiety severity. Patients did not find being asked 
about their intrusive experiences distressing, rather they often perceived the experience 
as beneficial.  
Overall, cancer patients with anxiety reported intrusive cognitions with several 
similarities  to those  found  in  PTSD,  depressed  and  anxious  groups.  However,  there 
were several differences between the intrusions reported by cancer patients and other 
clinical groups. For example, anxious patients reported fewer intrusions than found in 
other populations and reported less overall impact of intrusions (Reynolds & Brewin, 
1998).  Also,  intrusive  imagery  was  less  frequent  than  imagery  reported  in  anxiety 
disorders (e.g. Hackmann et al, 2000). Overall, intrusive thoughts were significantly 
more common than intrusive imagery, which contrasts with previous research reporting 
that  intrusive  images  are  more  common  in  PTSD  samples  (Ehlers  &  Steil,  1995). 
Intrusive memories reported in Study 1 were more similar to those reported in non-
clinical populations than PTSD samples. For example, intrusive memories reported by 
anxious  cancer  patients  were  mainly  contextualised  autobiographical  imagery  which 
could be retrieved during an interview without accompanying physical sensations (e.g. 
memory  of  mother  dying  of  breast  cancer),  whereas,  intrusive  memories  in  PTSD 
samples are often fragmented,  accompanied by high levels of arousal and cannot be 
deliberately retrieved (Brewin, 1998).  
Two possible reasons for the lower frequency and impact of intrusive cognitions 
were that 1) the anxious group was significantly less anxious than clinical groups and 
there is a linear relationship between anxiety and intrusions and 2) cancer patients may 
appraise intrusive cognitions as a normal stress response to the concrete stressor of a 
life-threatening illness. In Chapter 3, the cognitive approach to PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 
1995)  was  utilised  in  order  to  elucidate  the  processes  linked  to  the  maintenance  of 
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6.2.2. Study 2  
Study  2  was  a  cross-sectional  study  of  a  mixed  sample  of  anxious  cancer 
patients (see Chapter 3). The following hypotheses were tested:  
1)    The  positive  linear  relationship  between  anxiety  severity  and  the  number  of 
intrusions reported in Study 1 would be replicated.  
2) There would be a significant positive association between i) negative appraisal of 
intrusive cognitions (e.g. “Some day I will go out of my mind”) and anxiety severity 
and ii) negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions and intrusion associated distress; after 
controlling for intrusion frequency. 
3) Negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions would be associated with the extent to 
which  patients  engaged  in  coping  strategies.  Engaging  in  cognitive  avoidance 
mechanisms would be associated with higher levels of psychological distress.  
4)  The  positive  relationship  reported  in  Study  1  between  the  presence  of  intrusive 
cognitions and maladaptive adjustment would be replicated. 
Contrary to one explanation for the lower frequency and impact of intrusive 
cognitions  in  cancer  patients,  it  was  found  that  cancer  patients  appraised  intrusive 
cognitions in a negative way, as a sign that they couldn’t cope and had a psychological 
problem. The level of negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions was higher in cancer 
patients than in ambulance workers assessed for PTSD (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) and 
student samples (Starr & Moulds, 2006) and matched levels reported in a depressed 
sample (Moulds et al, 2008).  Negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions was associated 
with  increased  intrusion-related  distress  and  psychological  distress  severity,  after 
controlling for intrusion frequency, which corresponds to the considerable number of 
findings presented in Chapter 3 (e.g. Clohessy  & Ehlers, 1999;  Boelen et al, 2003; 
Williams & Moulds, 2007). As predicted, negative appraisal was associated with the 
extent to which patients engaged in strategies to control the intrusions (e.g. cognitive 
avoidance).  These  strategies  in  turn  were  associated  with  increased  psychological 
distress. The study also replicated the positive linear relationship between number of 
intrusive cognitions and anxiety and the positive relationship between the presence of 
intrusive cognitions and maladaptive adjustment.  
New  findings  emerged  from  Study  2,  including  the  greater  impact  of  visual 
compared to verbal intrusions. Visual intrusions were associated with higher levels of 
intrusion  and  avoidance,  greater  uncontrollability  and  were  more  likely  to  last  for 
seconds than minutes or hours. The fleeting nature of intrusive imagery paralleled work   171 
with PTSD populations (e.g. Speckens et al, 2007). Although the differences reported 
between visual and verbal intrusions were post-hoc and require further investigation, 
they are important for two reasons. Firstly, although intrusive imagery is sometimes 
reported  less  often  than  intrusive  thoughts,  it  is  associated  with  higher  subjective 
distress and feelings of reliving and thus may require targeted intervention. Secondly, 
the  finding  provides  further  evidence  for  the  distinction  between  types  of  intrusive 
cognitions (e.g. Brewin et al, 1996) which should be considered in future research with 
cancer patients.  
After  identifying  that  intrusive  cognitions  were  associated  with  anxiety  and 
maladaptive adjustment in prostate cancer patients, intrusive cognitions were explored 
in more detail in a mixed sample of anxious cancer patients. Study 2 confirmed the 
findings of Study 1 and extended them by showing that the meaning individuals assign 
to  intrusive  cognitions  and  intrusion-specific  coping  are  associated  with  increased 
psychological distress. Based on the identification of intrusive cognitions as a common 
feature  of  distress  in  cancer  patients  in  Study  1  and  Study  2,  the  knowledge  that 
intrusive  cognitions  mediate  and  maintain  psychological  distress  (e.g.  Hirsch  et  al, 
2004) and the suggestion that intrusive cognitions are amenable to direct modification 
(e.g. Holmes et al, 2007), a modular approach to therapy was utilised in Study 3.  
6.2.3. Study 3 
Study 3 (Chapter 5) used single-case design to assess whether a psychological 
intervention, imagery rescripting, would be successful in reducing the frequency and 
impact of intrusive imagery and associated psychological distress. Imagery rescripting 
was chosen based on the considerable number of studies across PTSD, anxious and 
depressed samples demonstrating its success for patients reporting frequent, distressing 
intrusive imagery. The hypotheses were as follows:  
1) Imagery rescripting would reduce the frequency, interference, vividness and distress 
associated with intrusive imagery and increase the controllability of intrusive imagery.  
2) Imagery rescripting would lead to a reduction in anxiety and depression levels. 
3) Positive outcomes, in terms of reduced frequency, impact and psychological distress, 
associated with imagery rescripting would remain at 3 month and 6 month follow-up. 
  Following previous research (e.g. Wheatley et al, 2007), imagery rescripting 
was  found  to  provide  effective  and  rapid  relief  from  anxiety  and  depression,  with 
reductions  in  negative  intrusion  characteristics  such  as  frequency,  distress,   172 
uncontrollability, interference  and vividness. These positive outcomes remained at 3 
month and 6 month follow-up. The success of imagery rescripting was explained using 
a competition retrieval account (Brewin, 2006) and the self-regulation model (Scheier & 
Carver, 2003) following Conway et al’s (2004) work conceptualising images as goals.  
6.2.4. Proposed model of cancer as a traumatic stressor. 
   Based on the findings of the present research an overall model of how cancer as 
a traumatic stressor leads to anxiety and depression through experiences of intrusive 
cognitions  is  outlined  (Figure  10).  The  flowchart  represents  a  re-formulation  of  the 
rationale for imagery rescripting therapy (see Figure 3, Chapter 5; Wheatley & Brewin, 
2005) in order to incorporate verbal  as well as visual intrusive cognitions, negative 
appraisal  and  intrusion-specific  coping.  The  figure  is  marked  to  indicate  where 
supporting findings can be found in the present thesis (e.g. Study 1).  
Evidence  suggested  that  cancer  is  a  traumatic  stressor  that  precipitates 
uncontrollable  intrusive  thoughts  and  images  (e.g.  Bleiker  et  al,  2000).  This  was 
confirmed in Study 1 and Study 2 of the thesis. Although these intrusions share some 
similarities  with  clinical  samples,  both  studies  showed  that  there  were  marked 
differences.  In  previous  research,  although  differences  were  reported  in  intrusive 
cognitions  between  psychological  disorders  (e.g.  depression,  PTSD),  the  cognitive 
approach to the maintenance of intrusive memories in PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995) was 
successfully applied to the maintenance of intrusive memories in other samples (e.g. 
Starr  &  Moulds,  2006).  The  same  approach  was  thus  applied  to  the  experience  of 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. 
The findings of Study 2 supported the suggestion that the experience of intrusive 
cognitions  in  cancer  patients  leads  to  psychological  distress  in  the  same  way  as 
proposed in the cognitive approach (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). The experience of intrusive 
cognitions as uncontrollable leads individuals with cancer to think that they are unable 
to  cope  or  have  a  psychological  problem.  The  relationship  is  bidirectional  because 
having intrusive cognitions which are considered a sign of mental fragility also means 
they  are experienced as less controllable. The  positive association between negative 
appraisal and intrusion uncontrollability reported in Study 2 supports this suggestion. 
Following negative appraisal, individuals subsequently engage in coping strategies (e.g. 
avoidance)  aimed  at  reducing  intrusive  cognitions.  Study  2  reported  a  significant 
correlation  between  negative  appraisal  and  coping  with  intrusions  (e.g.  rumination,   173 
avoidance). This relationship is also bidirectional because adopting ineffective coping 
strategies  enhances  the  negative  meaning  of  the  intrusive  cognitions  (e.g.  “I  cannot 
cope”).  Coping  strategies  such  as  avoidance  prevent  adequate  processing  of  the 
distressing  intrusions  and  paradoxically  exacerbate  rather  than  alleviate  intrusive 
cognitions, which in turn lead to maintenance of anxiety and depression (Michaels et al, 
2005).  It  is  suggested  that  the  failure  of  coping  strategies  exacerbates  intrusive 
cognitions in two ways identified in Figure 10; i) increased frequency of intrusions and 
ii) experience of intrusions as uncontrollable. The relationship between avoidance of 
intrusive  cognitions  and  depression  severity  reported  in  Study  2  supports  the  final 
relationship  in  the  flowchart.  This  is  a  preliminary  model  adopted  in  the  present 
research  and  requires  further  empirical  testing  in  order  to  elucidate  the  nature  of 
relationships. For example, suggested causal relationships need to be empirically tested 
in future research.  
 Interventions specifically targeted at the processes described below, are likely to 
be  most  useful  for  cancer  patients  experiencing  intrusive  cognitions.  This  is  further 
discussed in the section “Clinical Implications” (p 175).  
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Intrusive thoughts and images
with following characteristics (Study 1 and Study 2):
Frequent
Past/Present/Future oriented
Interfering
Distressing
Vivid imagery
Intrusive memories associated with sense of “nowness”
Last for seconds or minutes
Experiences of thoughts and images as uncontrollable 
(Study 1 and Study 2)
Negative intrusion-appraisal (Study 2)
(e.g. “These thoughts mean that I am going out of my mind”, “Something is 
wrong with me”)
Anxiety/Depression (Study 2)
Cancer as a 
traumatic stressor 
Intrusion-specific coping strategies (Study 2)
 e.g. avoidance, rumination
 
 
Figure 10 Formulation representing how intrusive cognitions experienced by 
cancer patients can lead to anxiety and depression. 
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6.3.  Clinical implications 
There are several clinical implications of the present research. Based on the finding 
that  intrusive  cognitions  play  a  role  in  psychological  distress  and  maladaptive 
adjustment in cancer patients, identifying them in individuals requiring psychological 
intervention would be helpful in therapy. Clinicians providing psychological therapy 
could be encouraged to routinely assess whether cancer patients experience intrusive 
thoughts or images. Avoidance of intrusive cognitions in Study 2 was associated with 
increased  negative  intrusion-appraisal  and  depression  severity,  after  controlling  for 
intrusion frequency. Identifying intrusive cognitions would also have implications for 
maladaptive  avoidance  responses  because  patients  are  automatically  encouraged  to 
confront rather than avoid their intrusions. This has practical application in enhancing 
treatment compliance, as avoidance includes avoiding places or individuals that trigger 
intrusive cognitions, for example, follow-up hospital appointments.  
Based on the finding that the appraisal of intrusive cognitions is associated with 
rumination and cognitive avoidance and both negative appraisal and maladaptive coping 
are  associated  with  increased  distress  in  cancer  patients,  brief  psychological 
interventions may be useful for alleviating distress. For example, simply asking cancer 
patients about whether they experience intrusive cognitions would help normalise the 
experience by showing that they are a common experience following a traumatic or 
critical life event. Therapies aimed at identifying and modifying negative appraisal of 
intrusive cognitions (Steil & Ehlers, 2000) would prove beneficial for cancer patients 
reporting these experiences.  Further, using case formulations such as those presented in 
Chapter  5  could  enhance  metacognitive  awareness  by  showing  patients  how  the 
experience of intrusive cognitions leads to psychological distress.  
Study  3  explored  the  use  of  imagery  in  psychological  therapy  and  provided  a 
rationale for targeting visual intrusions in cancer patients using imagery rescripting. 
Imagery rescripting is a technique which was applied to the treatment of childhood 
abuse memories (e.g. Smucker et al, 1995; Arntz & Weertman, 1999) and more recently 
developed  for  use  in  a  number  of  different  clinical  groups  (Holmes  et  al,  2007). 
Evidence from Study 3 showed that modifying intrusive images by encouraging patients 
to create alternative, more positive images led to decreased frequency and impact of 
intrusive  cognitions  and  clinically  significant  decreases  in  anxiety  and  depression. 
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design limits generalisability of the use of this therapy in cancer patients, the success 
reported in Study 3 is promising. For patients experiencing negative intrusive images, 
rescripting is a rapid and effective therapy for relieving psychological distress. 
 Another  insight  gained  from  imagery  rescripting  therapy  was  how  a  number  of 
different types of intrusive images are amenable to modification. For example John 
experienced a series of intrusive images where he had been bullied or acted like a bully. 
Cancer  had  triggered  feelings  of  loss  (in  physical  strength)  and  led  to  depressive 
episodes. John was frightened to leave the house and interact with other people because 
he felt he was no longer able to defend himself based on his illness. By addressing 
imagery he realised that he was not the aggressive person he thought he was, nor did he 
need to resolve situations using violence. It could be hypothesised that the change in 
meaning of these intrusive images meant that the loss of physical strength was no longer 
central  to  John’s  appraisal  of  cancer.    Although  John  reported  seemingly  unrelated 
intrusive imagery, the finding that the images had implications for disease-appraisal 
strengthens the argument that assessing intrusive cognitions more broadly, rather than 
within narrow definitions will encompass the rich experience of coping with cancer.  
Imagery  rescripting  is  one  of  several  therapies  that  would  prove  beneficial  for 
cancer patients reporting intrusive cognitions. Recent therapeutic techniques have been 
developed to address intrusive thoughts as well as intrusive images by pairing these 
negative  processes  with  positive  emotions  or  mental  states  (Brewin,  2006).  For 
example, techniques such as mindfulness based stress reduction (e.g. MBSR; Smith et 
al, 2005) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al, 2004) differ 
from traditional cognitive behavioural techniques which involve challenging the validity 
of negative thoughts. Instead, MBSR and ACT assume that it is not the presence of 
intrusive  thoughts  that  causes  distress,  but  the  tendency  of  the  patient  to  become 
emotionally involved in them. Participants are trained to distance themselves from their 
intrusive thoughts and acknowledge them in a dispassionate way, without emotional 
involvement. Thus intrusive thoughts are paired with positive mental states such as self-
acceptance in ACT.  In  Study 3, imagery  rescripting of negative memories involved 
pairing  negative  imagery  with  positive  imagery.  These  techniques  are  constructive 
because  they  help  patients  distance  themselves  from  extremely  negative  processes, 
without suggesting that these processes will disappear altogether. Thus, adaptive coping 
strategies are introduced and ultimately replace maladaptive coping strategies such as 
cognitive avoidance. The effectiveness of these approaches on the frequency and impact   177 
of intrusive thoughts as well as intrusive images in cancer patients remain a question for 
future research.  
6.4.  Limitations  
  The cross-sectional nature of the present research limits the conclusions in terms 
of causality. Prospective studies have reported that intrusive thoughts predicted anxiety 
(Brewin  et  al,  1998b),  psychological  distress  (Bleiker  et  al,  2000),  anxiety  and 
depression  (Epping-Jordan  et  al,  1999)  and  anxiety  (Hipkins  et  al,  2004)  in  cancer 
patients.  Future  research  taking  different  types  of  intrusive  cognitions  into  account, 
should  investigate  prospectively  the  course  of  intrusions  and  their  relationship  to 
psychological morbidity.  
  The present research adopted a cross-sectional design in order to first identify 
whether  different  types  of  intrusive  cognitions  are  reported  by  cancer  patients  and 
whether intrusive cognitions are similar to and behave in the same way as reported in 
other research. Now that the importance of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients has 
been established, prospective design would be a natural next step in research. Other 
types of study design, such as experimental manipulation used in other anxious samples 
(e.g. Hirsch et al, 2003; Hirsch et al, 2004) also has potential for elucidating causal 
relationships.  For  example,  patients  with  social  phobia  holding  a  negative  image  in 
mind  felt  more  anxious,  used  more  safety  behaviours  and  believed  that  they  had 
performed  poorly  compared  to  when  they  held  a  control  image  in  mind.  Although 
manipulating  intrusive  cognitions  in  cancer  patients  would  require  careful  ethical 
consideration, establishing causal relationships in cancer patients is important.  
The  present  study  did  not  assess  past  psychiatric  history  or  prior  traumatic 
events. There is evidence that greater exposure to traumatic events is associated with 
clinically significant stress response symptoms in both early stage and metastatic breast 
cancer patients (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Butler et al, 1999). Although in Study 
3,  anxiety  and  depression  were  assessed  with  the  SCID  (First  et  al,  2002),  other 
psychological disorders were not assessed such as PTSD. The decision not to make an 
exhaustive assessment of past and present psychiatric history was based on the goal to 
keep the time patients were required to spend in the interview to a minimum. In addition 
to potential psychological distress, patients were dealing with a life threatening physical 
illness and this had to be considered when designing interviews and completing NHS 
ethics. In Study 1 and Study 2, assessment of research participation supported previous   178 
trauma-related research (e.g. Newman et al, 1999), where participation was perceived as 
beneficial and associated with lack of regret in participating. Furthermore, there were no 
differences according to whether individuals reported intrusive cognitions or not. This is 
encouraging for future research assessing intrusive symptoms in cancer patients.  
In Chapter 3 it was suggested that simple rating scales for intrusion-specific 
coping may have compromised the reliability of assessment and future research could 
introduce more complex measures. Williams & Moulds (2007) addressed this limitation 
by  introducing  coping  measures  including  the  Ruminative  Response  Scale  of  the 
Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and the White Bear 
Suppression  Inventory  (Wegner  &  Zanakos,  1984).  They  also  introduced  additional 
measures  of  negative  appraisal,  including  the  Interpretation  of  Intrusions  Inventory 
(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2001).  Future research with cancer 
patients could use a broader array of self-report instruments, such as those mentioned 
above, in order to further elucidate the applicability of Ehlers and Steil’s (1995) model. 
In  addition  to  different  self-report  measures  the  use  of  open-ended  questions  and 
qualitative analyses would prove useful. Based on the complex aetiology of intrusive 
phenomena, qualitative methodology would also be useful for assessing other aspects of 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients.  
Participants in the present research were mainly White British and married. In 
particular,  at  the  screening  stage  of  Study  1  and  Study  2,  non-responders  were 
significantly more likely to come from a different ethnic origin than be White British. In 
a  review  of  the  literature  discussing  why  ethnic  minorities  are  under-represented  in 
research within the UK, it was suggested that key barriers were language, socio-cultural 
differences, shortage of resources for translation and fear and mistrust of the healthcare 
system (Hussain-Gambles, Atkin, & Leese, 2004). Future research would benefit from 
sampling  more  diverse  populations  of  cancer  patients.  This  could  include  further 
investigate  the  types  of  intrusive  cognitions  reported  by  children  with  cancer  (e.g. 
Stuber et al, 1994) and also children of parents with cancer (e.g. Huizinga et al, 2007).  
Another  limitation  of  the  present  research  is  that  all  studies  included  a  self-
selected sample (i.e. people who agreed to be interviewed) and so people with severe 
symptoms could be over-represented. Conversely, avoidance is a strong characteristic of 
intrusive cognitions and therefore people may not take up invitation to interview (Birrer 
et al, 2007). Although in Study 1, responders were significantly more anxious than non-
responders  and  thus  this  supports  the  first  possibility,  there  were  no  significant   179 
differences in anxiety between responders and non-responders in Study 2. However, 
there was an extremely low uptake rate for imagery rescripting therapy, which may have 
been as a result of an overall reluctance to focus on distressing intrusions. This is a key 
problem because a therapeutic intervention is only helpful if people agree to participate. 
Perhaps if intrusive imagery is assessed more routinely in clinical practice, the idea of 
using therapies such as imagery rescripting could be introduced more gently over a 
number of sessions rather than in an interview where patients may have acknowledged 
the presence of distressing intrusions for the first time. Another possibility for the future 
use  of  direct  imagery  techniques  in  therapy  would  be  to  introduce  tasks  aimed  at 
reducing  the  vividness  and  emotional  impact  of  intrusive  cognitions  (e.g.  EMDR; 
Kavanagh  et  al,  2001).  These  tasks  help  introduce  challenging  therapy  by  allowing 
patients to initially focus on imagery in a controlled way.  
There was a marked difference in uptake rates between prostate cancer patients 
in  Study  1  and  the  mixed  sample  of  cancer  patients  in  Study  2.  For  screening,  the 
overall  response  rate  was  75%  in  the  former  and  58%  in  the  latter.  This  is  despite 
identical methods of outpatient screening. For interview take up rate, this was 65% in 
Study 1 and 47% for outpatient invitations in Study 2. Although rates as low as 44% are 
not uncommon for survey research (Laposa & Alden, 2003), the discrepancy between 
the two studies require some explanation. One factor that could potentially explain the 
discrepancy is age, as in Study 2 screening, responders were significantly older than 
non-responders and prostate cancer patients are a typically older sample. Prostate cancer 
patients were also more likely to be retired than the mixed sample of cancer patients and 
thus have more time for participation.  In Study 2 there was an extremely low response 
rate  from  Psychological  Medicine  Referrals  (35%).  Although  purely  speculative 
because patients did not complete the HADS, this may be because patients referred to 
Psychological Medicine were at the peak of their anxiety and therefore less likely to 
participate. Another reason is that for Psychological Medicine screening, patients were 
sent  an  invitation  pack  consisting  of  an  invitation  letter,  information  sheet,  consent 
form, reply form and the HADS. This amount of information in one pack may have 
deterred patients. Future research investigating intrusive cognitions in cancer patients 
should take these findings into account and adopt methods to maximise participation. 
For example, Psychological Medicine patients could have been sent a letter with an 
expression of interest form as the first stage, or therapists could have approached the 
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The present thesis started from a PTSD framework and one potential criticism is 
that  the  symptom  clusters  of  arousal  and  avoidance  were  not  considered.  Although 
prevalence rates are low, some cancer patients do meet full criteria for PTSD. However, 
it is argued that the alternative transdiagnostic approach adopted in this thesis, which 
doesn’t classify individuals according to diagnostic categories, would still identify these 
cancer  patients  requiring  psychological  intervention.  In  fact,  the  majority  of 
interventions for PTSD target intrusive symptoms (e.g. reliving therapy; Foa et al, 1991; 
imagery rescripting; Arntz et al, 2007). Although some may consider it important to 
identify patients meeting full criteria PTSD, the present thesis suggests that identifying 
intrusive  cognitions  is  a  more  fruitful  starting  point  because  this  approach  includes 
people with PTSD and also includes those who experience significant psychological 
distress as a result of intrusive symptoms but who do not meet full criteria for PTSD. 
This was described as a modular approach to therapy in Chapter 4, where treatment 
approaches are tailor-made to individual presentation.  
Although imagery-based interventions were used in Study 3 and were tailor-
made to individuals reporting intrusive images, participants reporting intrusive thoughts 
were not provided with a specific intervention  as this was beyond the  scope of the 
present research. Imagery rescripting was used for several reasons. Firstly, it is a short, 
manualised  therapy  that  could  be  learnt  within  the  available  time-scale,  it  targeted 
intrusive imagery identified in cancer patients in Study 1 and Study 2 and several recent 
studies showed that is can be successful across samples to address negative imagery 
(Holmes et al, 2007). As discussed in terms of clinical implications of the present thesis, 
other psychological therapies aimed at intrusive thoughts as well as intrusive images 
should be assessed in future research.  
In  summary,  key  limitations  of  the  present  thesis  include  the  cross-sectional 
design of Study 1 and Study 2 and the inability to generalise from the single-case design 
of Study 3. The research did not assess the psychiatric history of cancer patients, relied 
on self-report measures and the use of simple-rating scales. The findings so far apply to 
a relatively homogenous sample of cancer patients and more diverse populations and 
other hospitals need to be sampled in order to further understand intrusive cognitions in 
cancer patients. The intervention component only targeted a specific type of intrusive 
cognition and interventions targeted at intrusive thoughts are equally important. In order 
to further understand the utility of applying a PTSD framework to cancer patients, other 
symptoms including arousal and avoidance need to be considered.    181 
6.5.  Future research 
6.5.1. Prospective research 
Although intrusive cognitions have been identified in cancer patients and linked 
to  psychological  distress,  few  studies  have  studied  the  temporal  course  of  stress 
response  (Gurevich  et  al,  2002)  after  cancer  diagnosis.  Andrykowski  et  al  (2000) 
assessed the temporal stability of PTSD symptoms in breast cancer survivors and found 
that symptoms did not significantly decrease between baseline and 1 year follow-up. 
Bleiker et al (2000) in a prospective study of early stage breast cancer survivors found 
that 60% of patients assessed (IES) at baseline (2 months post-surgery) continued to 
report high levels of intrusive thoughts at 2 year follow-up and Brewin et al (1998b) 
found  that  68%  of  patients  who  had  experienced  intrusive  memories  at  initial 
assessment continued to experience them six months later. Therefore evidence suggests 
that  intrusive  cognitions  are  not  a  transient  phenomenon.  In  Study  2,  it  was 
unexpectedly found that a longer time since diagnosis was associated with the presence 
of intrusive cognitions. Although an explanation for this direction is unclear and the 
finding needs to be clarified with future research, this implies that intrusive cognitions 
are not necessarily a result of the cancer diagnosis as a single event but reflects the 
ongoing nature of cancer as a life-threatening stressor. Future work investigating the 
temporal  stability  of  different  types  of  intrusive  cognitions  is  required  in  order  to 
establish the long-term effects of intrusive cognitions on psychological distress. This 
would also help identify the appropriate time for psychological interventions. This work 
could also investigate the possibility that the content of intrusive cognitions changes as 
the immediate stressor changes (Baum & Posluszny, 2001).  
6.5.2. Experimental design 
Drawing on other experimental paradigms in future research would prove useful.  
For  example,  theoretically  the  maintenance  of  imagery  depends  considerably  on 
working memory resources (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Research investigating the 
effects  of  distracter  tasks  on  desensitising  to  emotive  memories  has  found  that 
visuospatial  tasks  (e.g.  rapid  eye  movement)  reduced  the  vividness  and  emotion 
associated with visual images (Andrade et al, 1997; Kavanagh et al, 2001; Kemps & 
Tiggemann,  2007).    Other  research  has  focussed  on  reactions  to  traumatic  film 
consisting  of  numerous  distressing  images.  Competition  from  one  specific  kind  of   182 
distraction task while watching the film can significantly reduce the extent to which 
distressing  images  from  the  film  intrude  in  the  following  week  but  other  kinds  of 
distraction task actually increases the intrusions (e.g. Holmes et al, 2004; Stuart et al, 
2006). A review of the trauma film paradigm for inducing and modulating intrusive 
memories (Holmes & Bourne, 2008) concluded that it provides an invaluable tool for 
insight into the formation and maintenance of intrusive memories. They suggested that 
the  paradigm  could  be  adapted  for  concerns  of  other  clinical  disorders  (e.g.  social 
phobia,  agoraphobia)  and  this  may  also  prove  useful  for  cancer  patients  reporting 
intrusive imagery. For example, research could investigate whether the intrusiveness 
and vividness of imagery was reduced by training patients in a visuospatial tapping task 
in response to intrusions.  
Also,  further  research  assessing  the  utility  of  imagery  rescripting  as  a 
psychological intervention in cancer patients should include a control group within a 
larger scale study. This might establish the causal relevance of imagery by providing 
evidence that a reduction in negative imagery precedes decreases in anxiety rather than 
the reverse. 
As imagery depends considerably on working memory resources and imagery 
rescripting can be a successful therapy, other factors that influence the vividness of 
imagery in both intrusive images and imagery interventions may be important for the 
successful reduction of distress in cancer patients. In particular, it has been argued that 
imagery treatments for cancer patients such as guided imagery make assumptions about 
people’s  imaging  ability  and  specifically  about  the  vividness  of  individual  imagery 
(Kwekkeboom et al, 1998). Interestingly, this was the starting point of the present thesis 
as I studied the determinants of imagery vividness during my MSc in recognition of the 
potential use of imagery in therapy. In this sense, the thesis has been cyclical, as it 
began with the identification of imagery as an important factor to investigate in cancer 
patients  and  finishes  with  the  suggestion  that  because  imagery  does  have  a  role  in 
anxiety, imagery vividness remains a significant issue. In addition to the finding that 
imagery vividness is associated with increased positive outcomes (e.g. increased pain 
control)  for  cancer  patients  using  guided  imagery  (Kwekkeboom  et  al,  2003)  the 
imagery vividness in imagery rescripting therapy is also important. For example, the 
aim of imagery rescripting is to construct a competing image that has strong associative 
links to the negative image, will effectively compete with the distressing image (i.e. it 
will be easy to remember and retrieve) and involves positive affect. By increasing the   183 
vividness of the alternative imagery and decreasing the vividness of intrusive imagery, 
imagery rescripting is more likely to be successful.  
6.5.3. Beyond self-report 
Self-report and interview measures may be the most appropriate methods for 
assessing phenomena such as intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. However, there are 
problems  with  the  method  such  as  the  retrospective  nature  of  assessment  and  their 
vulnerability to demand characteristics (e.g. patients answer in the way they think they 
should).  Beyond the use of self-report scales, alternative assessment methods could be 
considered in future research. For example, in Study 2 patients were explicitly asked 
how they appraised their intrusive cognitions and it was found that negative appraisal 
was  associated  with  intrusion-specific  distress/coping  and  psychological  distress. 
However, other measures of negative appraisal such as the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT;  Greenwald,  Mcghee,  &  Schwartz,  1998)  could  be  used  to  gain  insights 
impenetrable by self-report measures alone. The IAT is an experimental method which 
measures the association between two concepts (e.g. intrusive thoughts and personally 
significant).  Participants  are  required  to  categorise  stimuli  where  faster  responses 
indicate  easier  pairings  and  slower  responses  indicate  more  difficult  pairings.  For 
example,  one  study  experimentally  manipulated  appraisals  of  the  importance  of 
intrusive thoughts in order to test cognitive theories of obsessions (Teachman, Woody, 
& Magee, 2006). Teachman et al (2006) found that the manipulation shifted implicit 
appraisals  of  intrusive  thoughts  in  the  expected  direction.  Participants  who  received 
information indicating that their intrusive thoughts were meaningful indicators of their 
values  implicitly  evaluated  themselves  as  more  immoral  and  dangerous  and  their 
intrusive thoughts as more important compared to participants who were not given this 
information.  However,  explicit  measures  of  intrusive  thoughts,  such  as  the 
Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (III; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group,  2001)  were  unaffected  by  the  manipulation.  This  showed  that  providing 
information  about  negative  thoughts  can  change  the  appraisal  of  those  thoughts  but 
implicit and explicit appraisals may be distinct. Future work investigating the role of 
negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients could use implicit as well as 
explicit  measures  of  intrusive  cognitions  and  determine  whether  such  appraisals  are 
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As well as using experimental manipulation and finding alternative methods for 
assessing aspects of intrusive cognitions, future research elucidating the similarities and 
differences of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients compared to other clinical groups 
may benefit from using functional imaging methods to assess the presence of intrusive 
symptomatology.  Research  has  started  to  consider  the  neural  correlates  of  intrusive 
symptoms  in  breast  cancer  patients  (e.g.  Matsuoka  et  al,  2003).  However,  future 
research with cancer patients may benefit from using tasks analogous to previous PTSD 
research such as script-driven imagery (Francati et al, 2007). Also, the emotional stroop 
has been used to assess the presence of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients (Naidich 
& Motta, 2000) and future research could extend this to use the emotional stroop within 
neuroimaging studies. In addition to script-driven imagery and the emotional stroop, 
new  tasks  such  as  the  trauma-film  paradigm  may  be  a  useful  tool  for  investigating 
neural correlates of PTSD symptomatology (Holmes & Bourne, 2008).  
The appropriateness of using these experimental techniques for understanding 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients is yet to be assessed but the central message is 
that other methods exist and future research with cancer patients should continue to use 
the wider literature, beyond psycho-oncology, to guide future research.  
6.5.4. Potential from cancer and PTSD literature 
A potential area for future research is to identify the risk factors associated with 
different types of intrusive cognitions reported in the present research. Risk factors for 
PTSD  symptomatology  were  discussed  in  Chapter  1  and  explored  in  relation  to 
intrusive cognitions in Study 2. The presence of intrusive cognitions was associated 
with longer time since diagnosis and occupation, with retired and unemployed patients 
more likely to report intrusive cognitions. Younger age was identified as a risk factor 
for more severe intrusive cognitions, according to levels of intrusion measured by the 
IES, although sex was not found to be related to intrusive cognitions. Disease stage was 
also unrelated to intrusive cognitions in Study 1 or Study 2 which contradicts some 
research (e.g. Hampton & Frombach, 2000) but corroborates others (e.g. Alter et al, 
1996). Now that the definition of intrusive cognitions has been broadened in cancer 
patients  to  include  different  forms  (visual/verbal)  and  timescales  (future/past),  risk 
factors  should  be  re-explored  in  prospective  research  to  determine  predictors  of 
intrusive symptoms in cancer patients and identify patients most likely to experience 
intrusive cognitions and require psychological intervention.    185 
  Other factors that are important include social support. Women with metastatic 
breast cancer reporting higher levels of stressful life events and poor social support had 
the most severe intrusive symptoms (Butler et al, 1999). Social constraints have been 
positively  related  to  intrusive  cognitions,  avoidance  and  higher  levels  of  depression 
(Cordova et al, 2001; Lepore & Helgeson, 1998). One suggestion is that social support 
and  interpersonal  relationships  buffer  the  negative  emotional  effects  of  intrusive 
thoughts (Lepore, 2001). Although the exact mechanisms are unclear, there are several 
possible explanations.  Based on information processing theories, one explanation is 
that social constraints inhibit cognitive processing of traumatic events, leading to poorer 
adjustment  whereas  good  social  support  facilitates  processing  and  integration  of 
traumatic  experiences  (Horowitz,  1979).  Alternatively,  Lepore  (2001)  suggests  that 
talking with supportive  others may help restore basic beliefs  about the self  and the 
world that have been shattered following cancer (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Other potential 
explanations include the idea that talking may lead to habituation to the trauma. Also, 
social support may prevent negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions (Ehlers & Steil, 
1995). This latter suggestion is supported by the current findings, where cancer patients 
were found to appraise intrusive cognitions in a negative way. Future research assessing 
the relationship between social support and intrusive cognitions in cancer patients could 
assess  whether  good  social  support  is  associated  with  lower  negative  appraisal  of 
intrusive symptoms.  
Pennebaker’s work (e.g. Pennebaker, 1997 for a review) has shown that talking 
and writing about trauma or distressing events leads to decreases in distress. Written 
emotional  disclosure  can  buffer  the  adverse  effects  of  social  constraints  in  cancer 
patients  and  may  be  a  beneficial  tool  in  aiding  psychological  adjustment  for  those 
unable to express concerns to others (Zakowski et al, 2004).  
6.5.5. Potential from general PTSD literature 
Following the cognitive approach to the maintenance of intrusive memories in 
PTSD  (Ehlers  &  Steil,  1995;  Ehlers  &  Clark,  2000)  there  may  be  several  other 
predictions about factors important in the maintenance of PTSD which are relevant to 
cancer patients. In addition to negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions, Ehlers & Clark 
(2000) suggested that a sense of current threat was important for the development of 
PTSD. Current threat can be an external threat to safety or an internal threat to self and 
the future. A sense of current threat may result from negative appraisal of the trauma   186 
and its sequelae. Various types of appraisal are important, such as appraisal of trauma, 
self-appraisal (e.g. “I am someone that bad things happen to”) and appraisal of other 
people’s  reactions  (e.g.  “They  think  I  am  too  weak  to  cope  on  my  own”).  Future 
research with cancer patients could further utilise the cognitive model of PTSD in order 
to guide research questions and facilitate hypotheses testing. For example, is a sense of 
current threat associated with intrusive cognitions in cancer patients? What other types 
of  negative  appraisal  are  important  in  cancer  patients?  Are  other  types  of  negative 
appraisal  associated  with  intrusive  cognitions,  maladaptive  coping  or  psychological 
distress?  
The present study provides novel findings by assessing the content of several 
different types of intrusive cognitions reported by cancer patients. Future research could 
also ascertain the source of the unwanted memory in line with previous PTSD research 
(see Birrer et al, 2007) by providing a list of options (e.g. “loss of job”, “your own life 
threatening  illness”).  This  might  help  distinguish  between  traumatic  stressors  and 
critical life events (Birrer et al, 2007) whilst providing more detailed information about 
the source of intrusive  cognitions in cancer patients.  It would also be interesting to 
investigate potential triggers (e.g. places, people, feelings) of intrusive cognitions in 
cancer patients and compare these to PTSD and depressed samples (Birrer et al, 2007).  
One difference noted between intrusive memories reported by  depressed and 
PTSD  samples  is  that  the  latter  group  reported  significantly  more  out-of  body 
experiences associated with their intrusions (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Out-of body 
experiences were described as those where the patient saw themselves and the event 
from  an  external  perspective.  Brewin  (1998)  suggested  that  this  may  represent  a 
dissociative response to traumatic events in PTSD patients. This phenomenon could be 
investigated in cancer patients by asking patients whether their intrusive memories were 
‘observer’ or ‘field’ memories. Observer memories may be reported by an individual if 
they dissociate from the experience based on extreme fear or risk of imminent death 
(Brewin, 1998). It might be hypothesised that due to the ongoing and chronic nature of 
cancer, these observer memories would be less frequent in cancer patients than in PTSD 
samples.  
Another area of potential interest is hotspots of trauma memories which have 
been identified in PTSD samples, are associated with intense reliving and reflect the 
worst  moments  of  trauma  (Holmes,  Grey,  &  Young,  2005).  For  PTSD  patients 
“hotspots” were often associated with a severe negative view of the self and threat to   187 
physical integrity and were commonly associated with emotions of anger and sadness as 
well as emotions typical of PTSD; fear, helplessness and horror. It would be interesting 
to investigate whether hotspots occur in intrusive imagery reported by cancer patients. 
Although it has been suggested that adhering to a strict PTSD framework when 
understanding distress in cancer patients may be unwarranted, the field can still utilise 
theoretical models arising from PTSD research. There is a high degree of comorbidity 
between  depression,  PTSD  and  anxiety  in  terms  of  reports  of  distressing  intrusive 
cognitions and thus consulting this broad literature is necessary to drive future research 
questions in psycho-oncology.  
6.5.6. Summary  
Future  research  would  benefit  from  adopting  prospective  designs  in  order  to 
clarify the causal relationships between intrusive cognitions and distress reported by 
cancer  patients.  Experimental  designs  (e.g.  visuospatial  tasks)  and  assessments  (e.g. 
stroop, IAT, functional imaging) may provide alternative approaches for investigating 
how  intrusive  cognitions  are  developed  and  maintained.  Potential  areas  of  interest 
include assessing risk factors for developing intrusive cognitions, focussing on other 
factors such as social support and using the PTSD literature to drive research questions 
with  cancer  patients.  Further  intervention  research  assessing  the  effectiveness  of 
imagery rescripting and other intrusion-focused interventions for cancer patients would 
prove valuable.  
6.6.  Summary of contribution 
The three studies presented in this thesis add to psycho-oncology research in a 
number of ways. By moving away from a strict trauma framework, patients not meeting 
full criteria for PTSD, those reporting future-oriented as well as past-oriented intrusive 
cognitions  and  those  reporting  intrusive  cognitions  indirectly  related  to  the  cancer 
experience can be recognised. Interview methods may be most appropriate for assessing 
the complex phenomenology of intrusive cognitions and this has rarely been utilised in 
previous research (Kangas et al, 2002). 
 Based  on  detailed  exploration  of  intrusion  qualities  in  cancer  patients,  this 
research has allowed comparisons to be made between intrusive cognitions reported by 
cancer  patients,  non-clinical  and  clinical  populations.  For  the  first  time,  research 
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exist, but that they share similar qualities with clinical groups, such as being frequent, 
uncontrollable,  severely  distressing  and  associated  with  high  levels  of  intrusion  and 
avoidance.  Intrusive  memories  were  also  similar  to  those  reported  in  PTSD  and 
depressed samples (e.g. Birrer et al, 2007), as they were extremely vivid, associated 
with  feelings  of  ‘nowness,’  and  re-experiencing  of  emotional  sensations.  However, 
there were significant differences between the intrusions reported by cancer patients and 
those reported in clinical samples. If the PTSD framework is entirely appropriate for 
understanding  the  experience  of  cancer  as  a  traumatic  event,  the  identification  of 
identical types of intrusive memories would be expected. However, although there were 
similarities,  several  key  aspects  of  the  intrusions  reported  by  cancer  patients  were 
different.  For  example,  cancer  patients  were  more  likely  to  report  verbal  intrusions 
rather  than  visual  intrusions  and  when  visual  intrusions  were  reported  they  were 
associated with less overall impact and were not associated with physical sensations. 
Other key findings were the positive relationship between anxiety severity and intrusive 
cognitions  and  the  positive  relationship  between  intrusive  cognitions  and  aspects  of 
maladaptive  adjustment  including  anxious  preoccupation  and  helplessness-
hopelessness.  
 This  research  is  also  the  first  to  apply  information  processing  theories  of 
psychological disorders, including dual representation theory (Brewin et al, 1996) and 
the  cognitive  model  of  PTSD  (Ehlers  &  Clark,  1995;  Ehlers  &  Clark,  2000)  to 
understanding  intrusive  cognitions  in  cancer  patients.  Importantly,  psychological 
variables,  such  as  negative  appraisal  of  intrusive  cognitions  were  shown  to  add  to 
intrusion  specific  distress,  general  distress,  and  intrusion-specific  coping,  even  after 
controlling  for  intrusion  frequency.  This  research  drew  a  novel  distinction  between 
visual and verbal intrusions in cancer patients by showing that visual intrusions are 
associated with more subjective distress and uncontrollability.  
Finally,  this  investigation  is  the  first  to  include  an  intervention  component 
comprising  a  direct  imagery  technique  (Holmes  et  al,  2007)  focussed  on  negative 
intrusive imagery in cancer patients to alleviate psychological distress. Previous psycho-
oncology research has emphasised the benefit of tailor-made psychological therapies 
that take into account the specific needs of individuals (Zakowski et al, 2004). The case 
studies described in Study 3 demonstrated the utility of applying a retrieval competition 
account to psychological distress in cancer patients because simply pairing negative   189 
imagery with imagery that was positive and easily accessible was successful in reducing 
negative intrusion characteristics, anxiety and depression.  
Collectively, the present findings may inform clinical practice by highlighting 
the  role  of  intrusive  cognitions  in  anxiety  within  mixed  samples  of  cancer  patients, 
highlighting the variety and complexity of intrusive cognitions which are experienced 
and  allowing  new  therapeutic  techniques  to  be  incorporated  within  existing  clinical 
practice, such as therapies developed in clinical populations to directly target intrusive 
cognitions.  
6.7.  Publications  
Study 1 was presented at the British Health Psychology Conference in Nottingham 
and the International Psycho-Oncology Society (IPOS) Conference at Imperial College 
London: 
Burnet,  K.L., Brewin,  C.R., Watson, M. (2007).  Intrusive cognitions and anxiety in 
cancer patients. Psycho-Oncology 16 (9): S132-S133, p1-133 
 
From  the  screening  data  of  Study  1,  an  article  was  published  investigating 
whether  anxiety  varies  according  to  treatment  type  in  early  stage  prostate  cancer 
patients: 
Burnet, K.L., Brewin, C.R., Watson, M., Dearnaley, D., Parker, C. (2007). Does active 
surveillance for men with localized prostate cancer carry psychological morbidity? BJU 
International, 100 (3), 540–543. 
 
Study 1 was published in February 2008: 
Whitaker, K.L., Brewin, C.R., Watson, M. (2008). Intrusive cognitions and anxiety in 
cancer patients. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 64, 509-517  
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6.8.  HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
This questionnaire will help you to let us know how you are. Read each item and tick the response which 
comes closest to how you have felt in the last few days. Don’t take too long over your replies, your 
immediate reaction to each item will probably be more accurate than a long thought-out response. 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
 
I feel tense or ‘wound up’: 
 
3   Most of the time             
2    A lot of the time 
1   From time to time, occasionally 
0   Not at all 
 
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy: 
 
0   Definitely as much 
1   Not quite so much 
2   Only a little 
3   Hardly at all 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if  
something awful is about to happen: 
 
3   Very definitely and quite badly 
2   Yes, but not too badly 
1   A little, but it doesn’t worry me 
0   Not at all 
 
I can laugh and see the funny side of things: 
 
0   As much as I always could 
1   Not quite so much now 
2   Definitely not so much now 
3   Not at all 
 
Worrying thoughts go through my mind: 
 
3   A great deal of the time 
2   A lot of the time 
1   From time to time but not too often 
0   Only occasionally 
 
I feel cheerful: 
 
3   Not at all 
2   Not often 
1   Sometimes 
0   Most of the time 
 
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed: 
 
0   Definitely 
1   Usually 
2   Not often 
3   Not at all 
 
 
 
I feel as if I am slowed down: 
 
 Nearly all the time        3  
 Very often          2 
 Sometimes          1 
 Not at all          0 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling like  
‘butterflies’ in the stomach: 
 
 Not at all          0 
 Occasionally        1 
 Quite often          2 
 Very often          3 
I have lost interest in my appearance: 
 Definitely               3     
 I don’t take as much care as I should    2 
 I may not take quite as much care       1 
 I take just as much care as ever        0 
 
 
I feel restless as if I have to be on the move: 
 
 Very much indeed                3 
 Quite a lot                  2 
 Not very much                1  
 Not at all                  0 
 
I look forward with enjoyment to things: 
 
 As much as I ever did      0 
 Rather less than I used to      1 
 Definitely less than I used to     2 
 Hardly at all         3 
 
I get sudden feelings of panic: 
 Very often indeed                3 
 Quite often                  2  
 Not very often                           1 
 Not at all                             0 
 
I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV 
programme: 
 
 Often            0 
 Sometimes          1 
 Not often          2 
 Very seldom                   3            
      Total A:   D:   
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6.9.  IES (Horowitz et al, 1979) 
 
Below is a list of comments made by people after stressful experiences, such as the 
intrusive (thoughts/memories/ images) you describe. Please check each item, 
indicating how frequently these comments were true for you DURING THE PAST 
SEVEN DAYS. 
If they did not occur during that time, please mark the “not at all” column. . 
 
            FREQUENCY 
 
Comment 
 
Not at all 
 
Rarely 
 
Sometimes 
 
Often 
1. I thought about it when I didn’t 
mean to. 
       
2. I avoided letting myself get 
upset when I thought about it or 
was reminded of it. 
       
3. I tried to remove it from my 
memory. 
       
4. I had trouble falling asleep or 
staying asleep because of 
pictures or thoughts about it that 
came into my mind. 
       
5. I had waves of strong feelings 
about it. 
       
6. I had dreams about it.         
7. I stayed away from reminders 
of it. 
       
8. I felt as if it hadn’t happened 
or it wasn’t real. 
       
9. I tried not to talk about it.          
10. Pictures about it popped into 
my mind. 
       
11. Other things kept making me 
think about it. 
       
12. I was aware that I still had a 
lot of feelings about it, but I 
didn’t deal with them. 
       
13. I tried not to think about it.         
14. Any reminder brought back 
feelings about it. 
       
15. My feelings about it were 
kind of numb.  
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6.10. Interview Schedule- Intrusive cognitions (Patel et 
al, 2007) 
 
1. MEMORIES 
 
1.  In the last week have you had any particular memories from a particular episode 
or event in your past that keeps coming back into your mind? (If last week was 
exceptional then ask about a typical week). 
 
YES/NO 
(Prompts – When you were feeling the most depressed or memories of particular 
negative events) 
 
2.  What are the two most distressing memories? (If more than 2 then inform the patient 
that we will just be concentrating on the two most distressing memories).   
 
Memory 1 - 
When did this episode happen? How old were you at the time of this memory?   
 
 
 
 
Can you briefly describe the memory that you have? 
 
a)  Please rate the vividness of your memory for the experience: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Hazy                           Normal                       Very clear                            Most  clear &        
memory                          memory                      & vivid memory                          vivid memory        
            
b)  What are the emotions that you associate with this memory? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
       Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                            Very much so 
 
Sad:            Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                     
 
Angry:            Anxious:          Helpless: 
 
 
c)  When  you  have  this  memory,  does  it  feel  like  it  is  not just  a  past  event  but  is 
happening all over again right now? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
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d)  When you remember the event do you re-experience emotions the same as, or very 
similar to, those that were felt in the actual event? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
e)  When you remember the event do you re-experience physical feelings the same as, 
or very similar to, those that were felt in the actual event? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
f)  How many times did you experience the intrusive memory in the last week? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
None of                                                               Half the                                                       All of 
the time                                                           the time                                                     the time 
 
 
g)  When you experience the intrusive memory on average how long does it last? 
 
seconds/minutes/hours 
 
 
h)  How much did the intrusive memory interfere with your daily life? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
i)  How uncontrollable was your intrusive memory in the last week? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
j)  How distressing was your intrusive memory? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                  Very much so 
 
 
 
Memory 2: Repeat above questions 
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2. IMAGES 
 
1.  In  the  last week  have  you  had  any  other  mental  pictures  or  images  that  keep 
coming (spontaneously) to mind and usually involve the same kinds of things? (If 
last week was exceptional then ask about a typical week). 
 
YES/NO 
 
2.  What are the two most distressing images? (If more than 2 then inform the patient 
that we will just be concentrating on the two most distressing images).   
 
 
Image 1 - 
Can you briefly describe what you see in the image? 
 
a)  Please rate the vividness of your image: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
     Hazy                           Normal                       Very clear                                     Most clear & 
   memory                      memory                      & vivid memory                           vivid memory  
                  
b)  What are the emotions that you associate with this image? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
       Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                            Very much so 
 
Sad:            Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                            
 
Angry:            Anxious:          Helpless: 
 
 
c)  When you have this image, does it feel like it is not just a past event but is 
happening all over again right now? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
         Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                          Very much so 
 
 
d)  How many times did you experience the intrusive image in the last week? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
None of                                                               Half the                                                    All of 
the time                                                            the time                                                   the time 
 
 
 
e)  When you experience the intrusive image on average how long does it last? 
 
seconds/minutes/hours 
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f)  How much did the intrusive image interfere with your daily life? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
g)  How uncontrollable was your intrusive image in the last week? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                  Very much so 
 
 
h)  How distressing was your intrusive image? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
Image 2: Repeat above questions 
 
3. THOUGHTS 
 
Have you been aware in the past week of thoughts that keep coming spontaneously 
into your mind?  (If last week was exceptional then ask about a typical week). 
 
YES/NO 
 
What are the two most distressing thoughts? (If more than 2 then inform the patient that we 
will just be concentrating on the two most distressing voices).   
 
 
Thought 1: 
What kind of spontaneous intrusive thoughts do you have? 
 
a)  Are your thoughts always the same or do they vary? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Always                          Mostly                          Mostly the                                              Always 
different                       different                        same                                                      the same    
 
 
b)  What are the emotions that you associate with this thought? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
       Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                            Very much so 
 
 
 
Sad:            Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                     
 
Angry:            Anxious:          Helpless: 
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c)  How many times did you experience the intrusive thought in the last week? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
None of                                                   Half the                                                                 All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                              the time 
 
 
d)  When you experience the intrusive thought on average how long does it last? 
 
seconds/minutes/hours 
 
e)  How much did the intrusive thought interfere with your daily life? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
f)  How uncontrollable was your intrusive thought in the last week? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
g)  How distressing was your intrusive thought? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
 
Thought 2: Repeat above questions  
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6.11. Mini-MAC (Watson et al, 1994) 
A number of statements are given below which describe people's reactions to having 
cancer.  Please tick the box to the right of each statement, indicating how far it applies to 
you at present.  
 
  Definitely 
does not 
apply to me 
Does not 
apply to 
me 
Applies to 
me 
Definitely 
applies to 
me 
1. At the moment I take one 
day at a time     
       
2. I see my illness as a     
   challenge   
       
3. I've put myself in the    
    hands of God   
       
4. I feel like giving up         
5.  I feel very angry about 
what has happened to me          
       
6. I feel completely at a loss 
about what to do 
       
7. It is a devastating feeling         
8. I count my blessings         
9. I worry about the cancer 
returning or getting worse 
       
10. I try to fight the illness         
11. I distract myself when  
 thoughts about my illness 
come into my head 
       
12. I can’t handle it         
13. I am apprehensive         
14. I am not very hopeful  
        about the future 
       
15. I feel there is nothing I 
can do to help myself 
       
16. I think this is the end of 
 the world 
       
17. Not thinking about it 
helps me cope 
       
18. I am very optimistic         
19. I’ve had a good life what’s 
     left is a bonus 
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20. I feel that life is hopeless         
21. I can’t cope         
 
22. I am upset about having 
         cancer 
       
23. I am determined to beat 
this disease 
       
24. Since my cancer 
diagnosis I now realise how 
precious life is and I’m 
making the most of it  
       
25.I have difficulty in 
believing that this happened 
to me 
       
26. I make a positive effort 
not to think about my illness 
       
27. I deliberately push all 
thoughts of cancer out of my 
mind 
       
28.I suffer great anxiety 
about it 
       
29. I am a little frightened         
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6.12. PSS-I (Foa et al, 1993) 
1)  Briefly describe below the stressful event reported by the individual. 
 
 
2)  Did the event evoke fear, helplessness and horror? (circle magnitude) 
Fear:                  0  Little or none    1  Moderate    2  Intense 
Helplessness     0  Little or none    1  Moderate     2  Intense 
Horror                0  Little or none    1  Moderate     2  Intense 
 
How long before the interview did the event occur? 
    < one month 
    1-6 months 
    6-12 months 
    >12 months 
 
For each item listed below, ascertain the individual experienced the symptoms during 
the past two weeks. Probe all positive responses in order to determine severity of the 
symptom (e.g. in the past two weeks, how often have you had bad dreams or 
nightmares), then rate the severity on the scale presented below. Rating scale (ratings 
made over the past two weeks) 
 
0 = not at all 
1 = once per week or less/a little bit/once in a while 
2 = 2-4 times per week/somewhat/half the time 
3 = 5 or more times per week/very much/almost always 
 
Re-experiencing symptoms (need one) 
1.  Have you had recurrent intrusive distressing thoughts or recollections about the 
event?                
2.  Have you had recurrent bad dreams about the event?             
3.  Have you had the experience of suddenly reliving the event, flashbacks of in, 
acting or feeling as if it were re-occurring?               
4.  Have you been intensely emotionally upset when reminded of the event 
(includes anniversary reactions)?               
 
Avoidance symptoms (need three) 
5.  Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings 
associated with the event?               
6.  Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid activities, situations or 
places that remind you of the event?               
7.  Are there any important aspects of the event that you still cannot remember? 
              
8.  Have you markedly lost interest in free time activities since the event? 
              
9.  Have you felt detached or cut off from others around you since the event? 
                    
10. Have you felt that your ability to experience emotions is less?          
11. Have you felt that any future plans or hopes have changed because of the 
event?               
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Arousal symptoms (need two) 
 
12. Have you been having persistent difficulty falling or staying asleep?  
              
13. Have you been continuously irritable or having outbursts of anger? 
              
14. Have you been having persistent difficulty concentrating?           
15. Are you overly alert since the event?               
16. Have you been jumpier, more easily startled, since the event?        
17. Have you been having intense physical reactions (for example, break into a 
sweat, hear beating fast) when reminded of the event?               
 
 
Indicate below if the problems you rated in Part 1 have interfered with any of the 
following areas of the person’s life DURING THE PAST MONTH. Mark Y for Yes and N 
for No. Remember that interference must be due to problems above and not due to 
general problems associated with having cancer.  
1.  Work                Y  N  
2.  Household chores and duties         Y  N 
3.  Relationships with friends          Y  N 
4.  Fun and leisure activities           Y  N 
5.  School work              Y  N 
6.  Relationships with your family        Y  N 
7.  Sex life              Y  N 
8.  General satisfaction with life          Y  N 
9.  Overall level of functioning in all areas of your life      Y  N 
 
6.13. RIQ (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) and coping 
1. A number of statements are given below which describe possible reactions to the 
intrusions you have reported.  Please tick the box to the right of each statement, 
indicating how far you agree with each of the statements.  
 
  Totally                                                                   Totally                                        
agree                                                                    disagree 
   1            2             3            4           5            6              7 
1.Something is wrong with me   
 
             
2. Some day I will go out of my 
mind 
             
3. I am inadequate 
 
             
4. I cannot cope 
 
             
5. I have a psychological 
problem 
 
             
6. I will not achieve goals that 
are important to me 
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2. We would also like to know how you cope with the intrusions you have reported.  
Please indicate, by marking on the following scale how much you have participated in 
the following techniques for coping and how effective these coping strategies are. 
 
a) I try to distract myself 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not used at all                    Used  
                              very much 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                                    Very 
effective                                               effective 
   
b) I try to push the intrusions out of my mind 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not used at all                    Used  
                              very much 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                                    Very 
effective                                               effective 
 
c) I dwell on it 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not used at all                    Used  
                              very much 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all                                    Very 
effective                                               effective 
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6.14. RPQ (Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002) 
We want to know your opinions about what it was like for you to be in this study.  What 
it was like for you to be interviewed about the types of intrusive thoughts/ memories/ 
images you experience.  Your answers will help us understand how people feel about 
being in studies like this one.  We REALLY want to hear your opinions, even if there 
were things you did not like. 
For each item below, please circle the number under the answer that is true for you.  
There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree  Maybe 
(in the 
middle) 
Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
1. Being in this study was 
boring. 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
2. I am glad that I was in this 
study. 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
3. It was my choice if I was in 
the study (I could have said 
no even if other people 
wanted me to say yes). 
1  2  3  4  5 
4. Being in this study made 
me feel upset or sad. 
1  2  3  4  5 
5. The things I said will stay 
private (no one else will know 
I said them). 
1  2  3  4  5 
6. I am sorry I was in this 
study. 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7. Being in this study made 
me feel good about myself. 
1  2  3  4  5 
8. I was told the truth about 
the study before it started. 
1  2  3  4  5 
9. I feel good about helping 
other people by being in this 
study. 
1  2  3  4  5 
10. I knew I could skip 
questions or parts of the study 
if I wanted to. 
1  2  3  4  5 
11. I knew I could stop at any 
time. 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
12. I knew I could ask to take 
a break whenever I wanted. 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS FOR THE RESEARCHERS? 
(Please write here or on the back of this sheet). 
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6.15. Anxiety and Depression subsections of the SCID 
(First et al, 2002). 
 
 
 
Now I would like to ask you some specific questions about problems you may have had. 
We’ll go into more detail about them later. 
 
 
1 = not present, 2 = unsure or equivocal 3 = present 
 
1.  In the last month, has there ever been a period of time when you were feeling 
depressed or down most of the day nearly every day?  
       1    2     3 
 
2.  In the last six months have you been particularly nervous or anxious?             
       1    2     3 
 
If answer is 2/3 for any of above, continue with relevant questions corresponding 
to 1. 2. or 3. below.  
 
(NOTE: ?= inadequate information, 1 =absent or false 2 =sub threshold, 3 = threshold 
or true) 
 
 
3. Are your concerns related/unrelated to your cancer diagnosis?  
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1. Current major depressive disorder      MDE Criteria 
 
In the last month…. 
Has there been a period of time when 
you were feeling depressed or down 
most of the day nearly every day? 
(What was that like?) 
 
If YES: How long did it last? (As long 
as 2 weeks?) 
 
What about losing interest or pleasure 
in things you usually enjoyed?  
If YES: Was it nearly every day? How 
long did it last (As long as 2 weeks?) 
 
For the following questions, focus on 
the worst two weeks in the past month 
(or else the past 2 weeks if equally 
depressed for one month) 
 
During this (2 week period) 
..how was your appetite? (What about 
compared to your usual appetite? Did 
you have to force yourself to eat? Eat 
less/more than usual? Did you lose/gain 
weight? How much? Were you trying to 
lose/gain weight?) 
 
…..how were you sleeping? (Trouble 
falling or staying asleep, waking 
frequently, waking too early OR 
sleeping too much? How many hours a 
night compared to usual? Was that 
nearly every night?) 
 
….were you so fidgety or restless that 
you were unable to sit still? (was it so 
bad other people noticed? What did they 
notice? Was that nearly every day?) 
If NO 
What about the opposite? Talking or 
moving more slowly than is normal for 
you? (was it so bad other people 
noticed? What did they notice? Was that 
nearly every day?) 
 
 
 
 
A. Five or more of the following 
symptoms have been present during the 
same two week period and represent a 
change from previous  
 
 
(1) depressed mood every day, as 
indicated by subjective report (e.g. 
feels sad or empty) or observation 
made by others (e.g. appears 
tearful). 
(2) Markedly diminished interest or 
pleasure at all, or almost all, 
activities most of the day, nearly 
every day (as indicated by 
subjective account or observation by 
others). 
(3) Significant weight loss when not 
dieting, or weight gain (change of 
more than 5% of body weight or 
decrease/increase in appetite nearly 
every day). 
(4) Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly 
every day 
(5) Psychomotor agitation or retardation 
nearly every day (observed by 
others, not merely subjective 
feelings of restlessness or being 
slowed down).  
(NOTE: CONSIDER BEHAVIOUR 
DURING INTERVIEW) 
 
 
(6) Fatigue or loss of energy nearly 
every day?  
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During this time… 
How did you feel about yourself? 
(worthless? Nearly every day?) 
 
Did you have trouble thinking or 
concentrating? (What kind of things did 
it interfere with?) (Nearly every day?) 
 
IF NO: Was it hard to make decisions 
about everyday things? (Nearly every 
day?) 
 
…were things so bad that you were 
thinking a lot about death or that you 
would be better off dead? What about 
thinking of hurting yourself? 
 
IF YES: Did you do anything to hurt 
yourself?  
 
 
 
If unclear- has (depressive episode) 
made it difficult to work, take care of 
things at home, or get along with other 
people? 
 
Just before this began, were you 
physically ill?  
If YES: what did the doctor say?  
Just before this began, were you using 
any medications?  
If YES: any change in the amount you 
were using? 
 
Just before this began, were you 
drinking or using street drugs?  
  
 
Did this occur soon after someone close 
to you died? 
 
How many times have you been 
depressed nearly every day for at least 
two weeks and had several of the 
symptoms you described?  
 
 
 
 
(7) Feeling worthlessness or excessive 
or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day (not 
merely self-reproach or guilt about 
being sick) 
 
NOTE CODE 1 or 2 if only self-esteem 
 
(8) diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, or indecisiveness, 
nearly every day (subjective or 
observed) 
(9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just 
fear of dying), recurrent suicidal 
ideation without a specific plan or a 
suicide attempt or a specific plan for 
committing suicide 
NOTE: Code 1 for self mutilation W/O 
suicidal intent. 
 
AT LEAST 5 OF ABOVE ARE 
CODED 3 AND AT LEAST ONE OF 
THESE ITEMS IS (1) OR (2)   
 
(No Criterion B in SCID). 
 
C. The symptoms cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational or other important 
areas of functioning 
 
D. The symptoms are not due to the 
direct physiological effects of a 
substance (drug abuse, medication) or 
to a general medical condition (e.g. 
Parkinson’s, stroke, metabolic 
conditions, endocrine conditions, viral 
infections, certain cancers) 
 
E. Not better accounted for by 
bereavement (after loss of loved one) 
Total no of MD Episodes: (code 99 if 
can’t count) but should be above 5 
otherwise minor depressive disorder. 
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2. Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
You’ve said that in the last 6 months 
you have been particularly nervous or 
anxious…. 
OR in the last 6 months have you been 
particularly nervous or anxious….? 
 
Do you also worry a lot about bad 
things that might happen? 
 
IF YES, What do you worry about? 
How much do you worry about 
(events/activities?) 
During the past 6 months, would you 
say you have been worrying more days 
than not?  
When you are worrying in this way, do 
you find it hard to stop yourself? 
 
When did this anxiety start?  
 
Now I am going to ask you some 
questions about symptoms that often go 
along with being nervous. 
Thinking about those periods in the past 
six months when you’re feeling nervous 
or anxious…. 
..do you often feel physically restless-
can’t sit still? 
…do you often feel keyed up or on 
edge?  
..do you often tire easily? 
..do you have trouble concentrating or 
does your mind go blank?  
..are you often irritable? 
..are your muscles often tense? 
..do you often have trouble falling or 
staying asleep?  
 
 
If unclear- what effect has the anxiety, 
worry or physical symptoms had on 
your life? Has it made it hard for you to 
do your work or be with your friends?  
 
 
 
 
 
A.  Excessive anxiety and worry 
(apprehensive expectation), 
occurring more days than not for at 
least six months, about a number of 
events or activities (such as work or 
school performance) 
B.  The person finds it difficult to 
control worry. 
 
(Does not occur exclusively during the 
course of a mood disorder, psychotic 
disorder or a pervasive developmental 
disorder.) 
 
C.  The anxiety and worry are 
associated with three or more of the 
following six symptoms present for 
more days than not for the past six 
months.   
 
(1) restlessness or feeling keyed up 
or on edge 
(2) being easily fatigued 
(3) difficulty concentrating or mind 
going blank 
(4) irritability 
(5) muscle tension 
(6) sleep disturbance (difficulty 
falling or staying asleep, or 
restless unsatisfying sleep).  
(At least 3 “C” are coded 3) 
 
D.  The focus of the anxiety and worry 
is not confined to the features of 
another axis 1 disorder e.g about 
having a panic attack, social phobia, 
OCD, separation disorder, anorexia, 
somatization disorder, 
hypochondriasis and the anxiety and 
worry do not occur exclusively 
during PTSD.  
E.  The anxiety, worry or physical 
symptoms cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning.  
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Just before you began having this 
anxiety, were you taking any drugs, 
caffeine, diet pills or other medicine? 
 
(How much caffeine, tea or caffeinated 
soda do you drink a day?) 
 
Just before these problems began were 
you physically ill?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.  Not due to the direct physiological 
effects of a substance or general 
medical condition 
 
General medical conditions include 
Hyper and hypo-thyroidism, 
hypoglycaemia, hyper parathyriodism, 
pheochrmomcytoma, congestive heart 
failure, arryythmias, pulmonary 
embolism, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, pneumonia, 
hyperventilation, B-12 deficiency, 
porphyria, CNS neoplasms, vestibular 
dysfunction, encephalitis 
 
Etiological substances include cocaine, 
amphetamines, cannabis, hallucinogens, 
PCO, or alcohol or withdrawal from 
CNS depressants. 
 
GAD criteria A, B, C, D, E and F are 
coded 3.  
 
Indicate current severity: 
Mild 1. few, if any symptoms 
Moderate 2- symptoms of functional 
impairment 
Severe 3-any symptoms in excess of 
those required.  
 
Age at onset?  
Code 99 if unknown
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ADJUSTMENT DISORDERS 
 
Do you think that your cancer diagnosis has anything to do with getting your 
symptoms? 
 
What effect have your symptoms had on you and your ability to do things? How 
upset were you? Has it made it hard for you to do your work or be with friends? 
 
Have you had this reaction many times before? 
 
Were you having them even before the stressor happened? 
 
How long has it been since the stressor/ complications arising from the stressor 
were over? 
 
Criteria for AD: 
A.  The development of emotional or behavioural symptoms in response to 
an identifiable stressor occurring within 3 months of the onset of the 
stressor 
B.  These symptoms/behaviours are clinically significant as evidenced by 
i.  marked distress in excess of what would be expected from 
exposure to the stressor 
ii.  significant impairment in social or occupational functioning 
C.  The stress-related disturbance does not meet criteria for another 
specific Axis 1 disorder and is not merely an exacerbation of a pre-
existing Axis I or Axis II disorder. 
D.  The symptoms do not represent bereavement 
E.  Once the stressor has terminated, the symptoms do not persist for more 
than an additional 6 months.  
 
Make diagnosis of adjustment disorder based on predominant symptoms: 
 
Adjustment disorder with depressed mood 
Adjustment disorder with anxiety  
Adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood 
Unspecified adjustment disorder 
 
 
 